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The influence of the government on private sector businesses is now more pervasive than 
ever.  The operations of firms, to a large extent, depend on how well the firms are 
tackling social, political and environmental issues.  This situation forces the private sector 
to carefully examine not only the market environment, but also the non-market 
environment.  Non-market players can be quite instrumental in the public policy decision-
making process, which may also influence the company and relevant industry practices.  
This thesis examines the non-market environment and the non-market strategies of firms 
in Indonesia – an emergent economy. 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the institutional changes in emerging 
economies and their impact on the firms’ choice of non-market strategies using the case 
of Indonesia.  Specifically, the objectives of the study are: to empirically identify the 
political and social antecedents in the non-market environment in Indonesia; to explore 
and examine the characteristics and nature of the non-market environment in Indonesia; 
to investigate how institutional changes in an emerging economy influence a firm’s 
choice of non-market strategies; to analyse the relationship between non-market strategies 
and the performance of the firms, and to discuss the policy implications of non-market 
strategies. In this thesis, the South Sulawesi region of Indonesia was selected as the 
research area as it illustrates the dynamic changes that define an emerging market.    
 
A qualitative research approach using grounded theory and case study principles was 
applied to provide a framework and to advance the description of the cases.  In total, the 
study used data interviews from 27 participants as the primary means of collecting data.  
Twenty-three of the participants are owners or directors of small firms.  In addition, there 
were two government officials, a journalist and a non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
member.   
 
The main finding of the study is that the institutional environment in Indonesia, as with 
many other emerging economies, is characterised by an unstable environment with 
ongoing institutional changes.  Firms engage in non-market strategies to help deal with 
the uncertainty and instability surrounding their non-market environment.  These 
strategies also assist firms in managing the institutional and societal environments.  Non-
market strategies such as building political connections, political donations and social 
strategies clearly serve the primary objectives of the firms.  Implementing non-market 
strategies also influenced the performance of firms as reflected in the firms’ getting more 
government contracts, increasing number of workers, and receiving various assistance 
and supporting activities from government officials to mitigate the regulatory burden.  




firms should not have to resort to some of these strategies especially bribery, or any other 
strategy that involve corrupt exchange with government officials.  Many of these non-
market strategies would not have been necessary if supporting market institutions are well 
established and a supportive regulatory environment is put in place.  Corrupt exchange 
will do more harm than good to the development of small firms in Indonesia.  Moreover, 
unstable regulatory environments such as the situation in Indonesia will make firms 
earmark more resources to strengthen their non-market strategies rather than building 
their core company competencies.  Hence, it is critical for the government to address the 
non-market environment through various measures including developing clear guidelines 
and improving transparency.  Maintaining a corruptive and collusive non-market 
environment will become difficult if business-government interaction is made more 
transparent. 
 
These findings imply opportunities for policy-makers and practitioners, as well as future 
researchers in the field of strategic management.  This study suggests that the relations 
between government and firms should be more transparent.  Several actions that may be 
taken in the short-term include creating clearer policies and measures that may lead to 
reducing the red tape bureaucracy.  To have clear regulations and improve the current 
legal framework, the local government should include other stakeholders, especially 
small firms in setting up a business-friendly environment.  Given the strong influence of 
the government on the business environment in emerging markets, policy-makers should 
also prioritise efforts to improve small firms’ knowledge and expertise in dealing with 
market forces. 
 
The significance of this research resides in two primary areas.  First, this thesis 
contributes through an interpretive perspective to strategic management theory and 
practice, particularly for firms in emerging economies.  This study contributes to 
knowledge on micro-level analysis of business-government interactions.  Previous studies 
mostly focused on macro-level analysis such as country and industry analyses.  In this 
study, we contribute to the extant literature on the non-market environment in emerging 
economies and non-market activities of small firms.  Moreover, by studying the political 
embeddedness of the firms and their political behaviour, the knowledge in the field of 
non-market strategy can be further extended.  Therefore, this study enriches our 
understanding on the importance of relational strategies as part of non-market strategies, 
particularly in economic transitional and weak institutional environment. 
 
Second, given the lack of information regarding the political behaviour of small firms, 
this study fills in the gap in terms of how small firms behave towards regulation, which 
will allow policy-makers to design more effective policies for small firms.  In addition, it 
will increase the knowledge of policy-makers on the impact of public policy on small 
firms’ operations; which will be particularly useful, since small firms are increasing in 
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The influence of the government on private sector businesses is now more 
pervasive than ever (Barron, 2011).  The operations of firms, to a large extent, 
depend on how well the firms are tackling social, political and environmental issues 
(Bach & Allen, 2010; Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005).  This situation forces the 
private sector to compete not only in their own market environment, but also in non-
market environments (Aggarwal, 2001).  Market and non-market strategies have 
become the instruments for firms to compete in an increasingly competitive 
environment.  Market strategies are aimed at shaping the interactions between firms 
and their competitors or consumers, as well as creating value for economic 
performance (Baron, 1995a).  Non-market strategies on the other hand, are aimed at 
influencing the institutional players in public policy arenas and tailoring non-market 
environments (Baron, 2010).  In recent years, institutional players are not only 
limited to public institutions such as government and legislatures, but also include 
private interests such as the media and non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
activists (Baron & Diermeier, 2007b).  These institutional players can be quite 
instrumental in the public policy decision–making process.  Furthermore, they also 
influence company and industry practices.   
While it is commonly recognised that non-market strategies differ in various 
institutional conditions (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012), studies in non-market 
competition were mostly done in stable Western economies (Li, He, Lan, & Yiu, 
2012; Yuanqiong, Zhilong, & Yun, 2007; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 
2005; Peng, 2003), with large companies being the object of most studies (Bengtson, 
Pahlberg, & Pourmand, 2009; Gao, 2006; Peng, 2003).  Scholars pointed out that 
non-market actions should be distinguished in different environments (Shaffer & 




addition, such economies may comprise of different stages of the economic, social 
and political models (Burns, 2012), which are characterised by weak and immature 
institutions (Peng, 2003).  Emerging economies are defined as “low-income, rapid 
growth countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth” 
(Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000, p. 249).   
In emerging markets with ongoing institutional changes (Yuanqiong et al., 
2007; Peng, 2003), private sectors are engaged in non-market strategies to deal with 
the uncertainty and instability surrounding the non-market environment, as well as to 
help the firms manage the institutional and societal environments (Faccio, 2006; 
Aggarwal, 2001; Fisman, 2001).  Non-market strategies such as building political 
connections or obtaining political donations, play a strong role in influencing the 
financial and non-financial performance of the firms (Zhou, 2013; Deng, Tian, Li, & 
Abrar, 2012; Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001).  Thus, examining non-market strategies 
of firms in emerging economies is important.   
In addition, the constantly changing environment, aggravated by globalisation 
and technology developments, provide an even greater challenge to small firms.  A 
firm’s size, which represents its resources (Cook & Fox, 2000), plays an important 
role in the choice of the degree of interaction between the particular firm and its 
political actors (Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004).  
Thereafter, it will also influence the attitude of how the firm tailors its non-market 
actions.  Unlike their larger counterparts, small firms are more vulnerable to the 
changing policy and political environment in general (Peng & Luo, 2000), thus 
forcing them to rely on intermediaries or act collectively when dealing with the 
political environment (Bennett & Ramsden, 2007; Wilts & Meyer, 2005; Cook & 
Barry, 1995).   
1.2. The Research Problem 
The importance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs—hereafter small 
firms) to the growth of economies has been acknowledged by many scholars in 
various areas of studies.  Small firms have widely been acknowledged as an 




(Mourougane, 2012; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Obloj, 2008; Hill, 2001).  In particular, 
small firms provide employment opportunities for many people and are well-known 
for their adaptability.  Adaptation is achieved because small firms service local 
markets and do not rely heavily on the support of formal financial institutions (Berry, 
Rodriguez, & Sandee, 2001). 
The fact that small firms represent a large segment of the economy in many 
countries and are affected by the government, does not mean that the studies carried 
out on the political behaviour of this sector are sufficient.  In fact, the growing body 
of research of small firms has overlooked their response behaviour to non-market 
environments, as well as their relationships with non-market actors.   
There are several reasons for the above situation.  Firstly, there is a lack of 
information about small firms in many countries, particularly in emerging economies 
with a limited number of scholars to cover the issue.  Another reason is the difficulty 
in obtaining data and information, particularly their non-market strategies, from the 
owners of small firms.  There is also an unclear separation between private and 
business information, which may reduce the clarity of the data and information.  
Also, small firms lack visibility as compared to larger firms.  As a result, very few 
studies exploring the political activities and behaviour of small firms in political 
environments, let alone in emerging economies such as Indonesia, can be found.  
Hence, there is a call for studies to examine the use of non-market strategies in 
diverse contexts of emerging markets (Wright et al., 2005). 
This thesis will cover mainly non-market environments faced by small firms 
in Indonesia and how these small firms deal with such environments.  Indonesia is a 
classic case where non-market environments play an integral role in the operations of 
small businesses.  In Indonesia, the development of small firms is constrained by a 
number of factors.  These include the informality of operations (Zhou, 2013; 
Mourougane, 2012; Hill, 2001), the ineffective and insufficient support by the 
government (Berry et al., 2001; Hill, 2001), the lack of foreign market knowledge 
and experience (Bhasin & Venkataramany, 2010; Sari, Alam, & Beaumont, 2008), 
the lack of innovation and productivity (Mourougane, 2012) and the uncertainty of 




In this thesis, the South Sulawesi province of Indonesia was selected as the 
research area, as it illustrates the dynamic changes that define an emerging market.  
The region provides an ideal setting to study the non-market environment faced by 
small firms.  Also, the economic development process in South Sulawesi represents 
the positive progress of the economic development in Indonesia.  As the capital city 
of the South Sulawesi province, Makassar has one of the highest economic growth 
rates (7.64%) in the country during the 2009-2014 period.  This high growth rate was 
also followed by an increasing amount of government budget on purchasing goods 
and service from firms, which to some extent, required a high intensity of business-
government interactions.  Apart from its positive economic achievement, Makassar 
remains one of the several cities that shows slow progress in the business climate 
reformation (World Bank, 2012).  Another reason for choosing Makassar is that 
anecdotal information indicated that the business climate in the city and the province 
in general, is commonly characterised by a high intensity of government and private 
sector collusion.  Many public areas in Losari and Karebosi, two of the most 
prestigious and historic public spaces in Makassar, were turned into private or 
business premises, which were driven predominantly by certain investors.  
Furthermore, access to reliable respondents from diverse backgrounds also supported 
the choice of this province.   
The constitutional and political reforms in Indonesia since 1998 have 
dramatically changed the relationship between businesses and the government, 
making Indonesia an interesting case for the investigation on how firms, in particular 
small firms, adapt to institutional changes and deal with uncertainties.   
The key research questions that this thesis sought to answer are: (1) what are 
the characteristics of the non-market environment in emerging markets?  (2) How 
does the non-market environment lead to a firm’s choice of non-market strategies?  
(3) How do non-market strategies impact the performance of firms? 
1.3. Conceptual Framework 
Building on Hillman et al. (2004) and Lux et al. (2011) frameworks, the 




1.1. The non-market strategy of a firm is influenced by the business environment and 
activities of the government (non-market environment).  Non-market strategy can be 
divided into two general strategies, namely corporate political strategy and corporate 
social strategy.  In terms of corporate political strategy, there are several factors that 
act as triggers of the strategy, namely institutional factors, political embeddedness, 
industry characteristics and social embeddedness.  When implementing a particular 
strategy, the firm can choose to use either the proactive or reactive approach 
(Hillman et al., 2004).   
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework 
A proactive approach is one where the founder or owner of the business turns 
into a politician (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009), or where there is the 
support of a particular politician through the election campaign and lobbying of 
certain laws (Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013).  On the other hand, a reactive 
approach could be achieved in the form of uniting all firms in the same industry 
through a formal organization, so as to influence public policies.  A firm may also 
decide to implement this approach individually or through the co-operation of other 
firms in the same industry.  The firms may then employ many tactics in 
implementing the strategy, such as political donations to political parties or 




Apart from adopting the corporate political strategy, firms may also 
implement corporate social strategies such as corporate social responsibility and 
philanthropic activities.  The antecedents or factors that influence the strategy are 
almost the same as that of the political strategy.  Factors include institutional changes 
(through regulations), being industry driven and the increasing pressure surrounding 
the industry, as well as the culture in which the firms operate.  A study by Rehbein 
and Schuler (2015) shows that a firm with a good history of contributing to social 
activities will gain easy access to the politicians and will often be listened to.  
Therefore, there is a link between corporate political strategy and corporate social 
strategy, in the sense that one can affect the other and both strategies are part of a 
firm’s competitive advantage (Porter & Kramer, 2006).   
Non-market strategies implemented by firms are driven by several motives 
(Oliver & Holzinger, 2008).  In particular, there are three such motives.  First, it may 
be part of the private interest from the owner(s) and founders (top management 
included), which generally drives the strategic orientation of the firm, particularly 
when it comes to social strategy and philanthropy (Sanusi, 2008).  Second, the size of 
the firm also plays an important role in the implementation of non-market strategy.  
Large-sized firms give more attention to the non-market environment and implement 
more social activities.  In Indonesia, when transitional changes occur, firms are 
expected to adapt to the strategy that meets the changes.  However, little is known 
about the circumstances under which such strategic transitions are undertaken.  More 
importantly, given the diversity of informal institutions (such as national culture) and 
formal institutions (such as legal frameworks) across countries, how firms, 
embedded in different institutional contexts, make different choices remains to be 
explored.  This research endeavours to start filling in this void. 
1.4. Objectives of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to investigate institutional changes in 
emerging economies and their impact on a firm’s choice of non-market strategies.  
The aim is to identify the non-market strategies of small firms and evaluate their 
impact on the firms’ performance.  To achieve this aim, the following objectives 




1. Empirically identify the political and social antecedents in non-market 
environments in Indonesia;  
2. Explore and examine the characteristics and nature of the non-market 
environment in Indonesia;  
3. Investigate how institutional changes in an emerging economy influence a 
firm’s choice of non-market strategies;  
4. Analyse the relationship between non-market strategies and the 
performance of firms. 
5. Discuss the policy implications of non-market strategies 
Given the lack of information regarding the political behaviour of small 
firms, this study will fill the gap in terms of how small firms behave towards 
regulations, which will allow policy-makers to design more effective policies for 
small firms.  It will also increase the knowledge about the impact of public policy on 
the operations of small firms, which will be particularly useful for policy-makers, 
since small firms are increasing in number amongst the industries.   
This study will also generate information that can be used to assist small 
firms in improving the economy in general.  Moreover, this study can help small 
firms identify which political strategies they could use for particular problems.  
Acquiring this knowledge will help firms avoid unnecessary expansion of their 
resources, as the range of non-market actions that are available to firms will be 
identified.  The firm may also enact appropriate non-market strategies if they 
understand the consequences that emerge, based on a careful examination of the 
social and political contexts and a good understanding of the institutional 
environment.  Thus, the findings of this study will be beneficial for small firms. 
1.5. Approach of the Study 
Research in the strategic management field is becoming more challenging 
with the rapid change of the technology and information system, along with other 
complex phenomena that surround strategic management (Arora et al., 2016; Brown 
& Eisenhardt, 1995).  In addition, the recent advance of the resource based view 




field should not be framed within “a fixed paradigm” (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 
1999, p. 444).  As a response to this challenge and given the nature of the research 
problem, this study employs qualitative methods.   
There has been an explosion of qualitative research in the field of 
management studies, but it is still under-represented in the area of non-market 
research.  A qualitative approach is used in this study to collect the data, so as to 
understand human experiences and discover the essential meaning of the problem 
under investigation.  The output of qualitative research “may be of more relevance 
and interest to management practitioners than those of traditional methods” (Cassell, 
Buehring, Symon, & Johnson, 2006, p. 163).  In addition, we consider the respective 
managers’ perceptions (obtained from interviews) as relevant to answering our 
research questions.  In this context, we adopted an interpretivist approach which 
focuses on human interpretation and meaning (Yin, 2009) to reach the objectives of 
the study.  This process encompasses interviewing, as well as analysing and writing 
of the case study — all of which are interconnected and not distinct phases in the 
process.   
This research was guided by grounded theory as the overarching 
methodology to study data from the exploratory case study and to acquire data within 
and outside the case study.  The grounded theory method has become one of the 
more important methods in qualitative study, since the seminal work of Glaser and 
Strauss (1967).  The case study approach was used alongside the grounded 
principles, since the method can help the researcher to build a theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Case studies also help the researcher when there is little control over the 
events and when the focus is on contemporary phenomena in a real-life context (Yin, 
2009).  Moreover, case studies are a preferred method of research in the evolving 
business context and the unfolding business and social processes  (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007).   
There are two kinds of informants for the interviews, namely internal and 
external informants (Piekkari, Welch, & Paavilainen, 2009).  Internal informants are 
those who are directly related to the case, either the owner or directors of the firm, 




such as the government officials.  Diverse informants are expected to offer diverse 
perspectives (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), which may help the researcher validate 
the information received from the informants.   
Also, we interviewed only one respondent from each firm.  We argue that 
interviewing only one respondent for each firm was acceptable because the research 
involved small businesses wherein each firm has only one or a few key individuals 
who are involved in the strategic decision-making.  Moreover, our respondents 
explained that usually, only the owner or the director makes strategic decisions, 
particularly when it comes to business-government decisions, such as building 
political connections and contributing to political donations.   
1.6. Significance of the Study 
Institutional changes highlighted the non-economic conditions for business 
operations in emerging markets  (Scott, 2008a; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  In both 
developed and emerging markets, the economic activities are regulated by the 
institutions in which the production, exchange and distribution are set by the rule and 
regulation.  Therefore, following rules, norms and belief system is important for 
firms in order to adapt with the institutional environment.  In addition, the firms also 
need to mobilize their social, economic and political resources, in order to adapt and 
change within institutional environments.  Although scholars claim that the 
institutional theory has reached its adulthood (Scott, 2008a), there are gaps in the 
literature on the role of institutional changes in business operations within emerging 
economies.  There is a strong need for a further coverage of open-ended questions 
relating to the applications of institutional changes for business strategies (Yang & 
Su, 2014; Grewal & Dharwadkar, 2002). 
The study has addressed the following gaps in the extant literature.  Firstly, 
existing research focus mainly on developed countries and relatively stable 
institutional environments such as the United States and European countries 
(Yuanqiong et al., 2007; Gao, 2006; Peng, 2003).  However, adopting non-market 
strategies is also a common practice in emerging economies such as China (Tian & 




non-market strategies in the context of emerging economies (Aggarwal, 2001).  
Moreover, extant studies consider non-market strategies as a whole, which obscures 
the differences among various non-market activities, especially when it comes to 
small firms.  Studies on how small firms interact with the government and non-
market environment were rather few and often even overlooked (Bengtson et al., 
2009; Cook & Barry, 1995).  This study is expected to increase the understanding of 
non-market strategy (through identifying different types of non-market strategies 
implemented by firms, particularly small firms in Indonesia, an emerging economy), 
and  acknowledge the institutional factors that surround the issues (Marquis & 
Raynard, 2015).   
The study is also expected to offer insights on the importance of the role of 
the government in emerging economies (through exploring the intertwined 
relationships between business and power).  Moreover, it extends the knowledge in 
the field of non-market strategy by studying the political embeddedness of the firms 
(Welch & Wilkinson, 2004), as well as the political behaviour of the firms (Salorio, 
Boddewyn, & Dahan, 2005).  The study will also have managerial significance in the 
form of recommendations on key strategies which firms can implement to improve 
their performance within conditions of institutional changes. 
The substantial lack of studies on the political behaviour of small firms, 
particularly in emerging economies, is not the only justification for this study.  It is 
important to develop studies and test theories on small firms to assess whether the 
common assumptions of studies on large firms can be applied to small firms or if 
they should be treated distinctly (Gilman & Edwards, 2008).  It is also important to 
note that apart from exploring the development of political relationships of firms, this 
study will also allow us to understand the broader political environment and how it 
impacts the operations of firms (Keillor, Boller, & Ferrell, 1997).   
1.7. Structure of the Thesis 
The subsequent chapter will discuss an extensive review of relevant literature 
in the non-market stream related to strategic management studies (Chapter 2), then 




on the business environment in Indonesia will be covered (Chapter 3).  Chapter 4 
outlines the research methods and provides a brief discussion on grounded theory.  
Chapters 5 and 6 presents the findings from the field research and discuss how the 
findings of the study compare with current literature on non-market strategies.  The 
conclusions are included in Chapter 7.  At the end of the thesis, some final thoughts 
and points for possible managerial implications of the study, along with the 
recommendations for future research are also provided.  Finally, the questions that 
were asked during the interviews and the documents used in this study are provided 







THE NON-MARKET CONCEPT:   
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the literature on the concepts of non-market 
environment and non-market strategy, as they apply to firms.  Section 2.2 focuses on 
non-market strategies and what makes them different with market strategies.  This 
then leads to the discussion of what constitutes non-market activities and the 
differences between market and non-market strategies.  Section 2.3 discusses the 
institutional environment and non-market opportunities.  Various types of applied 
management research that characterise non-market activities are reviewed in Section 
2.4.  This is discussed alongside the importance of integrating market and non-
market activities.   
In Sections 2.5, the characteristics of the non-market environment in 
emerging economies and the theories often used in the non-market strategy literature 
are looked into respectively.  In the next section (Section 2.6), the theoretical 
framework that shapes the discussion on the non-market literature is also reviewed.  
Section 2.7 outline the gaps that this study is expected to contribute in the literature 
of non-market and strategic management in general.  This chapter finally concludes 
with a summary of the contribution that the literature reviewed has to offer to this 
research.    
2.2. What Does “Non-Market” Mean? 
A firm operates in an environment where market elements such as products 
and services, the organisation of supply chain and distribution channels affect the 
competitiveness of the firm.  Other elements such as technology, the number of 




boosting a firm’s competitiveness.  However, apart from market elements, a firm’s 
performance also depends on the external elements of the markets or what is 
identified as non-market forces (Baron, 1995b) such as social, political and legal 
elements.  The external elements of market and non-market environments of a firm 
create opportunities for the firm to improve its performance and at the same time, 
shape the firm’s position to be competitive (Hillman & Keim, 1995).    
According to Henisz and Zelner (2003), non-market strategy, as a strategic 
management stream, should be given more attention in multi-disciplinary analysis, so 
as to develop more literature in this area.  Non-market factors should not be seen as 
merely exogenous to economic competition (Boddewyn, 2003; Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994); instead, they should be integrated into the strategic decision-making process 
to create value by improving the economic performance of a firm (Baron, 1995a).   
Since the expression of “non-market” is increasingly used in the management 
and organisation strategy field (Yuanqiong et al., 2007), defining “non-market” is 
important (Boddewyn, 2003).  In this study, the author used the perspective of Baron 
(1997, p. 146) regarding non-market environment as that which is “characterised by 
the social, political and legal arrangements that structure the firm’s interactions 
outside of, but in conjunction with, markets and private arrangements”. A non-
market strategy, therefore, as defined also by Baron (1995a, p. 47) is “a concerted 
pattern of actions taken in the non-market environment to create value by improving 
its overall performance”. 
2.3. Institutional Environment and Non-Market Opportunities 
A firm may be regarded as being embedded in a broader social and political 
context.  This influences the firm’s behaviour in accordance with formal and 
informal institutions, as well as social norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  
Institutions can also be related to three pillars, namely regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive (Scott, 2008a).  According to Scott (2005), the regulative pillar 
emphasises the importance of formal rules and their monitoring, as well as the 
enforcement mechanism governed by the state.  The normative pillar, on the other 




pillar refers to the beliefs and values derived from various interactions with other 
social actors.  Organisational legitimacy refers to the quality of the relationship 
between an organisation and its environment or social values (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  The influence of the environmental context of the firm on organisational 
legitimacy has been widely used and “institutionalised”, as well as adapted to 
particular organisational strategies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  The cultural-
cognitive pillar emphasises “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of 
social reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott, 2008b, p. 54).    
The three pillars above also shape institutions that put pressure on the firms 
which, in turn, influences the behaviour of the firms.  This broad view of the 
institutional environment surrounding a business actor is more specifically defined 
throughout this thesis as using the definition of ”institutions” by North (1990a, p. 3) 
as follows: “The rules and laws of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions.” Baron (1995b) broadly 
conceptualised the institutions as the non-market aspects of social, political and legal 
institutions.  In this study, the term “non-market actors” refers to the general public, 
civil society organisations and political organisations, while “institutions” are 
referred to as formal and informal rules of exchange.  Therefore, following Davis, 
North, and Smorodin (1971), the institutional environment can be outlined as the set 
of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for 
production, exchange and distribution.    
“Institutional environment” is a broad term that covers multiple dimensions.  
In this study, the dimension considered is the unique characteristic of the institutional 
environment in emerging economies such as Indonesia and how it shapes the actions 
of firms.  Emerging economies are defined as “low-income, rapid growth countries 
that use economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth” (Hoskisson et al., 
2000, p. 249).  Emerging economies are also characterised as nations that are 
changing from formal planning to open and free market economies.   
Many emerging economies are characterised by an institutional environment 
with inadequate market-supporting institutions (Zhou & Peng, 2012) and even weak 




corruption and bribery (de Jong, Tu, & van Ees, 2012) are prevalent in emerging 
economies such as Indonesia, where the institutional environment is characterised by 
unclear business-government interaction and low levels of law enforcement (Wu, 
2005; Schwarz, 1997; Irwan, 1989).  Peng (2001) and Aggarwal (2001) also 
emphasised that institutional factors play an important role in many emerging 
markets, particularly in the internationalisation aspects of a firm’s operations.    
Business actors will pursue non-market actions in situations when the 
institutions are ineffective and not well-enforced (North, 1990a).  This thus leads to 
the presence of informal institutions.  A non-market action is also the main choice 
when market-supporting institutions are poorly developed.  Market-supporting 
institutions are expected to perform three functions that encourage market activities 
by market actors.  Peng and Zhou (2005) argue that market-supporting institutions 
will encourage competition among market actors, reduce information problems in 
market competition and enhance the effectiveness of legal frameworks.  On the other 
hand, the poor quality of the three dimensions expected from the market-supporting 
institutions may lead to non-market actions by firms, since all three dimensions 
reinforce one another.  Therefore, the author argues that informal institutions may 
also exist as a result of the absence of formal institutions or as a form of modification 
of formal institutions.    
The degree to which informal institutions exist may also determine the level 
of uncertainty in the institutional environment.  The uncertainties surrounding the 
business environment, combined with poorly-enforced institutions, provide non-
market opportunities to business actors (Baron, 1995b).  Non-market opportunities 
are sometimes even perceived to be more interactive in certain institutional settings 
(Dieleman & Sachs, 2008).  In other words, when the firm, as a market actor, 
perceives greater returns from non-market activities as compared to market activities, 
then non-market opportunities are likely to exist.    
Firms react to the market environment by undertaking activities such as 
marketing, price reductions and research and development (Porter, 1980).   However, 
the business environment is not just related to market issues, but also to the non-




should be considered when addressing market forces, as well as when searching for 
market alternatives (Baron, 1995a).   
Previous studies suggest that firms have two choices of strategies in dealing 
with the non-market environment.  Firstly, a firm may choose to engage in a market-
based strategy featuring “arm’s length transactions” (Zhou & Peng, 2010; North, 
1990b).  Secondly, given the uncertainty surrounding market institutions, as well as 
the characteristics of most emerging economies, a firm may also choose to 
implement relational exchange strategies (Peng, 2003; Peng & Heath, 1996).   
Relational exchange offers an opportunity for a firm to reduce transaction costs 
through informal mechanisms with less formal agreement among the actors.  In 
addition, relational transactions also allow firms to gain access to information with 
flexible coordination through social relationships.  Ideally, the choice of strategy 
moves gradually from the latter to the first, along with the development of market-
supporting institutions.  However, a challenge for the literature in this stream is the 
diversity of informal institutions and legal frameworks among the nations with 
emerging economies.    
The institutional environment in emerging economies is mostly characterised 
by the implementation of policies from the government to encourage the marketplace 
to become more competitive and to allow integration with the global economy 
(Aulakh & Kotabe, 2008; Zhu, Hitt, & Tihanyi, 2007).  In the implementation of 
these policies, firms also have to deal with the changing political landscape, 
including changing the political regime that sometimes poses as a challenge to the 
firms.  Uncertainty and instability due to the sudden change in political power, for 
example, becomes critical to the firm’s performance and long-term survival.  This is 
because the government, as a political actor, typically has a high degree of control 
over market access, along with the resources that are needed by the firm (Peng & 
Luo, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996).   
In such situations, firms need to manage their dependence on institutional 
actors (Peng & Luo, 2000).  The dependence on particular institutional actors and 
government officials, for example, means a much larger concentration of power in 




having a political connection (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Canella, 2008; Fisman, 
2001).  Such a network-based strategy is considered a valuable resource for a firm in 
dealing with such challenging conditions. 
The proponents of the resource-based view (RBV) assume that institutional 
environment plays an important role in influencing the performance of a firm 
(Rehbein & Schuler, 2015).  Firms need to effectively manage dependencies on the 
institutional environment and therefore, emphasise political connection as one of the 
main managerial resources (Li & Zhang, 2007; Barney, 1991).  This is particularly 
important in emerging economies.  Managerial resources associated with top 
managers can be in the form of knowledge, experiences, skills and good external ties 
with other stakeholders of the firm.  Several empirical studies in emerging economies 
showed that political connections have a positive influence on a firm’s performance, 
through securing operation licenses, financing and support for research and 
technology for the firm (Li & Zhang, 2007; Zhou, 2007; Peng & Zhou, 2005).    
Political connections can be characterised in two general ways.  First, a firm 
is perceived as politically connected, if at least one of the top executive members is 
an active/ former politician or closely related to a top politician/ political party 
(Lester et al., 2008; Faccio, 2006).  Such a connection is common in more 
transparent countries, as a result of greater access to information.  However, it is also 
popular in countries that are highly corrupt and have a centrally-controlled economy 
such as China and Indonesia.   
Another characteristic of political connection is the form of relationships with 
government officials or political actors at various levels (Peng & Luo, 2000), even 
though they are not directly involved in the day-to-day operations of a firm.   Firms 
that rely on government sales usually employ political connection as their non-
market strategy (Lux et al., 2011; Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman et al., 2004).  
Reliance on government sales is also a reliable predictor of the political activity of 
firms.  Therefore, such firms are more likely to engage in political activities and 
develop political connections (Lawton & Rajwani, 2011; Lux et al., 2011; Hillman & 




that political connection is not universal, but instead, is embedded in the institutional 
context (Li et al., 2012; Scott, 2008a). 
On the other hand, relational-based strategies could be risky, particularly in 
institutional environments that are inconsistent and rapidly changing, due to political 
instability (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).  Moreover, even though non-market 
strategies are often more successful than market strategies in volatile non-market 
environments, firms also have to consider non-market competition in pursuing non-
market activities (Bonardi & Keim, 2005).  Non-market competition may involve 
both market and non-market actors.  While market actors compete in obtaining 
resources or benefits from public policy outcomes, non-market actors compete in 
supplying policies and expect economic resources in return.    
For decades, the firms’ approaches to the environmentcan be described via 
the industrial organisation perspective (Porter, 1980) and RBV (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984).  Porter (1980) proposed that the external environment of a firm is 
evaluated along five critical forces: the power of buyers, the power of suppliers, 
threat of new entrants, threat of substitutes and the intensity of rivalry in the industry.  
All five critical forces emphasise industry-level competition.  Hence, a firm can then 
evaluate the attractiveness of the industry and determine the appropriate strategy.   
In contrast, the RBV (Barney, 1991) expects firms to examine their 
capabilities, which can be utilised to produce a sustained competitive advantage.  
This process can help the firm select strategies that maximise their strengths and 
minimise their weaknesses.    
Despite the differences, both the industrial organisation concept of 
competition and the RBV strategies are selected by a firm through internal and 
environmental analysis.  This analysis leads a firm to adopt generic strategies such as 
cost leadership, differentiation and focus.  However, this traditional and competitive 
strategic tool only emphasises the market environment of the firm (De Figueiredo, 
2009; Baron, 1995a).  Baron (1995a) identifies the market environment as 
intermediated by markets or private agreements, which indicates a missing focus on 




stakeholders, from the government and media to civil society organisations.  It also 
shows that both approaches do not focus on the dynamics of the non-market 
environment faced by firms.    
The institutional environment offers opportunities for both market and non-
market actions to be taken by the firm (Hillman & Keim, 1995).  Most developed and 
mature markets focus on investments in market activities (marketing, research and 
development) which provide better returns, while investments in non-market 
activities (lobbying) provide better returns in less developed and immature markets 
(de Jong et al., 2012; Lux et al., 2011).  Non-market opportunities are available to 
business actors through two different outcomes.  Firstly, it allows business actors to 
persuade non-market actors to shape the firm’s market environment (Lawton & 
Rajwani, 2011; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Baron, 1995a) through protecting firms from 
competition and changing the technology which will benefit the firm’s market 
activities.  Secondly, market actors can influence non-market actors by offering 
policies that change the competition which will benefit specific market actors (Lux, 
Crook, & Leap, 2012).  In some situations, market activities can also shape non-
market actors to create or modify existing institutions, to meet with the new forms of 
economic activity such as e-commerce. 
To achieve the above outcomes, non-market strategies are perceived as more 
effective actions than market actions, because implementing non-market actions is 
often less expensive (Lux et al., 2011).  The decision to invest in non-market 
strategies is often perceived to offer a sustainable competitive advantage (Keim, 
2001; North, 1990b) and makes the firm invest less in market activities.   Non-
market opportunities, therefore, provide investment alternatives for the firm and in 
particular, social and political contexts, as they are more sustainable and less risky, 
as compared to market opportunities.  In most underdeveloped institutions for 
example, corruption is typically present because of the high level of uncertainty 
faced by the firms.  In most developed institutions, non-market opportunities also 
exist, but they appear in a different form such as lobbying and being actively 
involved in political activities.  Given the role of institutions in determining the level 
of uncertainty in market environments, non-market strategies have become 




In the past, a firm’s performance relied on the market environment.  
However, Bach and Allen (2010) argued that in the current situation, there are three 
reasons why firms need to put more attention on the non-market environment.   
Firstly, as institutions that have a big impact on society, firms are faced with 
increasing demands from society.  Secondly, influencing politics is a capability that 
is vitally important, since many firms are affected by regulations issued by the 
government.  Finally, the dynamic environment shapes different political situations 
within many places.    
In addition, the non-market environment becomes important since the geo-
political condition has changed (Doh, McGuire, & Ozaki, 2014).  Globally, the 
arrangements of nations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the 
proliferation of regional treaties such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
(ASEAN) have greatly influenced the firms’ strategies (Aggarwal, 2001).    
2.4. Non-Market Strategies 
The growing interest in the study of the non-market phenomena is 
accompanied by the debate over the use of “non-market” as a concept (see Table 
2.1).  Boddewyn (2003) provides a clear description of various definitions of the 
concept, “non-market”.  Previous studies on market and non-market concepts mostly 
treated the two areas as distinct, where non-market simply categorised everything 
that is not included in the market area (Shaffer, 2000; Baron, 1995a, 1995b).  The 
non-market environment is defined as consisting “of the social, political, and legal 
arrangements that structure the firm’s interaction outside of, and in conjunction with, 
the markets” (Baron, 1995a, p. 48).  This definition supports the industrial 
organisation framework of Porter (1980), in which the external environment is 
scanned and evaluated alongside five forces, from which appropriate strategies can 
be exploited to maximise opportunities and minimise threats.  Other studies critically 
assess non-market institutions that distinguishes them from market ones (Boddewyn, 
2003).  Doh et al. (2012) for example, argue that the non-market environment differs 
from the market environment, where the firm only acts as a market actor in various 




Table 2.1: Market and Non-market Strategies and Their Integration 
 Market strategy Non-market strategy 
Definition A market strategy is a concerted 
pattern of actions taken in the 
market environment to create 
value by improving economic 
performance (Baron, 1995a). 
A non-market strategy is a 
concerted pattern of actions 
taken in the non-market 
environment to create value by 
improving its overall 
performance (Baron, 1995b). 
A firm’s non-market strategy is 
typically considered the firm’s 
efforts to manage the 
institutional or societal context 
of economic competition 
(Boddewyn, 2003). 
Environment Interactions between the firm 
and other parties that are 
intermediated by markets or 
private agreements (Baron, 
1995a). 
Consists of social, political and 
legal arrangements that 
structure the firm’s interactions 
outside markets (Baron, 
1995b).    
Purpose Addressing and defending 
against market forces and 
realising market alternatives 
(Aggarwal, 2001) 
To shape the firm’s market 




Consists of external environment 
analysis, internal competence 
evaluation, strategic plan-
making and selecting, action 
plan-making and exacting, as 
well as feedback (Baron, 1997). 
Consists of issue-perceiving 
and prioritisation, issue-




Consists of market and non-market components that are integrated 
and tailored to the firm’s market and non-market environments 
and firm’s competencies (Baron, 1995a).   The integration aims to 
generate synergies and superior overall performance for the firm 
(Baron, 1997). 
Source: Adapted from (Boddewyn, 2003; Aggarwal, 2001; Baron, 1997, 1995a, 
1995b). 
The definition which merely identifies non-market as the opposite of market, 
however, poses several problems.  The term, “non-market”, may serve as an 
umbrella expression for the external condition which may be different from one 
study to another and therefore, it may not help to develop an overarching definition.   
In addition, defining non-market in this way often neglects the complexity of the 
issues surrounding the non-market environments of a firm and is therefore only used 




After critically evaluating four perspectives on the meaning of non-market based on 
the historical and conceptual context of the term, Boddewyn (2003, p. 320) offers an 
overarching definition of non-market which refers to: 
“(a) Values expressing the purposive pursuit of public interests; (b) 
internal and external interchange mechanism of coercion and 
cooperation that complement and balance competition in a 
reciprocal manner at various levels of interaction; (c) relationships 
among market and non-market organisations resting principally on 
their actors’ sovereignty rights; and (d) the conflictual integration in 
the light of their failures of society’s economic, political, social, and 
cultural organisations.”   
Contrasting with previous non-market studies, such dichotomous 
categorisation is, however, challenged by Devinney (2013) who argued that 
presenting non-market as the opposite of market is operationally useful, but it does 
not enrich our theoretical perspective, particularly in the management area.  In 
addition, what was labelled as “non-market” is actually a “market” that exists in a 
different form.  The categorisation of the strategies (market vs non-market) can lead 
a firm to believe that markets are homogenous and come in one form.  Unlike 
Porter’s generic strategies, non-market cannot be used easily to describe the 
condition when, for example, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) promotes the 
boycott of a product.    
Boddewyn (2003) argues that there are at least three reasons why scholars 
define non-market differently.  Firstly, some scholars such as Baron (2010) follow 
the positive tradition that a firm is influenced by external factors (non-market) which 
will affect the performance of the firm.  This industry analysis perspective is parallel 
with the positive political economy (PPE) approach, which examines how the formal 
political structure (government) affects firms.  Therefore, a firm needs to act in order 
to deal with the non-market elements.  The actions of a firm, as indications of 
interactions with non-market actors, might be in the form of lobbying or campaign 




Secondly, non-market factors are seen as endogenous rather than exogenous 
to the firm.  This argument indicates that non-market factors cannot be included in 
‘market calculation’, since the former is “non-tradeable” (Baron, 1995a; Boddewyn 
& Brewer, 1994).  This is the perspective of neoclassical and institutional 
economists, a group of scholars who believe that markets are independent. 
Thirdly, the different perspectives on the non-market environment result 
when scholars embed non-market components with social factors such as norms, 
rules and customs.  Embedding the non-market environment with those factors 
means that a firm absorbs norms, rules and customs into the firm’s function and use 
them to improve the firm’s competitiveness.    
The problem with such a simple categorisation is that it may send a 
misleading idea to a manager to treat market and non-market as separate 
environments.  Therefore, Baron (1995a) argues that the non-market environment 
should be seen as endogenous rather than exogenous, in the strategy formulation of 
the firm.  Both market and non-market competitions require instruments, which are 
the corresponding market and non-market strategies, respectively.  These strategies 
must be integrated to help a firm achieve superior equilibrium performance (Baron, 
1999).    
In this study, the terms “non-market strategy” and “non-market action” are 
used interchangeably to capture the behaviour of firms in dealing with their social, 
political and legal parties, as opposed to the interactions of firms in traditional 
market settings (e.g., with respect to buyers, suppliers and competitors).  Apart from 
actions taken in the non-market environment, non-market strategy also consists of 
actions taken in market arenas to influence certain aspects.  As Ozer (2010) argues, 
implementing non-market strategy such as corporate political strategy is not just an 
alternative for the firm, but is also complementary to market strategy, where firms 
may influence decisions such as product pricing or local component sourcing levels.  
Firms may also employ non-market actions such as corporate political strategy to 
gain public policy that can help create a favourable environment for the firm in 




Why do firms engage in non-market actions?  Despite the abundance of 
literature regarding non-market activities of firms, we found that the strategy 
literature provides inconsistent explanations as to why firms become politically 
engaged and how firms go about their political and public activities (Getz, 2002).  
The reason may be because defining the term “non-market” usually leads to 
confusion (as discussed earlier), as non-market and market strategies form a 
dichotomy, without any clarification on the details of each strategy (Boddewyn, 
2003). 
In addition, some scholars believe that there is not enough literature to 
explain how managers deal with non-market environments and stakeholders 
simultaneously (Mahon, Heugens, & Lamertz, 2004).  This is due to the 
methodological difficulties of operationalising the interrelationships between non-
market environments and stakeholders surrounding the non-market environments, so 
that they can be measured.  Previous studies and research on non-market actions, 
particularly political action, also provide mixed results, which may be confusing and 
indicate inconsistencies (Mathur & Singh, 2011). 
2.4.1. Corporate Political Activity 
Scholars in the non-market strategy stream identify political strategy as 
central to a firm’s overall business strategy in many industries (Barron, 2010), as it 
affects a firm’s behaviour and performance (Keim & Hillman, 2008; Hillman et al., 
2004; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Getz, 1997).  Political strategy is a non-market action to 
expand a firm’s strategy in order to influence government policy (Lux et al., 2011).  
Governmental policies have substantial power on the business environment.  
Moreover, they influence the processes and the outcomes of business activities.  
Governments also make firms highly dependent on legal and regulatory policy.  To 
moderate such dependency and to influence a government’s regulatory policy, firms 
participate in political actions.  Such actions are commonly referred to as CPA, 
which is defined as “corporate attempts to shape government policy in ways 




A more comprehensive definition is offered by some scholars who refer to 
corporate political strategy as “the strategy that enterprises employ to influence the 
formulation and implementation process of government policy and regulation, in 
order to create a favourable external environment for their business activities” (Deng, 
Tian, & Abrar, 2010, p. 372).  CPA may also be conducted in different forms, such 
as the participation of interest groups (firms included) in the government process.  In 
essence, all scholars agree that the strategic purpose of political activity and the 
importance of the political arena (Dahan, 2009) are the basis for the success of a 
firm.   
There are four pillars that shape corporate political activity (CPA), namely 
strategic goals, strategic options, resources and capabilities, as well as institutions 
(Lawton, McGuire, et al., 2013).  Previous studies also indicated that there are four 
types of antecedents of non-market behaviour of the firm, namely, the characteristics 
of the firm, as well as industry-level, issue-based and institutional factors (Hillman et 
al., 2004).  Size is the prominent determinant of CPA which also provides an 
indicator of the resources that can be utilised in implementing CPA (Lux et al., 2011; 
Hillman et al., 2004). 
 Various political tactics are employed by firms in pursuing CPA.  Scholars 
have identified general political tactics commonly used by a firm, even though such 
political tactics are mostly relevant to developed nations and refer mostly to the 
political environment in the U.S.  Political strategies and tactics used by firms in 
CPA can be grouped into three broad categories.  First, financial strategies, which 
meant that firms provide financial support and incentives to politicians and get 
access to the political process in return (Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  Financial 
contribution strategies are mostly derived from the U.S context, where firms 
contribute through Political Action Committees (PACs).  Apart from special 
channels such as PACs, firms may also contribute through donations to unspecified 
candidates or political ideologies (Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002), as well as 
through bribery (de Jong, Tu, & van Ees, 2015; Lawton, McGuire, et al., 2013).    
The political environment influences the strategies that are implemented by 




regulations are often subject to constant change, making it difficult for firms to 
predict the long-term business environment.  Given this uncertain and complex 
situation, it is not surprising that many firms choose bribery as a quick way to tackle 
the situation or to gain market access (Keillor et al., 1997).  A study by Transparency 
International even shows that bribery between companies across different sectors is 
just as common as bribery between firms and public officials (Transparency 
International, 2011).  However, the issue of bribery becomes a concern for many 
scholars since it can be ethically problematic (Lawton, Rajwani, & Doh, 2013).  In 
addition, bribery is an often used but rarely investigated strategy due to its dubious 
nature (de Jong et al., 2012).    
The second strategy is relational strategies, which has been extensively 
reviewed by scholars in the CPA stream.  Firms may build relationships with policy-
makers and develop political connections (Chung & Ding, 2010; Faccio, 2006) 
through appointing a politician or a former politician to be a member of the corporate 
board (Gray, Harymawan, & Nowland, 2014; Dahan, Hadani, & Schuler, 2013; 
Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009; Faccio, 2006; Hillman, 2005; Fisman, 2001).  
Another form of building political connections is the business owner being involved 
actively in politics as a politician (Imai, 2006; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  Apart from 
actively being involved in politics, the business owner may also seek and build 
informal relations with key stakeholders such as religious leaders or youth 
organisation activists (Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006).    
The last strategy is through informational strategies, where firms provide 
specific information to the government agencies about their preferred policies 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  Other forms of informational strategies are lobbying, 
petitions and comments which unlike the first two strategies, are not specifically 
driven by a firm’s objectives.    
Scholars using the CPA framework mostly engage in positivist and normative 
analysis (e.g.,  Lux et al. (2011)), which may overlook the issue of societal demands 
and the absence of ethical analysis in CPA discussions (Dahan et al., 2013; Mantere, 
Pajunen, & Lamberg, 2009; Oberman, 2004).  In addition, studies in CPA and non-




deal with the many questions in the non-market environment (Henisz & Zelner, 
2012),  such as how much a firm should invest in political capital and how firms 
manage the capital to reach its objectives.  Other scholars also indicate the lack of an 
international perspective, which prevents us from generating multi-variate 
knowledge, given the complexity of these phenomena (Skippari, Eloranta, Lamberg, 
& Parviainen, 2005).  Therefore, cross-cultural management, which emphasises the 
importance of cultural understanding as a prominent factor in influencing the choice 
of strategic action of a firm, has emerged (Barron, 2010). 
Albeit a less formal approach to the role of structural factors (Henisz & 
Zelner, 2012), it is worth noting that the CPA implemented by firms are not 
predominantly a management process.  Instead, it occurs under the aegis of a broader 
public relations function (Doh et al., 2012).  It is also important to note that since 
CPA represents a non-market strategy that is intended to influence political actors or 
governments, the expected impact on the firm is typically indirect (Hadani, 2007).  
As such, there must be a link between political tactics and public affairs capacity by 
firms, in order to tackle non-market environment factors, which are more demanding 
compared to the last decades.    
Apart from firm-level outcomes, the CPA traditions which developed mostly 
from the U.S context were also illustrated by some scholars (e.g., Getz (1997), 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) and Hillman et al. (2004)).  Hillman and Hitt (1999) for 
example, claimed that firms which rely on government sales are more likely develop 
a long-term relationship with government officials.  Establishing long-term 
relationships with officials is a way to achieve favourable policy-making and 
improved power and legitimacy of the firm (Getz, 2002, 1997).  Such favourable 
policy and legitimacy are mostly derived from the possible consequences of 
legislative outcomes.  However, Keim (2001) advised on the importance for firms to 
understand the complicated nature of the legislative policy-making process.    
To date, the CPA literature has focused mostly on firm-level analysis, such as 
the size of the firm, rather than external forces such as industry and interest groups of 
the firm (Hadani, 2007).  Moreover, current studies focus mostly on the “resources” 




processes and provide policy-based advantages to the firm.  However, such firm-
level engagement is not enough, given that the business-government landscape, 
including institutional structures, has changed dramatically (Lawton, McGuire, et al., 
2013).  Barron (2010), following Child (2000), also found that most research on CPA 
overlooks the influence of national culture on the political behaviour of firms.  This 
situation is shadowing the intent to replicate CPA research based on the western 
context to outside regions, which may neglect different institutional arrangements.    
2.1.1.1. Approaches to Corporate Political Activity 
There are two general approaches to CPA and each approach illustrates the 
firms’ tendency towards implementing their political strategies (Hillman & Hitt, 
1999).  The first approach is the transactional approach.  Most firms who adopt this 
approach are waiting for the issue to become salient, prior to embarking on a 
strategy.  The focus of this approach is primarily the achievement of specific 
objectives and the issue-based orientation strategy (Getz, 1997) and tends to be more 
reactive.   
Relational approach, on the other hand, is an attempt “to build relationships 
across issues and overtime” (Hillman & Hitt, 1999, p. 828).  The focus of the latter is 
mostly on the long-term objectives and being proactive with nature.  By adopting the 
relational approach, firms will build political capital (Shaffer, 2000), which can be 
used to reduce environmental uncertainty (Getz, 2002, 1997) and therefore, their 
economic goals would be better met (Hillman & Hitt, 1999).    
2.1.1.2. Types of Political Activities 
Another way to categorise various political activities by the firm is whether 
the actions are taken individually or collectively (Olson & Olson, 2009; Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999).  Typical examples of collective action can be seen from industry 
association activities, unions or industry groups.  Surprisingly, little attention has 
been given to the conditions in which a firm prefers to do collective rather than 
individual action.  However, scholars agree that the basic premise on which a firm 




Schuler, 2008; Hillman et al., 2004; Schuler, 2001).  In addition, various factors such 
as industry concentration (Hansen, Mitchell, & Drope, 2005; Schuler et al., 2002; 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999), import protection (Hansen, Mitchell, & Drope, 2004) and 
government contract protection (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Schuler et al., 2002; 
Rehbein & Schuler, 1999) also influence the firms’ preferred level of participation.  
Olson (1965) asserts that the choice of working collectively in the political arena 
may help a firm reach its objectives, since all firms involved share common interests.  
However, collective action also invokes a key challenge, namely the free-rider 
dilemma. 
2.4.2. Public Affairs 
Corporate public affairs (also called, and sometimes synonymous with 
external affairs, corporate affairs, external relations, public relations and government 
relations) is essentially a tool that helps firms deal with ideas, issues and stakeholders 
surrounding the firm.  It is driven by the increasingly complex business-government 
interaction, as well as the changing expectations from other stakeholders.  The 
changing business environment, as well as the political and social environment, 
forces firms to engage differently and strategically.  Therefore, public affairs is an 
externally-oriented function of the firm to build and maintain good relationships with 
the government and other non-market actors, such as local citizens, opinion makers, 
as well as advocates of business interests (Moss, McGrath, Tonge, & Harris, 2012; 
Griffin, Fleisher, Brenner, & Boddewyn, 2001).   
Practically, resource allocation, especially commitment from the top 
management in the firm, plays an important role in the success of public affairs 
(Griffin & Dunn, 2004).  The other factors include political preferences (Schuler, 
2001), long-term impacts on the firm (Richards, 2003) and firm performance 
(Hillman, 2001).    
Some scholars argue that public affairs should be called CPA, which is better 
conceptualised and more empirically driven (e.g. Lawton, McGuire, et al., 2013; 
Griffin, 2005).  In addition, the function of public affairs encompasses tactics such as 




corporate political activities (Moss et al., 2012).  Moreover, it is also a subordinate 
element of political strategy (Windsor, 2002).  Schuler (2001) argued that the field of 
public affairs is closely related to the internal process, with the assumption that the 
external condition works effectively.  However, CPA literature focuses mostly on 
structural factors that determine how firms react to political and alternative public 
policies that may follow.  Yet, there is no agreed theory of public affairs and external 
relations.  As a result, it is difficult to draw a clear line between the broad research 
focus of business political strategy, where some scholars show interest in 
government relations, while others try to formalise public affairs (Getz, 2002; 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  Griffin et al. (2001) provides a comprehensive chronological 
literature review of the public affairs field and found that the field is an 
interdisciplinary subject that influences both professional and academic perspectives.    
Furthermore, research in the public affairs stream still faces both macro and 
micro level issues.  Richards (2003) argues that simply quantifying the role of public 
affairs to a firm’s performance is insufficient.  Schuler (2001) also argues that the 
existing theoretical model in many public affairs studies is incomplete.  Due to the 
circumstances, many of the studies were forced to make assumptions about the 
proper constructs.  Therefore, the research work on the public affairs area should go 
beyond merely describing what public affair is and embrace more complex models 
and measurements instead.  The researchers in this field need to properly capture 
what “managing relationship” means for the managers and clearly measure the 
influence of public policy on the performance of the firm.  The performance of the 
firm, therefore, should be ruled as a basic point for public affairs to become an area 
of inquiry.    
On the macro level analysis, this field lacks an international perspective due 
to its ethnocentric perspective.  Most studies were based on the western context and 
lack coherence among studies in the same area that observe business-government 
interactions (Moss et al., 2012; Meznar, 2001).  Despite the lack of agreement on the 
definition of public affairs and disorganisation surrounding research in the field 
(Getz, 2002), scholars agree that public affairs as a sub-area of inquiry in the non-




and issue management (Hillman, 2001).  Therefore, public affairs play an important 
role in sounding corporate voices (Moss et al., 2012).    
2.4.3. Network Perspective 
Research on business-government interaction also attracted many scholars 
from the business network perspective such as the Industrial Marketing and 
Purchasing (IMP) group, an inter-organisational networks research group.  While 
other studies in corporate political science focus on the behaviour of an individual 
firm, the network perspective gives more attention to the relationship level.  This 
research stream studies the relationship as an implementation of the network theory.  
The relationship here is similar to the concept of embeddedness, which refers to 
firms’ “relations with and dependence on the various types of network” (Halinen & 
Törnroos, 1998, p. 189) and the history of the relationships between the participants 
(Ford & Mouzas, 2010).  This stream takes a relational study, not as an independent 
phenomenon (without influence from other relationships).  Therefore, the role of 
managers in business interactions becomes greater than before.  A business 
relationship is built based on the involvement of actors, resources and the activities 
performed by actors using available resources (Håkansson & Ford, 2002).  The 
actors that aim to control the actions and perform various activities with resources 
and knowledge may be individual or collective.  Hence, the three factors intertwine 
and interdependently connect to create a network.    
Several studies highlighted the importance of firms to take advantage of their 
position in the network (Hadjikhani, Lee, & Ghauri, 2008; Welch & Wilkinson, 
2004; Hadjikhani, 2000).  This research stream takes a network view of the 
interaction between business, social and political actors.  Given the traditional IMP 
views on inter-firm relationships (Bengtson, Ljung, & Hadjikhani, 2013; Bengtson et 
al., 2009), additional attention to the external parties of the firms will broaden our 
understanding of a firm’s network, as well as the political and social networks in 
which the firm is embedded (Welch & Wilkinson, 2004).   Nevertheless, to some 
extent, scholars such as Håkansson and Snehota (2006) emphasised the importance 
of adopting the concept of “context” rather than the environment of the firm.  They 




entities that relate to the firm.  Furthermore, all firms, regardless of the size, may be 
embedded in multi-level institutional environments, from the local to national levels.  
As such, this influences the decisions made by the firms, in dealing with the external 
environment.  Therefore, a firm should treat every relationship differently because 
each relationship has unique contents and a different effect on the network structure 
(Ford & Mouzas, 2010). 
Embeddedness is a central concept in network studies.  Moreover, the issue of 
how business networks are embedded in the non-market or political network 
becomes very important in this research stream.  Halinen and Törnroos (1998) 
suggested that in the business networks perspective, there are six different types of 
embeddedness: these are temporal, spatial, technological, market, political and social 
embeddedness.  Welch and Wilkinson (2004) also identified from the IMP stream 
literature, four dimensions of political embeddedness of the firm.  The four 
dimensions are political institutions, political actors, political activities and the 
political resources of the firm.  Political institutions hugely emphasise the ideological 
and political value dimension, which is always changing and affecting the other 
dimensions (Halinen & Törnroos, 1998).  Meanwhile, political actors are a part of 
the dimension that could influence the change, which may come from the shifting of 
the political structure.  The actors include bureaucrats, government officials, 
Members of Parliament, interest groups and the media (Hadjikhani & Håkansson, 
1996).  Business actors will try to convince political actors with any intentional 
effort, in order to get political support and at the end, lead the business actors to gain 
legitimacy (Hadjikhani & Thilenius, 2005). 
Halinen and Törnroos (1998) stated that the dimension of embeddedness is 
indicated by the involvement of a business in a political system whose main 
objective is to influence public opinion.  The degree of involvement ranges from 
adapting new regulations to supporting the government to formulating a policy or 
legislation.  The involvement of firms in the political system indicates political 
connection, which may occur from the high dependency level among the actors in 
the network.  Political actors may need support from the business actors with their 
resources in order to maintain their political position, while business actors expect to 




In the business network approach, the political impact can be divided into two 
general types, namely coercive and supportive impacts (Hadjikhani & Sharma, 
1999).  Coercive impact indicates the rules and regulations produced by political 
actors using their legitimate power, which the firms should obey, even though the 
rules and regulations restrict the firms’ activities.  The impact signals the need for 
firms to adapt to the regulations.  Supportive impact, on the other hand, leads to the 
initiative action that the firms may take in order to weaken and change the coercive 
behaviour.  The initiative may then bring about positive impacts on the firms, which 
may come in the form of financial support, subsidies and other supportive rules and 
regulations.  Both coercive and supportive impacts are also affected by the size of the 
firm.  The size of the firm could be one of the main prerequisites of the political 
behaviour of the firm.  Using the multinational enterprises (MNEs) and SMEs case in 
managing their relationships with the European Union (EU), Hadjikhani (2000) 
found that larger firms tend to be active rather than follow a situation.  This thus 
signals the proactive approach that may be used by the firms, particularly large firms 
(Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 2001). 
The last part of the dimension of embeddedness is political resources, which 
is basically explaining the intertwined position of the business and government.  
Apart from its regulative position, the government is also a source for the firm to 
obtain benefits in financial or non-financial forms.  The benefits could be getting 
contracts in providing goods and services to the government, getting support for 
research and development funding, as well as tax concessions and also other forms of 
protection.  In the end, firms target to reach institutional legitimacy by implementing 
such a strategy.  The concept of legitimacy, in the context of the political 
environment, is about how political actors perceive the business actors (Hadjikhani, 
Lee, et al., 2008).    
Legitimacy could be gained by a firm through two ways.  First, this is 
obtained through the size of the firm, which influence its business exchanges.  Large 
business are often supported by organised units that help the firm undertake business 
activities, while small firms are often forced to adapt to costly actions (Hadjikhani & 
Ghauri, 2001).  The second way is by interaction with non-business actors, where 




the network.  The exchange is more than merely economic in nature.  The firm gains 
legitimacy from the exchange, through the advantage of knowledge and expertise of 
the political settings (Welch & Wilkinson, 2004). 
Apart from mere legitimacy, the interaction between political actors and 
enterprises could strengthen the competitive position of the firm and positively affect 
the performance of the firm (Faccio, 2006; Hillman et al., 2004; Fisman, 2001; 
Shaffer, 2000).  Bonardi (2011) investigates the effect of the firm’s performance 
from a situation where the political environment of the firm is characterized as a 
marketplace.  As a marketplace, the government or politicians as policy suppliers 
will try to obtain support from businesses to retain their authority and power.  On the 
other hand, firms that serve as policy demanders will try to lobby public policy that 
favours them in order to reach their objectives such as increasing profits (Bonardi et 
al., 2005; Hillman & Keim, 1995).    
The government is a source of a wide range of political goods, from public 
procurement contracts, licenses and tax, industry regulations and financial support 
through to various other programs.  Therefore, Hadjikhani, Lee, et al. (2008) 
cautioned that the relationship with political actors cannot be treated in the same way 
as a business-business relationship.  Political knowledge and commitment are two 
factors that influence the success of business actors in gaining influence and support 
from political actors (Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 2001). 
The performance of a firm is influenced by its business relationship and 
connections both with business and non-business actors (political relationship) 
(Hadjikhani, Thilenius, & Pourmand, 2009; Hadjikhani & Thilenius, 2005).   
Besides, changing the business environment requires business actors not to focus on 
the dyadic relationship alone.  Small firms, given their resource-constrained 
conditions, are forced to attain alternative solutions apart from their dyadic network.  
Therefore, small firmsoften rely on collective form of actions and gain incentives 
from memberships in associations (Cook & Barry, 1995).  The involvement in 
business association helps small firms feel that their interests remain represented and 





2.4.4. Social Strategies 
As discussed above, the non-market strategy is typically considered as the 
way a firm manages its institutional and societal context (Boddewyn, 2003).  
Moreover, in recent years, private interests such as activists or NGOs have tried to 
affect company and industry practices using the arena of public sentiment and the 
media.  Dannreuther (2007) argues that these stakeholders must be engaged 
proactively by the firm, particularly in this age of social media.  The way that 
companies manage relationships with governments, NGOs, the media and society at 
large is a part of the non-market strategy (Bach & Allen, 2010). 
This condition presents new strategic challenges for companies in the areas of 
reputation management, self-regulation and the integration of private and public non-
market strategies, among others.  In addition to explicit political strategies, scholars 
in the strategic management field have also examined firms’ strategies in relation to 
corporate social responsibility (CSR).  CSR has been increasingly acknowledged as 
an important part of non-market strategies implemented by firms (Doh et al., 2012; 
Baron, 2007, 2001) and involves a moral duty to perform social activities (Baron, 
Harjoto, & Hoje, 2011).  The strategic use of CSR has received substantial interests 
from academic researchers, with an increasing number of proposals to integrate the 
social strategy of the firm into business and corporate-level strategies (Rehbein & 
Schuler, 2015; Doh et al., 2014).   
Despite the growing awareness of CSR in the literature, there is no unified 
definition of what CSR is.  Thus, CSR may have different meanings to different 
people (van Marrewijk, 2003). As a result, consumers and stakeholders of a firm, in 
general, have become more demanding.  The firm’s behaviour to the environment, as 
well as to the society at large, will always be monitored.  This situation forces the 
firm to produce environmental and ethical products and services.  Considering ethics 
and the environment may help the firm reach its objectives.  Some scholars even 
argue that ethical operation may benefit the firms including better financial 
performance (Tang, Hull, & Rothenberg, 2012; Baron et al., 2011; Baron, 2007).  
However, this argument is seen by some scholars as not completely true.  They argue 




good financial performance, some firms might found that there is no effect from 
implementing CSR to their performance (Vogel, 2005; Griffin & Mahon, 1997).  The 
discourse on the issue of CSR and corporate financial performance over the decades 
illustrate that there are clearly associations between social activities and 
performance.  Institutional conditions such as public-private regulation, social 
pressure from stakeholders (Campbell, 2007) and the context of the environment 
(Matten & Moon, 2008) may affect how CSR is implemented by a firm (Gjølberg, 
2009).  Apart from the debate on social responsibility and financial performance, as 
well as the specific institutional conditions in the implementation of CSR, the current 
trend shows that more firms adapt business responsibility along with ethical 
operations.  It is even embedded across business functions, from marketing to supply 
chain.  CSR answers the uncertainties that are faced by many firms in the changing 
social, technological and political arena (Carroll, 1979).   
One can argue that the general reason why there is a shift in firms’ attitude 
towards social and stakeholders’ expectation is simply that firms want to protect their 
reputation.  In addition, the force for the firm to absorb ethical and social issue in 
their operations is greater than before (Porter & Kramer, 2006).  CSR could also be 
used as a political tool of the firm to achieve its objectives (Detomasi, 2008).  The 
CSR concept itself can help to “introduce better ways for managers” to improve their 
service to shareholders and the society, considering the economic and social 
dimensions, along with the financial interests of the firm (Baron et al., 2011; Saiia, 
Carroll, & Buchholtz, 2003).  CSR may also lead to additional firm-level resources, 
which helps to improve the effectiveness of political strategies implemented by a 
firm (Rehbein & Schuler, 2015).  Hence, implementing CSR could also become part 
of a company’s competitive advantage (Porter & Kramer, 2006).  To achieve those 
objectives, the firm must go beyond responsive CSR to strategic CSR.  Strategic 
CSR means that firms do not just merely conduct altruistic activities, but also add 
social dimensions to the value of the firm.    
But what is the real motive for the firm to implement CSR?  Porter and 
Kramer (2006) argue that there are “four justifications” for a firm to implement CSR.  
First, it is a moral obligation for the firm to become a good citizen.  Being a good 




second reason is sustainability, where firms, apart from achieving its objectives, 
should also consider other issues such as environment and social factors in its 
operations.  Thirdly, CSR is the company’s licence to operate.  Lastly, implementing 
CSR and considering ethical issues in its operations may improve the image of the 
firm that may also lead to the improvement of customers’ awareness of the firm.  The 
latter justification is also supported in the form of legitimacy gained by the firm, as a 
result of the good social behaviour of the firm (Chen, Patten, & Roberts, 2008). 
The four justifications emphasise that CSR as a strategy, is a part of the effort 
of firms to face the non-market environment and, therefore, affects the firms’ 
performance.  Hillman et al. (2004) argues that a firm with a good history of 
contributing to social activities will get easy access to policy-makers and will often 
be considered by politicians.  As a result, a firm’s social activities (CSR) become a 
new form of corporate political action (CPA) and is not merely perceived as a 
synonym for business ethics and environmental policy (McWilliams, Siegel, & 
Wright, 2006).  A greater reputation of the firm is an alternative source of 
competitive advantage and also a kind of differentiation of the company when 
compared to its competitors.  As a result, it can increase consumer loyalty and 
productivity of its employees, which can affect the financial performance of the firm. 
2.4.5. Integrating Market and Non-Market Strategy 
The interest in the non-market strategy research stream is increasing, 
following the footsteps of previous research on market strategy.  Non-market 
strategy, as a research field, has developed significant insights from various research 
streams about how firms strategically interact and shape their external environments 
(Lux et al., 2011; De Figueiredo, 2009; Shaffer, 1995).  However, the trend in 
strategic management field studies separate the components of market and non-
market independently (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014).  Unsurprisingly, recent 
studies reflecting the complementarities have begun to emphasise the relationship of 
non-market strategy and market strategy of the firm and the need to integrate both 
strategies (De Figueiredo, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Hillman et al., 2004; 




1978), both market and non-market environments are critical sources of resources 
and legitimacy for firms.    
An integrated strategy is composed of the firm’s strategy which integrates 
both the market and non-market environments, as a result of strategic analysis 
beyond traditional market analysis (Baron, 1999).  Initially, market actors are likely 
to implement non-market strategies as complements to market strategies, according 
to varying degrees in a particular institutional environment (Baron, 1995a; North, 
1990a) and the actor’s ability to exploit both market and non-market opportunities.   
Non-market analysis and strategy formulation are then merged into an overall 
strategy process, as an action to address and defend against market forces and realise 
market alternatives.    
Both market and non-market strategies, therefore, are important to achieve a 
firm’s objectives and to generate superior performance (Baron, 1997).  Apart from 
empowering itself with market strategies and market competitiveness, a firm must 
also develop its ability to deal with governments, non-governmental organisations 
and interest groups.  Moreover, the competitive landscape of firms has transformed 
dramatically, where some dimensions of the non-market environment and the 
growing power of non-market actors have changed the fundamental role of the 
business model (Doh & Lucea, 2013).  It has been argued by scholars that non-
market strategies can be employed to reveal market opportunities (Baron, 1999; 
North, 1990a).  Porter and Kramer (2006) especially highlighted CSR as an integral 
part of non-market strategies that can broadly be employed as a source of opportunity 
and innovation, as well as supporting competitive advantage of the firm if integrated 
with market strategies.  Collaboration with interest groups and NGOs is also a 
combination of market and non-market strategies, which is certainly necessary for 
enhancing the legitimacy of the firms’ commercial activities (Boddewyn & Doh, 
2011).  Therefore, the more closely tied a social issue is to a firm’s market activities, 
the greater the opportunity for the firm to use its available resources to gain more 
benefit for both the firm and society.    
Non-market strategies can also help firms manage their regulatory 




the market (Baron, 1997) or to mitigate regulatory risks in merger and acquisition 
proposals (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014).  Shaffer (2000) supports the integration 
of market and non-market strategies with the empirical findings related to the 
particular organisational structure and the degree of diversification.  In doing so, a 
firm may employ tactics such as lobbying (De Figueiredo, 2010, 2009), advocating 
and coalition with interest groups (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) or even financial 
contributions to political actors (De Figueiredo & Edwards, 2007).    
The attempts of a firm to integrate both market and non-market strategies also 
attracted scholars to investigate it from the role of boundary-spanning functions 
(Yuanqiong et al., 2007).  According to this function, integrating market and non-
market components could be classified into two categories, namely buffering and 
bridging (Blumentritt, 2003; Meznar & Nigh, 1995).  Buffering and bridging are the 
notions that indicate the level of integration of both market and non-market 
components by firms in their interaction with the external environment (Meznar & 
Johnson, 2005).  Despite the differences, buffering and bridging activities are not 
mutually exclusive (Yuanqiong et al., 2007).  While the buffering strategy is more 
enterprise-oriented, where a firm tries to either resist or control environmental 
changes, bridging strategies refer to the internal adaptation that is implemented by 
firms to changing external situations.  In terms of implementation, the buffering 
strategy of the firm might be in the form of contributing to political action committee 
(PAC) and lobbying.  A firm can also be perceived as implementing a bridging 
strategy when the firm adopts legitimate managerial and technical practices related to 
green products. 
Despite the growing attention on integrating market and non-market 
strategies as a new perspective in the strategic management stream, the extant 
literature is conceptual in nature and lacks empirical evidence on what integration is 
and how it could occur (Xie, Li, & Xie, 2014).  While firms in most developed 
nations have legitimate ways to pursue non-market strategies in influencing public 
policy and regulatory framework, the question for many firms in emerging 
economies, particularly for the smaller firms, is how systematically they can 




2.5. Non-Market Environment in Emerging Economies 
The non-market environment in many emerging economies is different from 
those in advanced economies in various ways (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & 
Svobodina, 2004).  Many emerging economies are characterised by the institutional 
environment that lack market-supporting institutions with extensive information 
asymmetries (Xu & Meyer, 2012).  Moreover, as Hoskisson et al. (2000) pointed out, 
the government and society are stronger with their influence in emerging economies 
than in most developed markets.  However, Hoskisson et al. (2000) cautioned that 
the group of countries in emerging economies is heterogeneous and therefore, one 
must be careful not to over-generalise. 
Emerging economies also often lack adequate infrastructure (Kim, Kandemir, 
& Cavusgil, 2004; Kim & Lim, 1988) and established political institutions 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000).  In addition, most of the emerging economies have high 
levels of intervention from the government on the business environment (Dieleman 
& Boddewyn, 2012; Fan, Wei, & Xu, 2011) along with weak financial market 
development and other resources (Fan et al., 2011; Peng & Heath, 1996).  Such a 
situation can lead to uncertainties surrounding the business arrangements of firms 
(Xu & Meyer, 2012; Choi, Lee, & Kim, 1999), as well as the need to focus mostly on 
network-based behaviours (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Boddewyn & Doh, 2011; 
Fisman, 2001) so as to deal with many subjects.  In short, there are imperative 
differences both in the organisational and behavioural aspects of firms in emerging 
economies, that make them different from firms in more advanced economies (Fan et 
al., 2011).  Emerging economies, therefore, provide a mixture of opportunities and 
risks for the firms. 
2.5.1. A Weak Institutional Environment 
The available literature about firms in emerging economies is mostly related 
to the literature on the economics of corruption, which indicate a weak institutional 
environment context (de Jong et al., 2015, 2012).  Emerging economies such as 
China, Brazil, Indonesia and Thailand are characterised by institutional environments 




and immature institutions (Peng, 2003) that undermine markets (Meyer, Estrin, 
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009).  In addition, many studies noted that many countries in 
emerging economies are characterised by unclear business-government interaction 
and low levels of law enforcement (Wu, 2005; Schwarz, 1997; Irwan, 1989).   
The two main market-supporting institutions which predominantly determine 
the economic performance of firms are property right and contracting institutions 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2003).  Property right institutions symbolise the protection 
and commitment from the government, in which the absence of such institutions 
offers opportunities for the officials to engage in state predation activities such as 
extracting rents and collecting bribes (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2003; Henisz & 
Zelner, 2003; North, 1990b).  The lack of legal support to contracting institutions 
may also encourage economic behaviour from officials or public-private 
expropriation hazards, which may discourage firms from getting involved in 
productive economic activities (Li & Zhang, 2007). 
The problem with the two institutions is that it may encourage firms to 
substitute weak formal institutions with private arrangements instead, in order to 
reduce hazards.  Private arrangements also refer to ‘institutional substitution’, which 
may compensate for the missing formal market-supporting institutions through 
building personal networks or political connections (Peng & Zhou, 2005).  Another 
form of private arrangement is when the owner of the firm selects to enter politics by 
becoming a member of a political party (Li, Meng, & Zhang, 2006) or seeking 
elections to be in top office (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009), so as to 
gain economic incentives.  The incentives can then be used to secure access to the 
financial resources and information regarding government contracts and other 
supporting programs, in order to alleviate expropriation hazards (Hellman et al., 
2003).   
In well-functioning legal systems, economic gains from political connections 
are not expected, since it may be risky both legally and politically for the firms and 
non-market actors (Goldman et al., 2009).  In weak systems on the other hand, 




rents and therefore shape the political behaviour (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman & 
Keim, 1995) and performance of the firm (Kim & Li, 2014; Faccio, 2006). 
2.5.2. Institutional Transitions 
Institutional transitions are “fundamental and comprehensive changes 
introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that affect organisations as 
players” (Peng, 2003, p. 275).  Many emerging economies experienced transitions of 
political power from one administration to the other, which may affect the 
performance of the firm if the firm relied on the political connection to one 
administrative power (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001).  The transformation in the 
business environment in emerging market institutions may produce and alter the 
business strategy that fits with the new context (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Peng, 
2003).  Another dimension of institutional transition is the greater and broader effect 
of the government on the operations of the firm, which may affect the strategic 
decision-making process (de Jong et al., 2015).  A good question to ask here is, “how 
do firms interact and cope with such delicate environments, particularly in emerging 
economies?”   
In emerging economies, with the uncertainties surrounding the business 
environment and frequent transformations in the regulatory and legal framework, 
relational strategies is the leading strategy that is implemented by firms (Peng & 
Luo, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996).  Apart from lowering transaction costs, the actions 
also enable firms to pursue their objectives (with the advantage from public policies) 
(de Jong et al., 2015) and reduce the uncertainties caused by regulatory changes 
(Bonardi & Keim, 2005).  Relational strategies are even referred to as a unique type 
of entrepreneurial capital that leads to a better performance of the firm (Fan et al., 
2011; Peng & Zhou, 2005; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
However, since continuous transformation is one of the main characters of 
emerging economies, the strategic choices of a firm should not be static.  Peng 
(2003) argues that in institutional transitions, firms may need to switch strategies 
from relational to arm’s length transactions.  Thus, this illustrates that even in 




firms in achieving their objectives.  While interaction and building personal 
relationships between firms and regulatory entities are mostly on a voluntary basis in 
most developed markets, in many transition economies, such relationships are not 
just arbitrary but even compulsory (de Jong et al., 2015).  The decision-making 
process in a firm faces a greater challenge with the institutional voids and the lack of 
formal legal and regulatory frameworks (Peng & Heath, 1996), where each level of 
government institution has its own discretion on administrative and license issues.   
Given the uncertainties and constant challenges from institutional voids, 
organisational capabilities and the institutional capital are very important in a firm’s 
process of strategic formulation.  Building a personal relationship with the 
government in institutional transitions require these three capabilities - technical, 
social and personal.  The combination of technical capabilities, along with personal 
networks and social capital, will help a firm manage its cooperative relationship with 
the government and other regulatory officials.   
2.5.3. Informal Institutions 
Research on business-government interactions have concentrated mainly in 
more stable economies (Li et al., 2012; Yuanqiong et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2005; 
Peng, 2003), with large enterprises as the object of the studies (Bengtson et al., 2009; 
Gao, 2006).  In other words, most of the studies only examined business-government 
interactions using theories developed in the context of well-established countries, 
which may not properly explain the phenomena in most emerging markets (Barron, 
2010).  In addition, most of the research in this area examined mainly multinational 
corporations (MNCs), particularly from an international business perspective, where 
the firms must interact with the home country’s government.  As argued by Barron 
(2011), the national culture and character may affect many aspects of life, including 
business interactions with other parties.  Expanding the argument from Coen, 
Trumbull, Coen, Grant, and Wilson (2010), the current literature leads us to the 
condition which lacks the micro-theory of business-government interaction, 
specifically, the micro-theory that captures the business-government interaction in 
emerging economies, which explains the motivations and strategic choices by the 




from emerging economies, will help us improve efforts in theorising the non-market 
concept.   
Although much is already known about how managers need to understand 
different cultures based on its operation areas, there are only limited efforts to reveal 
the local context of business-government interactions.  As suggested by Shaffer and 
Hillman (2000), the future research of this topic should disaggregate non-market 
actions, given the different environments that are faced by the firms.  In addition, 
Peng (2003) and Yuanqiong et al. (2007) argue that the institutional transition in 
emerging economies offers new perspectives in terms of strategic choices, which can 
help us practically understand the behaviour of the firm under a certain context.   
Some scholars argue that the behaviour of the firm and how the firm adapts to 
its cultural environments is largely a rational process (Dacin, Ventresca, & Beal, 
1999).  However, this assumption is not entirely applicable in emerging economies, 
due to the condition that many firms face more information asymmetries (Xu & 
Meyer, 2012).  The firms in emerging economies are also subject to more complex 
informal constraints.   
Motivational considerations related to the cultural environment are also 
affected by the conceptions of culture, which may come as norms and values (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977) and overlap with rules and schemas.  Another different conception 
may characterise culture as constitutive and predominantly regulative.  Culture, 
therefore, provides us with clear categories and understanding, which enables us to 
engage in economic and social actions.  In addition, culture also helps us clearly 
identify norms and conventions that guide the actions (Dacin et al., 1999).  To 
achieve these objectives, firms are required to acquire cultural capital.  Cultural 
capital refers to “a subset of cultural resources (from those broadly available in a 
societal culture) and capabilities to manipulate them  that are internalized by the firm 
and are deployed in its value-creation strategies” (Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2010, 
p. 180).  The knowledge and knowing-capability of cultural movements, as well as 
socio-cultural trends, are examples of cultural capital that may help firms in 
capitalizing its capital and achieve their objectives.  While regulatory elements have 




growing recognition that cultural cognitive frameworks are also important in 
providing deeper foundations of institutional forms (Scott, 2008a).   
2.5.4. Government as a Major Stakeholder 
Apart from the weak institutional environment, the business environment in 
most emerging economies is characterised by transitional phases which may reflect 
the need for different strategic implementation from firms.  Several scholars 
emphasised that for such unique characteristics, different perspectives of strategies 
are needed, including building political connections (Bengtson et al., 2009; 
Hadjikhani et al., 2009; Faccio, 2006).  However, as emphasised earlier, unique 
contexts and characteristics should be regarded as an important consideration, prior 
to the implementation of a strategy (Li et al., 2012).   
Previous research on business-government relationships emphasised the low 
quality of market-supporting institutions as the primary factor that makes a firm 
choose a non-market strategy (Zhou, 2013).  In addition, many studies noted that the 
economics of corruption are closely related to emerging economies, such as 
Indonesia, where the institutional environments are characterized by business-
government collusion interactions and low levels of law enforcement (Wu, 2005; 
Schwarz, 1997).  However, several studies argued that even in the western developed 
economies with advanced institutions, political connections are equally important 
(Bengtson et al., 2009; Goldman et al., 2009; Hadjikhani et al., 2009).  Also, corrupt 
environments do exist (Wu, 2005), as firms also actively attempt to influence the 
decision-making processes (Deng et al., 2010). 
The competitive environment (market environment) faced by a firm is often 
shaped by the government with enormous power and regulatory facilities.  The 
power of the government is even greater in less developed markets, where market 
actors often face a lack of transparency and high interventions (Peng & Heath, 1996).  
Governments have the ability to alter the market environment through regulations, 
and therefore, public policy can become an important determinant of firms’ 
behaviour (Baron, 1995b; North, 1990a).  In most emerging economies, the 




governmental projects, and therefore firms need a unique strategy such as political 
ties with government officials in every level (representing a managerial resource).   
Given the prominent position of the government and other political actors, 
firms tend to compete in building good connections with political actors.  Hillman 
and Hitt (1999) argue that the success of a firm in a political arena and generally a 
non-market environment is dependent on how the firm can provide three incentives 
to political actors: financial incentives (campaign contributions), constituency 
building (votes) and information (through lobbying and providing supportive 
information for the political actors).   
In emerging economies, while studies show that the lack of regulatory 
frameworks influences the current state of corporate governance (Haque, Arun, & 
Kirkpatrick, 2011), the lack of regulatory framework coupled with the poor 
development of market-supporting institutions also provide opportunities (Henisz & 
Zelner, 2010) for the firm to rely on personal relationships.  This “institutional void” 
has frequently been cited as the reason for a firm to implement relational transactions 
and extensively use personal relationships (Peng & Luo, 2000).  The government 
influences the market environment through many ways: antitrust regulation, social 
regulation, economic regulation, as well as through government sales (Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999).  The decision of a firm to diversify is often also 
influenced by its political connections, especially in emerging economies (Li et al., 
2012).  Relevant literature has also placed government sales as one of the main 
determinants of a firm’s non-market activity (Hillman et al., 2004; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).   
2.6. Non-Market Strategies and Firms’ Performance 
Porter (1985) defined two types of competitive advantage: cost and 
differentiation advantages.  Given the discussion before, we can categorize “cost 
advantage” as a part of the market strategy of the firm, while “differentiation” is a 
part of the non-market strategy of the firm.  Since competitive advantage is a 
company’s ability to perform in one or more ways that competitors cannot or will not 




differentiation, whereby the firm can try to perform better than its competitors.  Non-
market strategies can also provide a competitive advantage by defending against 
rivals (Baron, 1995a, 1995b).  In terms of creating market opportunities, non-market 
strategies can be useful in defending new entrant firms.  
Bonardi (2011) sees the effect on a firm’s performance in a situation where 
the political environment of the firm is characterized as a marketplace.  It can be 
argued that the motivation behind the involvement of firms in politics is to purchase 
desirable public policies.  Within a marketplace, the interaction between suppliers 
and demanders in the public policy arena is important for both sides.  After all, as a 
supplier, the government needs to consider the society, while from the other 
viewpoint, businesses will consider shareholders and the objectives of the firms 
(Hillman & Keim, 1995).  Thus, the political strategy implemented by a firm can 
influence the firm’s performance (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008).  
The discussion of performance implication as a result of implementing non-
market strategies, particularly political strategies, could be divided into three general 
arguments (Rajwani & Liedong, 2015).  First, studies that indicate the positive 
outcomes from the implementation of political strategies by the firm.  In this 
scenario, positive outcomes might be in many forms, such as effective tax rate 
(Adhikari et al., 2006), government–revenues derived (De Figueiredo & Edwards, 
2007), access of funds from government (Faccio, 2006) and easy access to debt 
financing from government (Faccio, 2010). Accounting data and other financial 
indicators are widely used to measure firm performance.  Various financial indicators 
that used to measure the performance of the firm such as return on sales (ROS) 
(Hadani & Schuler, 2013), return on asset (ROA) (Imai, 2006; Peng & Luo, 2000), 
return on investment (ROI) (Mathur & Singh, 2011), accrual quality (Chaney, 
Faccio, & Parsley, 2011). 
In a study using data from firms in Malaysia, for example, Adhikari et al. 
(2006) found that firms with political connections may pay lower taxes, as compared 
to firms without any political connections.  Another study indicated that politicians 
being appointed as members of the board also triggers a positive impact on the stock 




Gee, 2006) result in easy access to financing as well as preferential treatment in trade 
agreements (Schuler et al., 2002).  
Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh (2006) also developed a model and 
tested it using the U.S utilities context.  They found that non-market strategies can 
help firms in this sector mitigate non-market pressure and gain a favourable 
regulatory framework.  In another study,  Faccio (2006) found that when a member 
of top management, such as a senior manager, enters politics, the corporate value 
(stock prices) increases significantly. 
In terms of social strategy, when employing corporate social performance 
(CSP) as the mediator, Yuanqiong et al. (2007) found that context-specific non-
market strategies such as the guanxi-based strategy, a form of network-based strategy 
through personal connections, plays an important role in firms’ performance through 
preferential environment and indirect economic improvement.  The same argument 
from Porter and Kramer (2006) showed that there is a link between competitive 
advantage and corporate social responsibility (CSR).  They also argued that CSR 
could be important for the company since it can help the company gain a competitive 
advantage.  CSR is becoming more important nowadays since consumers are 
demanding more from firms.  Customers are more attracted to companies that care 
about social issues such as poverty, global warming, air and water pollution, as well 
as energy consumption (Kotler & Caslione, 2009).  
Paying attention to such issues is important since it also makes a firm’s 
reputation “good” from the consumers’ perspective.  A better reputation could also 
be gained when a firm treats its employees fairly and maintains good relationships 
with its suppliers and partners.  This fine reputation, both from the internal and 
external aspects of the firm, is an alternative source of competitive advantage.  
Moreover, it is a kind of differentiation by the company when being compared to its 
competitors.  As a result, this can increase the consumer loyalty and productivity of 
its employees, which can affect the financial performance of the firm.  In the long 
run, when the firm is able to maintain the situation, or when the firm can adapt to the 




advantage (Smith, 2007).  It is sustainable as the advantage from CSR and the good 
reputation of the firm is hard for competitors to imitate.  
In addition, as the study by Saiia et al. (2003) revealed, when a firm operates 
in a positive manner, not only does it benefit the community; but it also improves the 
performance of the firm.  Cooperation with other stakeholders, particularly 
government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) will help the firm reach its 
objectives.  However, Smith (2007) also cautioned that to get a competitive 
advantage through social responsibility, the firm must be proactive in engaging with 
its many stakeholders. 
The second group of studies on performance implications of implementing 
non-market strategies, demonstrate the negative effect of political strategies to firm 
performance.  The association of the firm’s performance with relevant political 
activity has been challenged by Hadani and Schuler (2013).  They found that such an 
assumption is not supported by empirical data when they studied 943 firms from 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 database over an 11 year period.  In addition, the 
study also found that any political action taken by a firm is a risky business decision 
and therefore, may negatively affect the market value of the firm.  The findings 
support the previous research of some scholars such as Faccio (2006), that a firm 
involved in political activities and takes unwarranted risks may not be better off, as 
compared to a firm with less involvement in politics, particularly one which 
appointed politicians to enter the board of the firm.  
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) also found that “soft money” 
donations are negatively correlated with returns and record lower abnormal returns 
on acquisition announcements.  In Slovenia, having political connections, as well as 
politicians on the supervisory board, may lead to lower productivity and poor 
corporate governance (Domadenik, Prašnikar, & Svejnar, 2015).  Chaney et al. 
(2011) also found that firms with political connection have poor accruals quality.  In 
terms of social strategy such as philanthropy, Chen et al. (2008) found that there is 
no significant association between a firm’s charitable actions and its performance.  
Instead, corporate philanthropy is a tool for the firm to gain legitimacy, rather than a 




The third group of studies, despite the minority of this kind of studies, are 
studies that found neutral or mixed impact to firm performance.  In this scenario, 
there is no significant impact resulting from the implementation of political strategies 
and non-market strategy, in general, to the firm’s performance.  Rajwani and 
Liedong (2015), for example, reported that few studies indicated that campaign 
contribution has no impact on the performance of the firm, while another study 
showed poor performance from the firm with political connection.    
Despite the differences, the majority of the studies indicated the strong link 
between CPA and firm performance (Lux et al., 2011; Hillman et al., 2004), with 
particular emphasis on government impact on the performance of the firm.  
According to the survey conducted by McKinsey (2011) on “How business interacts 
with the government”, government activities have an economic impact on a firm’s 
performance.  Since market strategies alone cannot handle the external environment 
of the firm, non-market strategies are needed to tackle the dynamics of the 
environment.  In addition, many non-market issues come from market activities.  
Therefore, firms need to integrate both market and non-market strategies (De 
Figueiredo, 2009; Baron, 1995a).  As a result, non-market strategies play an 
important role for a firm’s performance, only when they are integrated with market 
strategies (Baron, 1999, 1995b).  
Various arguments and empirical studies have indicated that scholars have 
not reached an agreement on the measurement issues of how firms’ performance is 
affected by non-market strategies.  Therefore, as suggested by some scholars  
(Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Lux et al., 2011), this mixed outcome outlines the lack of 
evidence and the requirement to employ different variables and constructs, as well as 
other performance metrics in future studies.  Nevertheless, the above argument does 
not neglect the importance of political activities, particularly in regulated industries, 
where the position of the government in the political environment is recognised as 




2.6.1. Performance Outcome-Measurement Variables 
Firm performance has been a focus by scholars in the corporate non-market 
strategy stream (Lawton, McGuire, et al., 2013).  Studies in this stream were 
conducted in various industries with different levels of competition and regulatory 
environment.  The majority of the studies reported strong links between non-market 
strategies, particularly political strategy, with the performance of a firm (Lux et al., 
2012; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008; Hillman et al., 2004).  However, there is no agreed 
variables or constructs on how to measure performance outcomes.  There are two 
possible reasons that lead to the disagreement among scholars in measuring the 
impact of political strategies to firm performance.  Hillman et al. (2004) cited the 
difficulty in measuring political strategies, and secondly, the difficulty in isolating 
the effect of political strategies on performance.  
Rajwani and Liedong (2015) categorised three general outcomes of firm 
performance as the basis for defining constructs and variables for measurement.  
They are stock performance, operating performance and policy performance.  Stock 
market performance can be measured from the stock markets condition when 
politicians are appointed to corporate boards (Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 
2005), or the effect of news of politicians health to the firm’s market value (Fisman, 
2001)  Apart from secondary data sources which are mostly in the form of financial 
indicators, some studies also use measurements that based on self-reporting 
approach.  Yuanqiong et al. (2007) used attributes such as innovativeness, long-term 
investment values, responsibility to the community and the environment to measure 
social performance.  To measure firm economic performance, they used accounting 
variables such as growth rate of profits, growth rate of market shares and growth rate 
of sales in the last 3 years.  
Accounting data are also used to measure operating performance.  Various 
constructs were used to measure profit such as return on asset (ROA) (Peng & Luo, 
2000), return on investment (ROI) (Mathur & Singh, 2011), returns on sales (ROS) 
(Hadani & Schuler, 2013), and accruals quality (Chaney et al., 2011) are used to give 
a broad picture of the performance implication of the firm.  Employing financial 




researcher to get misleading information since it cannot portray intangible capital 
(e.g., personal relationship, political knowledge) perfectly (Hillman, 2005).  
The third category of outcomes is policy performance.  This kind of 
performance is not widely measured in non-market strategy impacts, with only a 
limited number of studies that measures the performance of firms in the policy arena.  
There are two possible reasons for this condition as argued by Hillman et al. (2004) 
that, first the difficulty in measuring political strategies, and secondly, the difficulty 
in isolating the effect of political strategies on performance. Examples of variables 
used to examine this type of outcome are voting patterns (Liebman & Reynolds, 
2006), lobbying effects on particular regulation (Mathur, Singh, Thompson, & 
Nejadmalayeri, 2013; De Figueiredo & Edwards, 2007; De Figueiredo & Kim, 
2004), and government bailouts (Faccio, 2006).  
Apart from the three categories of outcomes above, some scholars offer new 
paradigms in measuring firm performance as a result of political strategy 
implementation.  Instead of using financial performance indicators, some studies also 
use non-financial performance such as capability in product development and 
knowledge development in the firm (Hadjikhani & Thilenius, 2009; Hadjikhani et 
al., 2009).  These indicators are expected to offer new perspectives on firm 
performance by exploring long-term growth and survival of the firms.  These 
measurement indicators also discuss the non-direct effect of political strategy on 
firm’s performance. 
The discussion above reflects the difficulty or scholars’ various perspectives 
in measuring the performance of a firm.  The complexity of measuring performance 
is even greater in the context of emerging markets (Farashahi & Hafsi, 2009; 
Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng & Luo, 2000) and small and medium firms (SMEs) 
(Blackburn, Mark, & Thomas, 2013; Kusumawardhani, 2013; Halabi, Barrett, & Dyt, 
2010).  Several factors that contribute to the complexity of measuring performance 
are lack of reliable financial and accounting systems (Farashahi & Hafsi, 2009), the 
lack of knowledge and resource to create accounting reports (Halabi et al., 2010) and 
the unavailability of financial data, especially for small firms  (Kusumawardhani, 




mostly conducted using subjective measures on the basis of managers’ perception 
which serves as reliable proxy to capture actual performance (Peng & Luo, 2000).  
Subjective measurements, especially in the study of small firms, usually used 
comparison with some base performance (e.g., previous year’s performance) as the 
basis for assessment.  The comparison usually related to the growth of profit, market 
shares and sales (Yuanqiong et al., 2007). Firms may be asked about the performance 
of the firm compared with the previous performance, with major competitors and 
with other firms in the same industry (Runyan, Droge, & Swinney, 2008).   
Another study from Blackburn et al. (2013) utilised three main measures to 
assess the performance of small firms, namely, employment change, turnover change 
and profitability.  While the first two simply compare the factors with previous 
conditions, the last factor digs more on the perception of the small firm on how they 
think they perform compared to previous conditions.  The use of subjective 
perceptual measurement was also supported by Dess and Robinson (1984). They 
offer to use perceptual measurement using return on asset (ROA) and growth in sales 
(last several years) as an alternative to reflect firm performance.  In addition, they 
also argued that a researcher can also include broader societal, community and 
environmental dimensions to subjective perceptual measurement.  
While objective measurement clearly offers more credibility with the 
advantage of reducing the common method bias, subjective measurement based on 
the perception of respondents and self-reported data has also been accepted by 
scholars in strategic management field (Farashahi & Hafsi, 2009; Dess & Robinson, 
1984).  In addition, the reliance on secondary data may contribute to the lack of 
theoretical development in the field of CPA (Lux et al., 2011) since most of 
accounting data may not perfectly capture intangible political capital (Hillman, 2005) 
and could be misleading (Rajwani & Liedong, 2015). Therefore, subjective 
measurement and even field research utilising interview and survey is needed to 
broaden our understanding of non-market strategies and its implication to the firm 
performance (Lux et al., 2011). Refining and evaluating non-market strategies 
utilising primary data is also helpful in providing significant information for firms in 




2.7. Theoretical Foundations in Non-Market Literature 
Several different theories have been employed by scholars to explain firms’ 
strategies in the political arena, as well as why and how firms engage in political 
activities (Getz, 1997).  Theories such as institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; North, 1990a; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), resources dependence theory (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978), institutional-based view (Peng et al., 2008; Peng, 2002), resource-
based view (Barney, 1991) and social capital (Deng et al., 2012; Butler & Purchase, 
2008; Carlisle & Flynn, 2005) have helped to explain the political behaviour of 
firms.  The following section will discuss briefly these theories since these are 
necessary for understanding the non-market strategies of firms. 
In exploring the non-market strategy, the institutional perspective has gained 
momentum and drawn attention from scholars (Henisz & Zelner, 2003).  Various 
labels on theorising institutions may be confusing, since most labels depend on the 
origin of the scholars’ disciplines and perspective orientations (Peng, Sunny Li, 
Pinkham, & Hao, 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2000).  Scholars in the institutional-based 
view stream theorise that firms could produce an altered business strategy to fit with 
the new context, as a result of the dynamics of emerging market institutions (Meyer 
et al., 2009; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Peng et al., 2008; Peng, 2003).   “Institutional 
theory” is commonly referred to as sociology discipline of institutional literature 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), while ”institutional economics” is proposed by scholars 
from the economics field (North, 1990a).  Peng (2002) offered a new label of 
“institution-based view” from the management scholars' perspective.  Various labels 
based on different emphasis and perspectives were also noted by Doh et al. (2012).  
They differentiate three institutional perspectives on non-market research, namely 
new institutional economics, neo-institutional perspectives and national business 
systems. 
For the purpose of this thesis, we believe that the institutional perspective, (as 
mentioned earlier) as well as institutional literature, are relatively the same, with only 
minor differences in focus and perspective.  Therefore, we believe that all available 
labels on institutional literature feature the same characteristics.  The institutional 




organisations or the external environments that can influence the social and 
organisational behaviour (Scott, 1987).  Institutions are treated as independent 
variables, while strategic choices are the outcomes developed through dynamic 
interaction between the institutions and firms.  Therefore, when formal institutions 
are unclear and less supportive, informal constraints become very essential in 
reducing uncertainties and providing guidance for the firms (Peng et al., 2009).   
The resource-based view (RBV) considers firms to be bundles of resources 
(Barney, 1991) and the resource dependence theory (RDT) also considers firms’ 
resources as very essential in their respective performance.  The resources are also 
the starting point for firms to develop their future strategies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  The basic assumption of resources in the RBV are that all resources must be 
rare, valuable and non-substitutable, which could be the sustained competitive 
advantage of the firm (Barney, 1991).  However, it should be noted that this basic 
assumption of resources is not context-free.  Priem and Butler (2001) argue that in 
one context, the resources may be valuable and hard to imitate, while in the other 
context of high velocity and dynamic competition, the resource may be easy to 
imitate and thus becomes non-valuable.  The RDT on the other hand, also 
emphasises the importance of resources, not just those that create a competitive 
advantage, but those that focus more on organisational effectiveness—the ability to 
create acceptable outcomes and actions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).    
Despite the fact that the three theories are different in focus, they are closely 
related to similar key elements, namely resources and the institutional environment.  
RBV and RDT differ in how firms obtain the resources; RBV is internally-focused, 
while RDT is externally-focused (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009).  Being 
internally focused means that all resources are accumulated internally by the firm 
and therefore are imperfectly imitable, given the long-time process in its 
accumulation stage.  On the contrary, the RDT posits that no organisation is self-
contained and therefore, its resources depend on other organisations and how firms 
manage their inter-dependencies with external organisations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  However, both RBV and RDT explain that firms can acquire complementary 




In terms of the institutional environment, there is a key difference between 
institutional theory and RDT.  Institutional theory perceives firms as passive entities 
that comply with institutional pressures, while in the RDT, firms are assumed to be 
more active in dealing with the external environment through adjusting power 
relationships and developing strategic responses (Oliver, 1991).  The supporters of 
the RDT focused on various active behaviours of the firm to reduce uncertainty and 
mitigate the dependency on the external environment (Hillman et al., 2009) through 
various political activities such as lobbying, legal actions and personal services.  The 
primary goal of these political activities is for firms to be able to shape the public 
policies that favour them (Hillman et al., 1999).  In emerging economies where 
institutions are less predictable and government intervention remains extensive, firms 
depend more on the domestic institutions (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008).  The ability of 
the firm to influence its institutional environment through political activities is a key 
resource that distinguishes a firm from its competitors and this therefore, becomes its 
competitive advantage (Hillman et al., 1999; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Barney, 
1991).  One of the main managerial resources is political activity, such as building 
connections (Li & Zhang, 2007; Barney, 1991).  This is particularly important in 
emerging economies, where the power of the government is superior and can 
interfere with business operations (Li et al., 2012; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
To create political resources, firms have to develop good relationships with 
external and political actors, which encourages the establishment of valuable 
resources such as human and social capitals (Lester et al., 2008).  While some 
scholars differentiate between the two (human and social capitals), we believe that 
both capitals intertwine with each other conceptually and empirically (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998).   
The acquisition and accumulation of social capital evolved from Bourdieu 
(1986) in his seminal work on the various forms of capital.  Social capital is an 
umbrella expression to label resources that are embedded within social networks 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002).  Moreover, social capital is defined by Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998, p. 243) as, “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 




Social capital has been extensively used to describe the success of 
organisations in mitigating the uncertainties and lack of regulative support in the 
form of personal service (Hillman et al., 1999) and other factors related to the 
dependency relationship (Getz, 1997).  The breadth of social capital can also be 
reflected in the social ties, which in the context of international business are also 
critically important for firms (Corredoira & McDermott, 2014; Hadjikhani, Lee, et 
al., 2008).  An example of a response from the external environment is the guanxi-
based relationship, a form of network-based strategy through personal connections, 
in China (Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011; Zhu et al., 2007; Carlisle & Flynn, 2005).  In a 
different context of the U.S firms, Lester et al. (2008) also found that firms benefit 
from former government officials’ social capital (personal ties) when they are 
appointed as board members. 
2.8. The Gaps 
The nature of non-market factors varies over time and is related to a country 
and its respective firms and sectors within the economy.  In Asia and most emerging 
economies in general, non-market issues are closely related to the efficacy of 
business-government interactions.  Government intervention, through various 
protectionist policies, has been actively used in many emerging countries to support 
firms’ competitiveness (Aggarwal, 2001).  While scholarly investigations on non-
market issues is quite abundant in most developed nations, scholarly investigations 
on non-market issues in emerging economies are still limited (Yuanqiong et al., 
2007; Gao, 2006; Wright et al., 2005).  Also, the current studies on institutional 
environment in emerging economies focus only on the impact of institutional 
variation on organisations (Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Peng et al., 2008).  There are 
differences both in the organisational and behavioural aspects of firms in emerging 
economies that make them different from firms in more advanced economies (Fan et 
al., 2011).  Moreover, in emerging economies, there is a mixture of opportunities and 
risks for the firm. 
Given the importance of non-market environments to the strategic decision- 
making process of the firm in emerging economies, several important questions arise.  




How do small firms, given their resource boundaries, deal with the non-market 
environment in emerging markets?  What is the motivation behind the non-market 
decisions made by the firms? 
This study examines these questions, while focusing on small and medium 
firms (SMEs—also referred to in this study as small firms) in Indonesia.  Extensive 
studies focusing on SMEs have been conducted and research in this field has matured 
into a body with multiple sub-genres such as entrepreneurship, marketing, finance, 
and leadership (Gao, Sung, & Zhang, 2013).  However, studies that focus on SMEs 
and non-market environments are rare.  Moreover, most studies on SMEs tend to 
assume that the models derived from larger firms can be applied to small firms 
(Gilman & Edwards, 2008).  As pointed out by Taylor (2006), it is important that 
SMEs or smaller firms are studied in their own right, in order to understand how and 
in what way they behave under non-market environments, rather than contrasting 
them with the ideal image of what small firms should do.    
2.9. Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, the literature pertaining to non-market perspectives 
concerning business-government interactions was reviewed.  The literature reviewed 
included generic research and current empirical results in the fields of non-market 
strategy and strategic management.  This review revealed three things.  Firstly, 
existing research focused mainly on developed regions, such as North America and 
Europe, while the non-market environment is also challenging for firms in many 
emerging countries (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008).  Secondly, extant studies focused 
mainly on large firms or MNCs (Doh & Lucea, 2013), which neglect the conditions 
of the non-market environment faced by smaller firms.   Thirdly, existing research 
refers mainly to the non-market strategies as a whole, which raises the question of 
whether the same strategy may be implemented by smaller firms.  Furthermore, there 
is still an interesting but unknown issue in micro-level studies on what the motivation 
for non-market action is (Devinney, 2013), as well as how small firms deal with its 
non-market environment, especially in the context of emerging markets (Bengtson et 
al., 2009; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Hadjikhani, Lee, et al., 2008).  Therefore, there 




In integrating insights from various perspectives and disciplines, this study 
recommends the use of context-based study in strategic management to enrich our 
understanding of organisational behaviour (Meyer et al., 2009). Context-based 
strategy is very helpful particularly because the nature of non-market factors varies 
over time and is related to a country and its respective firms.  
The outcomes of non-market and political strategies of the firms have been 
measured in various ways employing different performance metrics.  As a result, 
scholars report different outcomes from their studies.  Most studies examine the 
performance from stock prices, as well as the operating performance variables such 
as ROA, ROI, and market share of the firm.  Assessing non-market strategy and its 
relationship to the performance of firms have also employed social strategy. 
Information obtained as part of this literature review has helped to narrow the 
research focus in this study, to an investigation of the non-market business 
environment in emerging economies, as well as non-market strategies implemented 
by firms and the motives for such practices. 
Considering the importance of firms’ institutional environment in emerging 
economies, this study focuses on the unique characteristics of the institutions and the 
distinctive actions taken by firms in dealing with non-market environments.  The 
non-market environment in most emerging economies could be characterised by a 
weak institutional environment, institutional transitions that shaped the behaviour of 
the firms, the important role of informal institution, good understanding of culture 
and a major governmental role.  Possible theoretical frameworks about how firms 
shape the institutional environment, as well as the importance of the size of the firms 
as an antecedent in determining the political behaviour of the firm were also 
discussed. 
The next chapter will briefly discuss small firms in Indonesia, along with the 







SMALL FIRMS IN INDONESIA 
3.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, we review relevant empirical studies and the current condition 
of small firms in Indonesia.  As Baron (2010) noted, to a certain degree, the non-
market environment faced by a firm is context-specific.  The non-market 
environment also depends on the institutions, culture and the interests of the 
organisations within the country (Scott, 2008b).  Therefore, in examining the non-
market environment faced by small firms in Indonesia, we need to understand the 
context and characteristics of the business-government interaction in Indonesia. 
This chapter is organised as follows.  Section 3.2 presents the business 
regulatory environment in Indonesia.  It includes the discussion of elements that 
affect the institutional environment in Indonesia.  Section 3.3 discusses 
decentralisation as a product of institutional change in Indonesia.  This is followed 
by the discussion of small and medium firms in Indonesia in Section 3.4.  In Section 
3.5, a discussion of why the size of a firm is one of the important antecedents of non-
market strategies taken by the firm is provided.  Finally, Section 3.7 provides the 
summary of this chapter. 
3.2. The Business Regulatory Environment in Indonesia  
The 1997-1998 crisis and its aftermath brought an era of political change and 
reform to Indonesia.  Starting as a financial crisis, the magnitude and complexity of 
the crisis later turned into more multi-dimensional and complex situations.  Apart 
from the economic crisis, Indonesia also had to deal with social and political changes 
which affected the business environment.  One of the major changes for the business 
environment was the political instability and uncertainty after the implementation of 




In the 1990s, following successful macroeconomic policy reforms that 
supported political stability, the business environment in Indonesia became more 
conducive.  The country opened up economic and business opportunities to the 
private sector, so as to hasten the development process.  As with many East Asian 
countries, Indonesia also underwent a process of urbanisation and industrialisation.  
As a result, the contribution of agriculture as the primary sector to total gross 
domestic product (GDP) decreased by 35% during the 1967 - 2009 period.  At the 
same time, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the total GDP increased 
by more than 19% (Elias & Noone, 2011).  Despite the economic growth and 
liberalisation of the foreign investment regime, various idiosyncrasies still occurred 
in the business sector in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2013; World Bank, 2012; 
Brodjonegoro, 2004; Van der Eng, 2004).  The rampant corruption, military 
involvement in business and lack of good corporate governance initiatives indicated 
possible risks and challenges for firms.  However, such risks were also accompanied 
by great opportunities for business enterprises.  Various ways to mitigate risks have 
been explored and implemented by firms, including political patronage which 
involves establishing close ties with former President Suharto and his associates. 
Under President Suharto, the groups that were advanced in economic 
activities were mostly his family and business colleagues (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008).  
Access to all political, military and economic elements was centrally controlled by 
Suharto and his family (Mackie, 2010; Schwarz, 1997).  As pointed by (Dieleman & 
Sachs, 2006), “friendly capitalists”, who were competent and more importantly, 
willing to cooperate with the regime, benefited from the centrally controlled power 
and economic protectionism from Suharto.  Chinese conglomerates such as the Salim 
Group, Astra International and Sinar Mas benefited immensely through investments, 
collaborative businesses and joint shareholding with the Suharto family (Chua, 
2008).  Even though many indigenous enterprises (pribumi) were also advanced in 
their political patronage, their control and dominance of the Indonesian economic 
share was not as successful as the Chinese enterprises (Tan, 2000).  Indigenous 
enterprises also lacked the resources to collaborate with the Suharto family in raising 
funds and forming partnerships with the military, the main backbone of the Suharto 




According to (Robison & Hadiz, 2012), the alliance of Chinese 
conglomerates and Suharto’s political regime were bounded together by common 
strategic interests. For example, many organisational structures from Chinese 
businesses were designed to accommodate the Suharto family and his circle of 
friends as business partners or other top management posts.  Designing such 
organisational structures was part of the Chinese conglomerates’ strategy to survive 
in the Indonesian economic climate, given their politically weak position (Dieleman 
& Boddewyn, 2012).  It was also a price that many Chinese tycoons “were willing to 
pay to maintain a stake in predatory, extremely profitable symbiosis with the state” 
(Chua, 2008, p. 8).  
In 1997, when the Asian crisis took place, the weakness of the economic 
structure, where political connections drove the economy rather than fundamental 
instruments such as productivity (Fisman, 2001), hit Indonesia harder than other 
countries in Asia.  In addition, the domestic trade regulations, ill-prepared banking 
system, lack of transparency and monopolistic environment during Suharto’s reign, 
were mostly cited as reasons which made Indonesia more vulnerable to adverse 
external shocks (Fukuoka, 2012; World Bank, 2012; Basri & Eng, 2004).  The Asian 
financial crisis, along with political tensions, was also the key factor that led to the 
collapse of the Suharto autocracy after 32 years in office (Mackie, 2010). 
The transition from Suharto to his successors was followed by substantial 
political reform.  Free and fair elections, the assurance of free press and release of 
political prisoners were examples of the policies that arose as a result of the political 
reform.  The most important policies that influenced the business environment were 
the launching of the decentralisation process, which reduced the power of the central 
government.  
3.3. Decentralisation  
A centralised government is often recognised as one of several burdens that 
slow down the development progress in many countries, including Indonesia.  Prior 
to the decentralisation era, many development programs were created centrally in 




Java.  This led to a high welfare gap between and outside of Java.  Given the intense 
centralist features of former President Suharto’s regime, decentralisation (as a result 
of the political and social reform in the early 2000s) was believed to bring about 
promising benefits. 
Decentralisation in Indonesia is commonly known as regional autonomy 
(otonomi daerah).  Decentralisation is characterised by the dispersing of the central 
authority, which in the Indonesian case, was granted to two levels of local 
governments, namely the provincial, district (kabupaten) and municipal (kota) 
governments.  An advantage of decentralisation is that delegating some authorities to 
local governments may increase public participation, transparency and ensure that 
public service is closer to the public (Hadiz, 2013).   
Political and administrative decentralization was introduced through Law 
No.22/1999 on Regional Government and this was followed by the fiscal 
decentralization Law No.25/1999 on fiscal balance between the central and local 
governments.  The central government then issued subsequent laws (Law No. 
32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004 respectively) to improve many weaknesses in the 
previous laws, especially relating to the concept of decentralisation and public 
participation in the decentralisation process.  One of the clear developments of 
decentralisation was the direct elections of the head of Kabupaten (districts) and 
Kota (municipalities) in 2005.  
Under the decentralisation law, local governments can also exercise their 
rights to make laws on a wide variety of issues.  However, this jurisdictional right 
was not used effectively due to the lack of legal drafting skills from many local 
governments, as well as the intention to produce more laws than what was needed 
(Butt, 2010).  The lack of sufficient knowledge and resources made it harder for the 
local governments to produce sound regulations to create a favourable business 
climate.  As a result, many local governments, along with local parliaments, created 
laws that contradict with other local and national laws.  Extensive laws and the 
significant policy differences between districts and cities were also considered the 
main factors that brought about uncertainty within the business environment in 




decentralisation laws require every local government to set new regulations to 
implement their new authorities.  While small numbers of local governments 
successfully set new regulations to support their authorities, some others had 
difficulties doing so due to their lack of resources and capabilities.  
Decentralisation provides greater autonomy for local governments to manage 
several authorities, which in the past was exclusively managed by the central 
government.  The local budget proposals, recruitment of civil servants, local fees and 
charges, just to name a few, are the areas of authority of the local government.  More 
authority meant more power to the local government.  Direct elections also affected 
the business climate, with more local political actors involved, seeking support from 
their business actors.  As a result, in the post-Suharto regime, political connections 
spread widely and are no longer merely related to the leader of the central 
government, but are now also linked to politicians and law-makers at the local level. 
Fiscal decentralization comes with budgetary consequences.  Many local 
governments, with their law-making powers, issued local laws primarily to increase 
their revenue through imposing more taxes (pajak), user charges (retribusi) and 
complicated licensing processes.  Unfortunately also, many of the local laws were 
unclear, unnecessary and exploitative in nature (Butt, 2010), and as a result, caused 
high economic costs which affected the business actors (Brodjonegoro, 2004).  High 
logistic costs resulted from uncertain custom clearance regulations and additional 
costs were incurred from the illegal collection or bribery of local government 
officials (Patunru, McCulloch, & von Luebke, 2012).  In the past, such extra costs 
could be clearly estimated.  However, the extra costs that are added to production 
costs in the decentralisation era are surrounded with uncertainties.  Thus, the extra 
cost cannot be easily estimated (Brodjonegoro, 2004). 
Unclear hierarchies and authorities between tiers of government (central, 
provincial and district governments) also create confusion for the stakeholders, 
particularly the business actors.  According to the National Trade and Industry 
Chamber (KADIN), there were more than three thousand local regulations (Perda-
Peraturan Daerah) that were not business-friendly and caused a high-cost economy 




with higher-level laws/ policies were cancelled by the central government (Ministry 
of Home Affairs) (KEMENDAGRI, 2012).  Several years later, the situation 
remained the same.  From November 2014 until mid-2015, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs cancelled 139 local regulations (KOMPAS, 22/07/2015).  Many of these 
local regulations were indicative of the ineffective and irresponsive services 
introduced by many districts in Indonesia, which may constrain domestic and 
international investments (von Luebke, 2009). 
Political instability, the complexity of labour regulations and concerns for 
security that ultimately affects the cost of doing business also contributed to the 
uncertainties faced by the firms.  In addition, ongoing changes of regulations, as well 
as the lack of law enforcement have become worse for business people and have 
affected their ability to cope with the numerous business regulations.  There is no 
clarity on the local fiscal and business regulations and policies for business activities.  
Hence, many potential investors highlight a greater challenge from the local 
regulations, rather than the local economic potential in making their investment 
decisions (Brodjonegoro, 2004).  
Decentralisation, apart from its benefits, has also created a complex and 
uncertain environment for private enterprises, due to the fact that they need to deal 
with multiple regulatory levels.  While all firms are affected by the complexity 
surrounding the regulatory environment in Indonesia, this burden is even greater for 
small and medium enterprises.  
3.4. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia 
The definition of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (also referred to in 
this study as small firms) is important, since the term can cause confusion and even 
constraints in policy implementation if each institution has a different classification 
and definition (Mourougane, 2012).  We use the term ‘small firms’ to differentiate 
them from larger firms.  However, to give a more detailed explanation in terms of 
size distinction, the criterion of the World Bank Enterprise Survey (World Bank, 
2009) is commonly used in many studies wherein a firm size is defined by the 




while one with 20 - 99 employees is defined as a medium-sized firm1.  In this study, 
both small and medium-sized enterprises are included and the number of employees 
is used as the criterion.  We use SMEs and small firms interchangeably and only 
refer to them in the context of the formal sector. 
The contribution made by SMEs to the economic development of many 
countries, particularly developing countries, has been widely acknowledged 
(Mourougane, 2012; Nichter & Goldmark, 2009; Berry et al., 2001).  Many studies 
have emphasised the importance of SMEs in terms of their high proportion of overall 
business operations in various economies, as well as the contributions made by 
SMEs as providers of employment opportunities to economic development.  In 
Indonesia, SMEs dominate the composition of enterprises in terms of proportion, 
even superseding large enterprises (Table 3.1).  In addition, SMEs are also perceived 
as fostering a competitive environment with their large numbers within national 
economies, while having the ability to adapt to constantly changing business 
environments. 
Table 3.1: Composition of Indonesian Enterprises Based on Scale (2005-2013) 
Year 
Enterprise Scale (in thousands) 
Micro Small Medium MSME % Large % Total 
2005 45 217 1 694 105.4 47 017 99 5.02 0.01 47 022 
2006 48 512 472.6 36.7 49 021 99 4.57 0.01 49 026 
2007 49 608 498.5 38.2 50 145 99 4.46 0.01 50 150 
2008 50 847 522.1 39.7 51 409 99 4.65 0.01 51 414 
2009 52 176 546.6 41.1 52 764 99 4.67 0.01 52 769 
2010 53 823 573.6 41.6 53 823 99 4.83 0.01 53 828 
2011 55 206 602.1 44.2 55 206 99 4.95 0.01 55 211 
2012 55 856 629.4 48.9 56 534 99 4.96 0.01 56 539 
2013* 57 189 654.2 52.1 57 895 99 4.96 0.01 57 900 
Source: Kementrian koperasi dan UKM (2009; 2012).  
                                                 
1 There are several definitions and classifications of SMEs which vary across institutions and 
countries.  The variables used to rank firms such as the number of employees, net assets and sales and 
investment levels.  In Indonesia, the general term used is Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise or 
MSMEs (Usaha mikro, kecil dan menengah-UMKM) and is used differently by various institutions 
and government agencies.  It is even used as the name of a ministry -“The Ministry of Cooperative 
and MSMEs”.  Micro enterprises are mostly informal and mostly in the agriculture sector.  Also, they 





* Note: Estimated figures based on the latest available data. 
Table 3.1 shows the increasing number of total SMEs in Indonesia.  SMEs in 
Indonesia account for almost 97% of all firms in all sectors.  Meanwhile, Table 3.2 
indicates the important influence of SMEs in the Indonesian economy in providing 
job opportunities, contributing to the non-oil and gas exports, as well as in alleviating 
poverty.  From 2005-2011, SMEs make up more than 90% of the total workforce in 
Indonesia.  Apart from employment creation, a huge number of SMEs also reflects 
the potential contribution of SMEs to the development of entrepreneurship, industry 
and the rural economy.  During the financial crises in 1997-1998 and 2008-2009, 
SMEs played an important role in supporting the Indonesian economy.  Not only did 
SMEs play a role through domestic activities, but they also provided employment 
opportunities (Mourougane, 2012) and contributed to value-adding, as compared to 
larger firms (Berry et al., 2001).   
Table 3.2: Indonesian Employment by Enterprises Scale (2005-2011) 
Year Enterprises Scale (Millions) 
Micro Small Medium MSME % Large % Total 
2005 69.96 9.20 4.41 83.58 96.80 2.71 3.15 86.30 
2006 82.07 3.13 2.69 87.9 97.30 2.44 2.70 90.35 
2007 84.42 3.27 2.76 90.49 97.27 2.53 2.73 93.027 
2008 87.81 3.51 2.69 94.02 97.15 2.75 2.85 96.78 
2009 90.01 3.52 2.67 96.2 97.30 2.67 2.70 98.88 
2010 93.01 3.62 2.75 99.40 97.22 2.83 2.78 102.24 
2011 94.95 3.91 2.84 101.72 97.24 2.89 2.76 104.61 
2012 99.85 4.53 3.26 107.65 97.60 3.15 2.84 110.808 
2013* 104.6 5.57 3.94 114.144 96.90 3.53 3.01 114.144 
Source: Kementrian koperasi dan UKM (2009; 2012).  
* Note: Estimated figures based on the latest available data. 
The Enterprise Survey conducted by the World Bank (2009) found that SMEs 
in Indonesia are more likely to pay a bribe as compared to the large firms.  In 
addition, the survey also revealed that most SMEs seem to expect to bribe officials so 
as to obtain a license.  Apart from the low level of law enforcement in Indonesia, 
such situations also reflect the less supportive environment for SMEs, compared to 




Indonesia need twice as many days to get an operating license, as compared to larger 
firms.  Various intervention programs by the government to develop SMEs were 
ineffective, due to minimum comprehensive evaluation (Hill, 2001).  A lack of co-
ordination among government agencies at different levels with various SME-
development programs also made the situation more complex for SMEs 
(Mourougane, 2012; Hill, 2001).  
SMEs in Indonesia are mostly operating in the informal sector and are 
characterised by low value-added goods for the local markets (Tambunan, 2011).  
Compared with other leading Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand 
and Singapore, Indonesia has a heavy regulatory burden that influences the decision 
of SMEs to become formal or legally registered (Mourougane, 2012).  Apart from 
less incentives for SMEs to become formal as compared to other regions, the 
complicated procedures and corrupt local authorities that informal businesses face 
(see Table 3.3) can hamper the formalisation interests of SMEs (Vial, 2011).  In 
addition, being a formal institution does not stop the difficulty for SMEs, since they 
have to deal with labour regulations, local taxes, workplace safety and many other 




Table 3.3: Small Firms and Regulatory Environment (Regulation, Taxes and 











Days to obtain import license n/a 11.8 10.0 10.5 16.4 
Days to obtain construction-
related permit 
34.1 17.0 68.2 32.3 46.1 
Days to obtain operating license 22.3 16.9 14.8 21.2 16.3 
Senior management time spent 
in dealing with requirements of 
government regulation (%) 
1.5 4.8 7.1 1.9 7.3 
Firms are expected to give gifts 
in meetings with tax inspectors 
(%) 
12.5 23.0 9.9 14.0 19.1 
Firms are expected to give gifts 
to secure a government contract 
(%) 
50.9 59.2 59.4 53.0 31.5 
Firms are expected to give gifts 
to get a construction permit (%) 
38.0 25.4 72.3 37.1 31.8 
Firms are expected to give gifts 
to get an import license (%) 
n/a 24.2 17.7 19.5 19.2 
Firms are expected to give gifts 
to get an operating license (%)  
25.2 29.5 26.0 25.9 17.7 
Firms with bank loans/ line of 
credit (%)  
16.5 27.6 47.1 18.2 40.4 
Firms with a checking or 
savings account (%) 
46.3 89.1 92.5 51.5 89.6 
Firms formally registered at the 
start of their operations (%)  
24.7 55.0 91.3 29.1 83.9 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey, World Bank (2009).  Retrieved from 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/GIAWB/EnterpriseSurveys/Documents/Pr
ofiles/English/indonesia-2009.pdf  
Note: Size is defined by the number of employees: Small (1-19), medium (20-99) 
Table 3.3 above shows some of the enterprise survey indicators that signals 
the obstacles faced by firms from all levels.  It also shows factors that may affect 
how firms deal with the challenging business environment in Indonesia.  Some firms, 
for example, provide gifts to government officials to secure a construction permit and 
to secure an import license.  The table indicates that business actors still face major 




A study by the Regional Autonomy Watch (KPPOD, 2011) found that small 
firms were more negatively affected by regulations, since many of the regulations 
caused an increase in their transaction costs.  Given their scale, small firms also had 
to pay more taxes and user charges per worker as compared to their larger 
counterparts.  In addition, many small firm owners believed that the local 
government favoured large firms over them (KPPOD, 2011). 
Despite the growth potential of SMEs in Indonesia, their performance is 
limited by a number of constraining factors.  Some of these include the informality of 
operations (Zhou, 2013; Mourougane, 2012; Sari et al., 2008; Hill, 2001), ineffective 
support from the government (Berry, Rodriguez, & Sandee, 2002; Hill, 2001), lack 
of foreign market knowledge and experience (Bhasin & Venkataramany, 2010; Sari 
et al., 2008), lack of innovation and productivity (Mourougane, 2012), as well as 
uncertainty of the non-market environment (Marino et al., 2008).  
The uncertainty caused by the lack of clear rules of interaction of businesses 
with political factors concerning local governments, the business environment, red 
tape and rent-seeking activities (Peng & Heath, 1996) can lead to a high transaction-
cost economy for SMEs (Hoskisson et al., 2000).  Some research studies have shown 
that institutional transitions in emerging economies offer new perspectives on 
strategic choices (Yuanqiong et al., 2007; Peng, 2003).  A number of studies have 
highlighted the importance of implementing non-market strategies for small firms 
(Baron, 1995b) to deal with uncertainty.  Non-market strategies include building 
political connections (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001), lobbying (Lawton & Rajwani, 
2011; Hillman et al., 1999), corporate social responsibility or philanthropy (Baron, 
2007; Baron & Diermeier, 2007a) and business owners turning into politicians 
(Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009).  Apart from the fact that such 
strategies can boost the performance of businesses and affect their respective values 
(Zhou, 2013; Deng et al., 2012; Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001), they might be the only 
choices available for these businesses to survive (Bengtson et al., 2009). 
To sum up, SMEs in Indonesia are more affected by over-regulation and 
regulatory uncertainties when compared to their larger counterparts (Mourougane, 




2009), political instability is also one of the main constraints faced by businesses in 
Indonesia.  However, it is worth noting that some improvements have been made 
through the One-Stop Service program and the nationwide introduction of a 
computerised system for company registration.  These programs are expected to 
simplify the business licensing process in Indonesia, particularly for small firms.  
Given the strategic position of small firms in the Indonesian economy and the 
complexity surrounding the operations of small firms in Indonesia, it is important to 
understand how they interact with the government in employing non-market 
activities.  Despite the fact that firms, regardless of their size, display various 
managerial behaviours (Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 2001), the growing body of research in 
small firms has not sufficiently encapsulated the behaviour of small firms in non-
market environments.  Hence, this study fills this gap within the context of 
Indonesia. 
3.5. Size Does Matter 
Research on the business-government interaction indicated that the size of the 
firm is one of the main antecedents that influence the level at which firms deal with 
their non-market environments.  Hillman et al. (2004) and Lux et al. (2011) 
identified that in corporate political activity (CPA) literature, firm size is a part of a 
firm’s political antecedents at the firm-level analysis.  As mentioned by various 
scholars, the measurement gauge of a firm’s size varies from sales, assets, market 
share to the number of employees.  
While most empirical studies assess the size of the firm as an important 
antecedent, there is no clear explanation yet as to why size is a predictor of the 
political action of the firm.  A compelling and practical argument is that larger firms 
are more visible, as compared to their smaller counterparts.  Resource-based theories 
argue that a firm’s contribution is mostly influenced by its resources (Barney, 
Wright, & Ketchen, 2001).   
Hadjikhani and Ghauri (2001) argue that larger firms are more powerful as 




provide more essential services to the government in its political activities.  This is 
understandable since large firms have more resources (Lux et al., 2011; Hillman et 
al., 2004) that will affect their knowledge and commitment in the relationship 
(Hadjikhani, Lee, et al., 2008).  Political knowledge refers to the know-how or 
understanding of the needs of political parties, which is important in maintaining the 
connection, as well as the knowledge about political decisions (Bengtson et al., 
2009).  Commitment, on the other hand, refers to the resources that the business 
actors have made in order to succeed in the relationship, which is used to deal with 
political organisations (Hadjikhani, Lee, et al., 2008).  
Knowledge, as well as commitment dimensions, is important in the context of 
how firms organise their political initiative.  Small firms, given their limited 
resources and bargaining power, are restrained to initiate a major political action 
(Bengtson et al., 2009).  Small firms also often have limited choices when faced with 
rent-seeking attitudes from the government officials (Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & 
Rubanik, 2011).  As a result, political tactics are only deployed when certain issues 
such as legislative requirements and any regulation-related matters arise.  In 
implementing their political tactics, small firms often rely on the intermediaries in 
representing their concerns (Bengtson et al., 2009).  On the other hand, larger firms 
may organise more structural tactics individually to target rules and regulations, in 
order to gain favourable treatment (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008).  
The size of the firm is also important in the context of the political 
environment, since it is an indication of the preference for political involvement of 
the business actors.  Rehbein and Schuler (1999) pointed out that apart from 
representing resources, the size of the firm also represents the political power that 
firms have.  In other words, the larger the firm, the more stakeholders (voters) there 
are involved in the action and the more effects the government and politicians have 
to consider (Hillman et al., 2004).  In the USA, firm size also influences a firm’s 
resources and the condition by which they interact with the government, as well as 
the capabilities with regards to the level of lobbying (Drope & Hansen, 2006).  In 
emerging economies, the size of the firm also influences its position as the target of 




unstable institutional environment, small firms are more vulnerable than larger firms 
(Peng & Luo, 2000).  
Cook and Fox (2000) however, indicated a different scenario as they found 
that small firms are more active as compared to their larger counterparts.  Although a 
lack of resources mean that the smaller firms cannot match the larger firms’ 
approaches, the latter has different patterns of how they engage in public policy 
processes.  It should be noted that the result of such strategies are also affected by the 
level of the government which the firm deals with, as well as the issues related to the 
firm.  Therefore, when small firms are affected by particular issues beyond their 
territories, they tend to form a collective action (Cook & Barry, 1995) and are forced 
to adapt to the political environment (Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 2001).  Conversely, 
Hadjikhani and Ghauri (2001) also found that not all small firms are affected 
homogeneously but instead, they are affected based on the political issues, 
administrative commitments and connections to the political actors in the political 
arena.  On the other hand, these varying factors may also become factors that bring 
small firms together as a homogenous group, which can then be employed to initiate 
a strategic decision, namely collective action.  
3.5.1. The Role of Intermediaries  
Collective action is used by small firms through business association, so that 
their interests could be effectively represented.  There are two main reasons for small 
firms to get involved in collective action through business association (Wilts & 
Meyer, 2005).  First, collective action helps small firms exercise their influence in 
the industry and be aware of their position within the competitive map, through 
cooperation and acting collectively with their competitors.  Second, small firms can 
gain expertise and information from acting collectively.  This may be employed to 
improve the firm’s individual performance.   
According to Hillman and Hitt (1999), prior to the decision of acting 
collectively or individually, a firm should consider several factors such as industry 
concentration, government contract option and seeking import protection.  Apart 




association to act collectively.  As argued by Olson (1965), even though all firms 
have a common interest in engaging in collective action, in reality, there are no 
commonalities in sharing costs and efforts in pursuing collective action.  Time 
perspective, therefore, is one of the common filters to accommodate the free-rider 
problem within the area of collective action. 
Bengtson, Hadjikhani, and Pahlberg (2011) claimed that using the time 
perspective on the interaction of small firms within the political environment could 
be either short or long-term.  The decision to use either of the two time perspectives 
would be based on the political factors.  Given the limited resources of small firms, 
for the short-term approach, they tend to use ad hoc issue-related relationships, in 
which specific tactics would be implemented when the issue occurred.  Long-term 
dimension on the other hand, has a tendency to reach a more general issue with more 
general political actors. 
3.6. Chapter Summary  
The business environment in Indonesia has changed significantly as a result 
of the Asian financial crises that led to political and social changes.  The 
implementation of decentralisation and the downfall of former President Suharto in 
1998 made the business environment more complex and challenging.  Political 
instability and uncertainty were due to unclear regulation, multiple state players and 
also additional costs that arose from illegal collection or bribery of local government 
officials.  A positive impact of decentralisation resulted when some local 
governments became aware of the need to improve their regions and take the 
opportunity to implement good governance.  However, decentralisation for business 
actors meant the opportunity for local governments to influence the local business 
climate.  SMEs are one of the most affected sectors of the changing political 
landscape in Indonesia, particularly when the local governments can exercise their 
authority.   
SMEs are commonly characterised as a significant source of employment and 
such is the case with Indonesia as an emerging market.  SMEs are also the dominant 




However, this significant number does not make SMEs immune from uncertainties.  
Security concerns, excessive additional costs in licencing and administrative matters, 
labour problems and political instability are the main sources of the uncertainty faced 
by SMEs.  Non-market strategies, such as building political ties and personal 
relationships with government officials, have become the choice for SMEs in dealing 
with changing environments.  Apart from the fact that such strategies can boost the 
performance of businesses and affect their respective values, such actions might be 
the only choice available for these businesses to survive. 
Extensive studies focusing on SMEs have been conducted and research in this 
field has matured into a body with multiple sub-genres such as entrepreneurship, 
marketing, finance and leadership (Gao et al., 2013).  However, studies that focus on 
SMEs and non-market environments are rare.  Moreover, most studies on SMEs tend 
to assume that the models derived from larger firms can be applied to small firms 
(Gilman & Edwards, 2008).  As pointed out by Taylor (2006), it is important that 
SMEs or smaller firms are studied in their own right, in order to understand how and 
in what way they behave under non-market environments, rather than contrasting 
them with the ideal image or what small firms should do.  In particular, identifying 
an economic, social and institutional context in Indonesia would be fruitful to seek 
an understanding of the non-market environment faced by SMEs in the country.   
The next chapter will discuss the research method employed in this study, 
including the justifications for using the qualitative approach to address the research 








The objective of this chapter is to present and describe the methodological 
approach used in this research.  This chapter attempts to describe the research design, 
beginning with a brief discussion on the research paradigm underpinning the research 
in Section 4.2.  The chapter also explains qualitative inquiry as the research approach 
adopted for this study and the rationale behind the decision in Section 4.3.  
Furthermore, the use of grounded theory to generate substantive theory is explained 
in this section along with the case study approach and the decision to combine the 
case study approach with grounded theory.  In Section 4.4, the selection of cases was 
provided, where the criteria used by the researcher in choosing the case studies to 
reach the research objectives was listed.  It then followed by the discussion of how 
data were collected and also how the performance of the firm was measured using 
subjective perceptual measures in Section 4.5.  Section 4.6 discusses the data 
analysis process applied, including details of the coding process, the steps involved 
in the coding process and how comparative analysis was used.  This is then followed 
by Section 4.7, where the data analysis procedure is explained.  In Section 4.8, the 
research site, as well as the focal industries in this study, was briefly discussed along 
with the reason for the decision.  The chapter concludes with the steps that have been 
undertaken to ensure that methodological rigour has been adhered to, along with the 
ethical issues that have been considered in this study in Section 4.9 and Section 4.10 
respectively. 
4.2. Research Paradigm 
The concept of paradigm is a common concept used in management research 
after the publication of Burrell and Morgan (1979) work, Sociological Paradigms 




influences the way in which knowledge is interpreted and studied.  A paradigm is a 
systematic set of beliefs which is based on the approach of the researcher to the 
nature of the world and reality (ontology), the theory of knowledge (epistemology) 
and the application of method to study the reality assumptions (methodology) 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Paradigms can be characterised 
into five philosophical traditions namely positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, 
constructivism/ interpretivism and participatory (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). 
Table 4.1 shows how ontological, epistemological and methodological issues are 
addressed by these alternative inquiry paradigms.  
As shown in Table 4.1, ontologically, both positivism and post-positivism 
share a common view that values, objectivism and reality should be separated from 
the researcher and should be value-free (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Epistemologically, 
researchers employ scientific approaches through the application of the methods of 
natural science using quantitative methods to measure social phenomena.  By doing 
this, researchers can draw generalizable inferences from mainstream deductive 
research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The proponents of interpretivism on the 
other hand, believe that social reality may change, is influenced by multiple 
perspectives and is not merely a given (Locke, 2003). Therefore, the researcher needs 
to understand the subjective meaning of social reality and remain open for alternative 
perspectives (Leppäaho, Plakoyiannaki, & Dimitratos, 2015).  Interpretivists believe 
in a dialectical process where researchers accept that people may have different 




Table 4.1: Basic Beliefs of Alternative Inquiry Paradigm 
Issue Positivism Post-Positivism Critical Theory et al. Constructivism/ 
Interpretivism 
Participatory 










virtual reality shaped by 
social, political, cultural, 
economic, ethnic and 
gender values, 










reality, co-created by mind 


















Critical subjectivity in 
participatory transaction 
with cosmos; extended 
epistemology of 
experiential, propositional 

















Dialogic/ dialectical Hermeneutical/ 
dialectical 
Political participation in 
collaborative action 
inquiry; primacy of the 
practical; use of language 
grounded in shared 
experiential context 




To investigate and understand the nature of the non-market environment in 
Indonesia, this study employed the interpretive paradigm as the ontological 
perspective (Lincoln et al., 2011; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Bryman (2012) argued that 
interpretivism asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are continually 
being accomplished by social actors.  It implies that social phenomena are constantly 
changing and therefore, the “causal-functional” approach of natural science is not 
applicable, as argued by Max Weber (O’Gorman & MacIntosh, 2015). Interpretivism 
as a paradigm also provides opportunities for the voice, concerns and practices of 
research participants to be heard.  As the research is focused on the nature of the non-
market environment and actions taken by firms, the ontological assumption is 
aligned on the basis of realities being constructed by the firms under investigation. 
The interpretivist paradigm is thus suited for this study and consequently, these pre-
suppositions are the foundations for designing the research strategies, data collection 
and the choice of methods utilised in this study. 
4.3. Research Approach 
Given the complexity of the non-market environment, the author decided that 
it was more appropriate to conduct the investigation using a qualitative approach. 
The qualitative approach is a form of interpretive inquiry (Creswell, 2012). This 
approach is used to collect and understand human experiences and to discover the 
essential meaning of the problem-situation under the researcher’s investigation 
(Merriam, 2014). Qualitative research is also perceived as the best approach to study 
a particular subject in depth (Myers, 2013) and to uncover causal mechanisms 
through unconventional methods (Bluhm, Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011), which 
may benefit both practitioners and policy-makers (Bloor, 2011). Myers (2009) 
suggested that qualitative methods offer the researcher a variety of options to 
analytically explore and approach various levels of analysis.  It also provides 
multiple choices and the means to explore the complexity and depth of the 
phenomena with multiple perspectives (Creswell, 2012).  
The same argument is shared by management scholars who argue that the 
output of qualitative research “may be of more relevance and interest to management 




addition, the qualitative research approach offers the means to identify general 
patterns relating to important questions in the field of strategic management (Bettis, 
Gambardella, Helfat, & Mitchell, 2015).  It also offers holistic interpretations of 
realities beyond merely measured variables (Rynes & Gephart, 2004) and the 
understanding of the social processes in context (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011), which 
may improve the practical relevance of the findings (Barratt, Choi, & Li, 2011).  
In this context, the qualitative approach is used to meet the objectives of the 
study; to identify the political and social antecedents in the non-market environment 
in Indonesia, as well as to explore and examine the nature of the non-market 
environment in Indonesia.  Through qualitative research, this study can contribute 
insights and assist in the understanding of the non-market environment and strategies 
implemented by small firms in Indonesia, from the perspective of those experiencing 
the phenomenon (Bluhm et al., 2011). In this case, the qualitative approach allows 
the researcher to study a unique situation rather than to generalise data with the 
quantitative approach. 
In this study, the managers’ perceptions (obtained from interviews) are 
considered relevant to answer the research questions.  In this context, as mentioned 
earlier from the assumptions of constructivist ontology, the study adopted an 
interpretivist paradigm as the appropriate epistemology (Lincoln et al., 2011; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). This epistemological position stems from the focus on human 
interpretation and meaning (Yin, 2009), which helps the researcher obtain the 
objectives of the study.  In this case, the researcher needs to interpret and understand 
the realities presented by the participants, instead of merely measuring and 
explaining the realities.  This process encompasses interviewing, analysing and 
writing of the case study — all of which are interconnected and not distinct phases of 
the process.   
Interpretivism offers various scientific inquiry methods.  Creswell (2012) 
identified five common qualitative research strategies, namely; narrative research,  
phenomenology, ethnography, case study and grounded theory study.  Narrative 
research, sometimes also called as biography study, is a study that focuses on the 




understanding of the participant, is required to capture the participant’s experience.  
Phenomenology is a study that not only focus on the individual, but also on the 
experiences of the individual’s lived experience of a phenomenon.  This kind of 
study mostly focuses on what the participant(s) have in common.  Unlike narrative 
studies, the objective of phenomenology studies is “to reduce individual experiences 
with a phenomenon to a description of the universal essence” (Creswell, 2007, p. 58).  
Participants, as objects of the study, particularly entire cultural groups, are also the 
focus in ethnographic research.  Ethnographic studies are driven by the intention to 
describe and interpret the shared patterns of several factors (values, behaviours, 
beliefs) of a cultural sharing group through in-depth observations (Watson, 2011).  A 
good understanding of the social-cultural system and cultural anthropology is a 
critical precondition in this approach.  Case study, on the other hand, is an approach 
where “the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded 
systems (cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information and reports a case description” (Creswell, 2007, p. 
76).  Case study research may involve an individual, a program or a group as the unit 
of analysis.  Meanwhile, the grounded theory approach moves beyond narrative 
study, phenomenology and case study.  Apart from the stories and experiences, the 
orientation of grounded theory is also to generate or even to discover a theory 
through constant comparative analysis and theoretical sampling (Locke, 2003).  
Given the nature of this study which requires an in-depth knowledge of the 
nature of the non-market environment in Indonesia and the experiences of small 
firms in dealing with the non-market environment in Indonesia, the grounded theory 
approach and the case study method are the most appropriate and most suited to this 
present research and hence, were then utilised in this study.  A more thorough 
treatment of the grounded theory and case study approaches follows in Sections 4.3.1 
and 4.3.2 respectively.   
4.3.1. The Grounded Theory Method 
Grounded theory has its roots firmly in Social Sciences, particularly 
Sociology (Goulding, 2002). It was devised by American sociologists, Barney Glaser 




University of California (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  The development of the usage of 
grounded theory can also be seen in the nursing field, where many studies benefited 
from the method; as it can help explain what happened (phenomenon), rather than 
simply describe the case (Benoliel, 1996). Recent studies also stated that grounded 
theory is a valid and useful method in management studies (Locke, 2015; Binder & 
Edwards, 2010; Fendt & Sachs, 2008; Locke, 2003; Goulding, 2002). 
Since the initial development, the grounded theory method has diversified 
from both its initiators, as Glaser and Strauss disagreed on the meaning and 
procedures in implementing grounded theory.  Creswell (2007) stated that there are 
three variations of grounded theory.  First, the “classic grounded theory” or also 
known as Glaserian grounded theory which is associated with Glaser (1978). This 
version has its grounding in the original grounded theory work of Glaser and Strauss 
(1967). The classic grounded theory emphasised the concept of emergence, where 
data emerges from the coding procedure and is not forced (Glaser, 1998). The 
second, a systematic and structured approach from Corbin and Strauss (1990), is also 
known as Straussian grounded theory. Straussian proponents suggested that the 
coding paradigm needs to be verified using technical procedures, rather than merely 
comparative methods of analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The third version of 
grounded theory is the constructivist approach developed by Charmaz (2006). The 
latter version was developed as the refined version from the Glaserian and Straussian 
versions and emphasises that the theory is constructed rather than emergent.  
Glaser and Strauss (1967) argued that a new theory could be developed  by an 
interpretation from the actor who is involved in the “daily realities” through 
constantly and carefully paying attention to the contrast between “what is actually 
going on” in the substantive area.  This can be reached especially when the 
researcher is not influenced by the knowledge acquired prior to the research.  The 
proponents of Glaserian emphasised that “in grounded theory, we do not know until 
it emerges” (Glaser, 1992, p. 95).  Straussian approach, on the other hand, does not 
emphasise the necessity to minimise the preconceptions.  Instead, the approach even 
suggested that the preconceptions based on the literature and experience might 
“stimulate our thinking about properties or dimensions that we can then use to 




In this study, an early literature review was undertaken before data collection 
because firstly, it assisted the researcher in the development of the thesis proposal by 
understanding the current state of the art in the study area and thus, justify the 
decision to conduct the study.  Secondly, the researcher also read literature on 
grounded theory methodology to understand clearly the method and review how 
other researchers conducted the grounded theory method practically.  Thirdly, 
reading literature prior to the data collection and analysis phase aimed to identify 
gaps and the need for the study (Dunne, 2010; Heath, 2006).  It also helped the 
researcher in addressing the concern of where the researcher’s study resides within 
the field of management (Locke, 2003). However, as stated by Urquhart, Lehmann, 
and Myers (2010), any external idea derived from an earlier reading should not 
distract the researcher. 
Apart from their divergences in philosophy and method, the three schools of 
thought have a fundamental agreement that grounded theory can be utilised to 
illuminate social process and associated behaviour (Annells, 1996). In addition, the 
contribution of grounded theory in the development of qualitative research is far 
more important than the epistemological discussion about the differences of 
grounded theory between each school of thought (Fernández, 2004). 
The overall research design for this study follows the grounded theory 
approach developed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), as well as Corbin and Strauss 
(1990), since it provides a systematic procedures and approach (Creswell, 2007) for 
an elaborate process (Lehmann, 2010a). Such clear guidelines for data analysis is 
useful for the novice researcher (Heath, 2006; Heath & Cowley, 2004) to construct 
grounded theories in a consistent manner (Kendall, 1999). The Straussian approach 
also allows the use of existing literature relevant to the research topic (Dunne, 2010).  
The general rationale for choosing a qualitative approach for this study, 
particularly the grounded theory method, is that it was seen as the most appropriate 
methodology.  Moreover, it is most appropriate in the context of ontological and 
epistemological reasons, as the study is expected to explore the nature of non-market 




there are five reasons for the researcher to choose the grounded theory method 
combined with the case study approach for this study. 
Enables research objectives to be achieved.  The main objectives of this 
study are identifying the nature of the non-market environment in Indonesia as an 
emerging economy, as well as the non-market strategies implemented by firms in 
Indonesia.  The aim of grounded theory is “to explore basic social processes and to 
understand the multiplicity of interactions” (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 142). The 
case study also serves as a means to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within 
a real-life context, with the support from multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009). 
Therefore, the combination of the grounded theory method with the case study could 
be utilised in exploring the experiences of small firms in dealing with the non-market 
environment in Indonesia.  It is also suitable to understand the nature of the non-
market environment (core phenomenon) and the antecedents that caused this 
phenomenon (causal conditions) from the participants’ experiences and perspectives 
(consequences) (Creswell, 2007). The adherence to the procedural steps demanded in 
the grounded theory method helped the researcher to formulate a substantive theory 
which is another objective of this study.    
It captures complexity.  Strategic management, which consists of non-market 
strategy, is very complex.  The complexity stems from the environment where 
factors such as social, political and technology may also affect the decision-making 
process. Such complexity requires a comprehensive understanding.  As such, the 
grounded theory style can help the researcher capture such complexities, since the 
method helps the researcher explore participants’ experiences and perspectives 
(Locke, 2003). Furthermore, the exploration can help the researcher reveal 
thoroughly, what is happening in practical life (non-market strategies) at a particular 
time (non-market environment) and at a particular context (Locke, 2003). As argued 
by Corley (2015, p. 2) that grounded theory is a “useful approach in studying 
organisational phenomena particularly those involving change”. 
Systematic procedure.  Charmaz (2006) argued that the grounded theory 
method consists of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analysing 




grounded theory is done simultaneously.  A non-linear process in grounded theory 
also advocates the systematic rigour and thoroughness that helps the researcher 
reveal unexplored phenomenon, such as why the firm implemented a particular non-
market strategy. 
Interpreting experiences.  Parry (1998) noted that central to the grounded 
theory method is the identification of a basic social process, which can then be used 
to explain the social phenomenon under investigation.  Given the experience and 
perspective offered by the participants in the study, grounded theory was chosen to 
help the researcher seek the meaning of the action taken by each firm in response to 
the non-market environment.  Grounded theory can also help the researcher explain 
the patterns from the phenomenon and clarify the process of the implementation of 
non-market strategies by the firms in Indonesia, as these areas are currently 
unexplored. 
Data management.  The grounded theory method was chosen for this study 
because of its suitability to manage qualitative data (Fendt & Sachs, 2008; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967), as well as the fact that it offers a logically consistent procedure in the 
data collection and analysis stage (Charmaz, 2006). The grounded theory method 
also provides the means to analyse the relevance of the data related to the study 
(Glaser, 2008) and the applicability of the findings to be generalised to other 
substantive areas (Fendt & Sachs, 2008).  
4.3.2. The Case Study Approach  
Case study has been accepted and has become one of the popular and relevant 
research strategies in business and management research for decades (Piekkari et al., 
2009; Cassell et al., 2006).  Case studies have made a critical contribution in terms of 
theory building in many areas in management studies (Barratt et al., 2011). The 
adoption of case study in business and management studies can be traced back to the 
long tradition of teaching business to use real-life cases.  Adapting real-life cases to 
the teaching process in business and management classes is very popular since it 




According to Yin (2009), a case study is a particular strategy that allows a 
researcher to conduct an in-depth investigation of a program, an activity, a process or 
one or more individuals. In the case study research, an issue is explored through one 
or more cases within a bounded system (Creswell, 2007). As a strategy for 
qualitative empirical research, a case study is very relevant in the field of 
management and organisation since it allows “understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 533).  
According to (Yin, 2009), using case studies is the preferred strategy to 
facilitate the answering of the “how” and “why” questions, when the researcher has 
little control over events and when the focus is on contemporary phenomena in a 
real-life context. Moreover, case studies are one of the preferred methods of research 
in the evolving business context.  In addition, case studies assist in unfolding 
business and social processes (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Case studies are also 
used to study the social life and experience of an individual or group through 
systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, 
event or group (Berg, 2004). 
Flyvbjerg (2006) pointed out that even though case study is a popular 
research strategy in many disciplines, there are still misunderstandings about case 
study that may undermine its credibility.  These misunderstandings mostly relate to 
generalizability, tendency of generating hypothesis and the difficulties of developing 
general prepositions (Tsang, 2013). Dubois and Gadde (2002) also found that some 
case studies rely on statistical generalisation and has also stronger reliance on theory. 
To avoid such misunderstandings, Cassell and Symon (2006) pointed out that 
case study, and qualitative studies in general, should be taken seriously at the first 
instance. Yin (2009) suggested that the researcher needs to select design and type of 
case study that will be conducted carefully.  The types and design of case studies 
may guide the overall study objective.  Case studies are also “necessarily exploratory 
in nature” to answer the problematic challenge of its generalizability (Tsang, 2013, p. 
11). In addition, an exploratory case study may help the researcher to understand 
how a phenomenon occurs and to understand how organisational dynamics work (De 




along with overlapping data analysis and collection may help the researcher in theory 
development.  In addition, utilising multiple data sources such as interviews, focus 
groups, observation, archival sources and survey as means to collect primarily 
qualitative data can enhance the credibility of case study results (Barratt et al., 2011). 
Utilising multiple methods in collecting data can also be treated as an effort for 
“triangulation” and, therefore can help the researcher in producing meaningful results 
(Bluhm et al., 2011). 
Given the exploratory nature of our research, case study analysis was also 
employed as part of the approach along with grounded theory.  By doing so, we 
expect to systematically analyse from the case to mid-range theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989) or by utilising perspectives of empirical phenomena with the specific context 
(Yin, 2009).  Case studies are useful to explore and investigate real-life phenomenon 
and help to produce deep understanding about the phenomenon.  We expect that such 
approach can help us avoid the “taken for granted” paradigm which leads us to less 
reflection of the study as some previous research on SMEs (Blackburn & 
Kovalainen, 2009).  By doing this, we will need to overcome curiosity regarding case 
study and draw conclusions from the case (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
Therefore, we are giving more attention on social and economic phenomena as an 
important element of theory building (Blackburn & Kovalainen, 2009). 
4.3.3. Combination of Grounded Theory and Case Study Approaches 
Lehmann (2010b) pointed out that traditionally, case study research followed 
positivist model of theory testing in controlled studies.  This is different with 
grounded theory which tends to follow naturalistic approach of ethnography and 
interpretation.  In case study research, for example, the role of literature is essential 
to verify the theoretical framework (Yin, 2009). In grounded theory, on the other 
hand, the role of literature merely is to create theoretical sensitivity in the data 
analysis process to help the researcher generate concepts and guide the researcher 
toward what to do next (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967).  Therefore, utmost care must be considered in combining case study and 
grounded theory method.  Fernández (2004, p. 47) proposed that in doing so, the 




In this study, the grounded theory is used as the overarching methodology 
and is also used as the research basis customised to the case studies (Fernández, 
2004; Whiteley, 2004; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Theoretically, there are similarities 
between grounded theory and case study research.  For the context of this study, 
grounded theory is viewed as a research design and data interpretation style that is 
blended with the case studies’ research designs.  As argued by Locke (2003, p. 24) 
“the grounded theory style of handling and interpreting data may be incorporated 
into case studies”. In particular, grounded theory was used as the basis in collecting 
and analysing data from the case study.  The principles of the grounded theory 
method such as systematically collecting data, theoretical sampling and constant 
comparisons, were used throughout the case studies.  Such “systematic combining” is 
helpful particularly for theory development, where theoretical framework, fieldwork 
and case analysis develop simultaneously (Dubois & Gadde, 2002).  As pointed by 
Krueger, Mellat Parast, and Adams (2013), grounded theory enables researchers to 
investigate complex problems through broader research questions which help the 
researcher in theory development.  Therefore, despite such differences, case study 
method with a more systematic approach can be blended with the grounded theory 
perspective with its informative aspect (Lehmann, 2010b). 
Recent scholars highlighted the success of the combination of grounded 
theory with case studies (Binder & Edwards, 2010; Fernández, 2004; Locke, 2003; 
Lehmann, 2001; Taber, 2000).  One argument to support the decision to combine 
grounded theory and case studies is that in investigating social and organisational 
contexts, the grounded theory method is consistent with an interpretive paradigm of 
case studies (Urquhart et al., 2010; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  Lehmann (2001) 
also pointed out that grounded theory method can be utilised and designed to meet 
the requirement of what constitutes a good case study.   
Moreover, case studies are “exploratory” and “descriptive” in nature and are 
thus, well-suited for this study.  On the other hand, grounded theory’s systematic 
data analysis procedure and techniques such as the constant comparative process and 
theoretical sensitivity coding steps advances the description of the cases.  For the 
context of this study, grounded theory therefore facilitates the better understanding of 




For this reason, seeking theory grounded from case study data has strengths 
compared to other strategies, due to the creative insights in the process of study and 
the close connection between theory and data (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Since the topic of 
non-market strategy is quite broad, this study was designed to be exploratory, which 
helps in clarifying and understanding the issues concerned.  An exploratory study is a 
valuable means of finding out “what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask 
questions and to assess phenomena in a new light” (Robson, 2002). The principal 
ways of conducting exploratory research include a search of the relevant literature 
and conducting interviews. It is believed that newly found insights might demand a 
revision of the research problem and conclusion as the research progresses. 
4.4. Selection of Case Studies 
One of the frequently cited challenges for theorising from case studies is 
related to case selection.  However, as argued by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), 
the focus should not be about the representation of the case to the population. 
Instead, they suggest that given the aim of the case studies is to develop theory, 
theoretical sampling is more appropriate.  Consistent with grounded theory 
methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), theoretical sampling was employed in 
conjunction with purposive sampling throughout the data collection and analysis 
processes. 
Identifying politically connected firms or companies which are implementing 
non-market strategy is difficult as the firms might hide their political connections as 
much as possible (Imai, 2006). To simplify this, the researcher firstly collected data 
regarding the firm, if its members (Founder, CEO or directors) are active politicians, 
as well as the exact political positions that they hold.  Publications such as 
government reports, election committee report and also news reports were chosen to 
identify the political figures that were connected to the firms.  
Identifying firms that have connections to the government through 
government contracts was done through snowballing sampling, which comes from 
the participants of this study and also via discussions with several key figures in the 




literature review (Chapter. 2), the firms that fulfil and rely heavily on government 
markets usually implement corporate political strategy as its non-market strategy.  
In addition, during the interview period (January 2013 - April 2014), there 
were two political events that were held in the province.  Firstly, an election for the 
governor position, which was held on 22 January 2013.  In this election, apart from 
the incumbent, there were two other candidates, the current Mayor of Makassar and 
the head of the Sinjai district.  Secondly, the election for the Mayor of Makassar city 
was held on 18 September 2013. For this election, there were ten candidates.  Also, 
the current Mayor did not participate as it was the second period of his position.  
The two events above made it difficult to find participants who were prepared 
to share their insights regarding the topic of the research.  Even though the latter 
election was held after the interview phase, most of the potential participants 
remained reluctant to be involved in the study.  Apart from the sensitivity of the 
issue, business people are always worried that they will be targeted by the political 
candidates; targeted in the sense that the particular candidate will think that certain 
firms support the opposite candidate instead.  However, most business people chose 
not to show their support in active ways.  As a result, it took the researcher more time 
to build up trust between the researcher and the potential participants.  In the middle 
of the process, several potential participants refused to participate without providing 
a reason.   
Prior to the interview process, the researcher sent a consent form and 
information sheet regarding the study. While letter for interview request was made in 
Bahasa, consent form was created in English first and then translated into Bahasa. 
The english version of the consent form was submitted for ethics review and 
approval from the supervisors. The translation process was done  by the researcher 
and clarified by two research colleagues form Curtin Business School and 
Hasanuddin University for validation and consistency. 
As indicated above, the process of gathering information on the business-
government relationship in South Sulawesi was to some extent very challenging.  To 




environment and the firm’s strategy to be involved in the environment, a list of 
criteria for selecting respondents were used.  It was expected that this would help the 
researcher make objective decisions.  Based on the literature, the following criteria 
were formulated and used for choosing respondents for this study:  
1. The case firms satisfied the grounded definition of “smallness”.  The 
definition of ‘small’ used in this study was based on Law No. 20/2008 
for Micro, Small and Medium enterprise (SME). 
2. The case firms were located in Makassar as the capital city of South 
Sulawesi, so it can be easily reached within daily travelling distance. 
3. The case firms had been operating for a minimum of five years. 
4. The case firms’ owner/ director/ founder is an active politician, a 
government official or has a close relationship with a politician or a 
political party, OR; 
5. The case firms reflect government sales dependency. 
4.5. Data Collection 
Following a series of discussions with journalists, NGO activists and research 
colleagues in Makassar prior to the collection process, the researcher identified and 
contacted 45 individuals to participate in the study.  Prior to the interview process, 
consent forms, as well as formal letters of interview request, were administered to all 
individuals.  Several potential respondents declined to participate, while other 
respondents postponed the initial time for the interview.  
In the first phase of the data collection process, following the assurance of 
confidentiality, the researcher interviewed five SMEs owners.  After the coding and 
initial data analysis process at the first stage of data collection, it was then decided 
that another stage of data collection was needed.  Since the grounded theory concept 
of theoretical sampling (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) guided the interview process, 
additional information are needed to clarify certain emerging concepts. Additional 
information was sought through additional interviews which lead to another stage of 




The second data collection stage involved ten more participants.  The last data 
collection stage involved 12 participants.  All interviews were conducted by two 
research assistants.  The research assistants are postgraduate students at Hasanuddin 
University Makassar who have been trained by the principal researcher and were 
involved in the first two data collection stages.  During the last stage of the interview, 
the principal researcher communicated regularly with the research assistants. 
In total, the study used data interviews from 27 participants, which can be 
divided into three general categories, namely business actors, government officials 
and NGO activists.  The researcher believed that by following such procedures, it can 
accurately reflect the situation where the same phenomenon is studied by multiple 
sources (Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989).  Each participant represents different firms or 
institutions.  These participants were assumed to have a good overview of their entire 
firm or institution, as well as be involved in the decision-making process related to 
the non-market environment.  For the business actors, the author selected firms from 
three different industries, namely the hotel, government contractor and advertising 
industries, respectively.  
The characteristics of the firms, as well as other non-firm informants are 
shown in Table 4.2.  As agreed between the researcher and the firms’ participants, all 
information that may directly be linked to the firm was made anonymous.  Therefore, 





Table 4.2: Characteristics of Participants 
No. of 
Emp. 
Firms’/Institutions’ profile Participants’ Profile 
Name/Industry Years in 
Industry 
Position Age Initials  
93 Hotel ‘AI’ 19 Owner 42 PAR1 
35 Hotel ‘JJ’ 23 Director 40 PAR2 
30 Advertising ‘AN’ 35 Director 33 PAR3 
55 Contractor ‘YN’ 30 Director 34 PAR4 
25 General trading 
‘FD’ 
6 Director 35 PAR5 
55 Contractor ‘BL’ 9 Director 40 PAR6 
10 Contractor ‘HH’ 20 Director 56 PAR7 
52 Contractor ‘LG’ 25 Director/ 
Head of Business 
Assoc. 
53 PAR8 
15 General trading 
‘DM’ 
10 Director 56 PAR9 
50 Medical Equipment 
Provider ‘AW’ 
11 Director 39 PAR10 
10 Contractor ‘BA’ 25 Owner 70 PAR11 
8 Contractor ‘MS’ 5 Owner  59 PAR12 
8 Advertising ‘MS’ 6 Director  29 PAR13 
50 Contractor ‘AR’ 7 Director  - PAR14 
15 Supplier ‘AM’ 11 Director - PAR15 
8 Contractor ‘YH’ 14 Owner - PAR16 
50 Advertising ‘NH’ 24 Director  PAR17 
6 Contractor ‘FI’ 12 Owner 35 PAR18 
8 Advertising ‘AA’ 10 Owner 35 PAR19 
20 Contractor ‘SD’ 19 Owner 51 PAR20 
5 Advertising ‘IF’ 13 Owner 37 PAR21 
100 Hotel ‘AT’ 30 Owner 52 PAR22 
- Hotel ‘AS’ 8 Director 45 PAR23 
- Irman Yasin Limpo  Head of Trade and 
Industrial Agency,  
46 NON1 

















In terms of data collection, an in-depth semi-structured interview was chosen 
since it helps the researcher acquire more information from the participants.  A 
general interview guide was developed prior to the interview to help the researcher 
conduct the interview thematically, despite the fact that the interview was intended to 
be conversational (Bryman, 2012). Interviews were started with open ended 
questions such as, “Please tell me about your company”, “Please tell me about 
yourself”, “What are your company’s market strategies”, “Do you have non-market 
strategies, what are they”, and “Do you think by doing this strategy you get more 
sales and government contracts”.  Follow up questions were directed by answers 
provided by the participants.  The full guide of open ended questions during the 
interview is provided in Appendix B at the end of this thesis.   
The interviews were carried out with the unstructured questions (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008) relating to the non-market environment faced by small firms in South 
Sulawesi. Such an approach has been recognised as particularly valuable when used 
to address sensitive issues.  It is also useful when the researcher accesses the real 
experiences of the participants in dealing with the non-market environment in South 
Sulawesi.  Following the pattern suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998), earlier 
interviews were kept open-ended and broad. The subsequent interviews were more 
directed by emergent themes arising from earlier interviews and data analysis.  All 
interviews were recorded using a digital recorder.  Word processor software was 
used to do the transcription, which was then imported to NVIVO 10, a text-based 
computer-assisted program to store and manage the study data. 
All interviews were conducted at a location and time that was most 
convenient to the participants.  The interviews ranged between 45 to 90 minutes.  
Some interviews were held at coffee shops and restaurants, while others were 
conducted in the participants’ offices.  When the interview was conducted in the 
coffee shops and restaurants, the researcher paid the bills and ensured that the 
participants did not need to pay for any expenses during the interviews.   
All interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia and then translated into 
English.  The interviews were audio taped and transcribed.  The transcripts served as 




translation was correct, we double checked the translation result with two other 
research colleagues.  These two research colleagues served as the translation 
moderator (Nes, Abma, Jonsson, & Deeg, 2010). The first research colleague was an 
Indonesian that also a PhD student in Curtin Business School. Another translation 
moderator is a lecturer at the department of Management in Hasanuddin University 
Indonesia.  The reason to choose the translation moderator was that both research 
colleagues were trained in qualitative research and has a close working relationship 
with the researcher. After completing all transcripts in Bahasa, the researcher then 
translated them into english. All english version of the transcripts then submitted to 
the translation moderators for clarification as part of collaborative work to bridge the 
language differences (Welch & Piekkari, 2006). Final check was conducted with 
clarifying all the translation result with one of the colleague at the language centre in 
Hasanuddin University. The interview data was complemented with a range of 
secondary data (statistics, government reports, news reports, web page information) 
that was publicly available, to help us ensure the reliability and construct validity and 
also served as a means of triangulation. 
4.5.1 Measurement of Firm Performance  
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.6, majority of the studies conducted on 
non-market strategies emphasised the strong link between non-market strategies, 
especially political strategy, and firm performance (Lux, 2008; Oliver & Holzinger, 
2008).  However, there is no single set of agreed variables or constructs used by 
scholars in measuring firm performance related to the implementation of non-market 
strategy.  Rather, various indicators have been suggested in the literature.  Hillman et 
al. (2004) argue that there are two factors that cause difficulties in reaching an 
agreement on common performance measures: the first is the nature of political 
strategy which reflects the complexity making it hard to measure performance; and 
second is the difficulty in isolating the effect of political strategies on performance.  
The situation is even more challenging in the context of emerging markets and small 
firms (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng & Luo, 2000).  This issue is also confounded by 
many factors such as the lack of reliable accounting system, limited access to 
publicly available financial data, and even reluctance by the managers to provide 




In this study, firm performance was evaluated using subjective measurement, 
where the perception of managers of small firms was used to reflect firm 
performance.  The reasons for employing subjective measures are as follows: firstly, 
there is no publicly reliable data available recording the performance of the small 
firms and secondly, even if the participating firms in the study kept their own data, 
they were reluctant to provide the data to the researcher.  As discussed in Section 
2.6.1, subjective perceptual measurement in the topic of firm performance is 
acceptable if objective measures are difficult to obtain (Dess & Robinson, 1984). 
During the interview, participants were asked about their perception on the 
performance of the firm.  The question asked from the participants include: “How 
did your firm perform this year”, Did you get more contracts this year than in 
previous years”, “Do you think you are selling more products this year compared to 
last year”, “How do you think your performance is compared to other firms in the 
same industry?”. 
4.6. Data Processing and Coding  
In the grounded theory method, coding is the central action that is used for 
analysing the text and subsequently interpreting and judging by the researcher 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Conceptual abstraction and reintegrating data as a theory 
takes place during the coding process.  Corbin and Strauss (1990) proposed three 
layers of coding process that is rigorous and defined by technique, but still remaining 
flexible in certain circumstances.  The three coding processes are open coding, axial 
coding and selective coding.  
In this study, the purpose of coding is to generate theory for the case and not 
for validation (Whiteley, 2004). As a result, during the coding process, the researcher 
occasionally identified concepts using literary terms, or the terms that are commonly 
used in the literature of the field of study.  For example, the term “non-market” has 
been used in this study regularly.  This was influenced by the reading of the literature 
in the field of study.  The use of literary terms in this study does not mean that the 
perspective of the researcher will be contaminated by the literature and will 




the literary terms will help the researcher to elaborate from existing theories, rather 
than directly or unconsciously test the hypothesis (Suddaby, 2006). As suggested by 
Heath (2006), knowledge from the literature prior to the study is important to 
identify the significance of the study, as well as to gain familiarity with the literature.  
The next step is axial coding, where the researcher links categories to their 
sub-categories.  In this stage, the categories are refined through examination and then 
compared and contrasted with other categories.  By doing this, the researcher sought 
to understand the phenomenon of the categories and how it happens.  During the 
axial coding process, the researcher also sought any details and contributing factors 
that are related to the categories such as organisation details or regulations.  Major 
categories, as a result of continued examinations to the sub-categories, were tested in 
order to confirm or refute them.  Hawker and Kerr (2007) suggested that in order to 
gain more insight from the process, the researcher should ask further questions and 
examine the available data. 
The final step is selective or analytical coding, where the researcher tries to 
integrate and refine the categories from theoretical perspectives and subsequently 
develop the theoretical scheme.  The theoretical scheme or core category can be 
drawn when a category is mentioned with high frequency and is well-connected with 
other categories.  In this process, the core category is used as the thread for the study 
in integrating all aspects of the emerging theory.  
The formal process of coding in this study began shortly after the first 
interview had been conducted.  Inductive reasoning was used as a guideline for the 
data analysis process and grounded theory.  In total, 215 codes (Appendix B) 
emerged from the interview transcripts during the initial coding process.  NVIVO 10 
(see Figure 4-1) was used to help with the management codes at this stage.  It 
allowed the researcher to not only code the data, but also to rename and merge 





Figure 4.1: NVIVO Was Used to Manage Data during the Study 
The structure and organisation of categories in the open coding process was 
altered several times due to coding inconsistency and labelling ambiguity.  In the 
following excerpt from an interview transcript (Table 4.3), the process of initial or 
open coding is shown.  In the open coding process, the codes were more descriptive 
and multi-dimensional so as to identify what was happening in the data.  The coding 
process also avoided the over-consideration of relevance (Glaser, 1978) and 
therefore, the researcher coded as many codes as possible. Common themes or issues 
were identified using line-by-line analysis and sometimes with labels that involved 
conceptually labelling responses, phrases or words taken directly from the 
participants’ own words.  During the process, coding consistencies were checked and 
rechecked using coding rules that were also revised several times.  The same process 




Table 4.3 Example of the Initial Coding Process 
The categories that emerged from the open coding process were then sorted 
non-hierarchically into a range of categories and themes that were derived from the 
research questions.  This was done through identifying commonality with words and 
phrases.  To identify patterns of meaning and similarity of issues, each category from 
the initial coding process were constantly compared and grouped together in the axial 
coding process (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Each category was also assessed to check 
for overlapping and similarity and was then merged together, resulting in a reduced 
list of categories (Table 4.4).  Even though open coding and axial coding are two 
distinct stages, in practice, the researcher continuously alternated between the two 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Memos, diagrams and relevant literature were used during 
the open and axial coding processes to check for accuracy and wider applicability. 
Interview Transcript Open Coding Framework 
We have more regulations now compare to the 
past 10-15 years.  But again, the problem is 
usually in the implementation and law 
enforcement.  For business, I think the most 
important thing is stability and clear of 
regulation implementation.  We have ASEAN 
free trade agreement in 2015, and the 
government has to help the business to anticipate 
this, [PAR #2]. 
Over-regulation, Problem in 
regulation, Confusing 
Regulation, Law Enforcement, 
Regulatory Efficiency, Challenge 
for the future, The importance of 
the government for the 
competition  
Look, they have already decided which firm wins 
the contract even before the bid invitation is 
announced.  Our main problem is the low level 
of law enforcement.  If you think about this, you 
can get frustrated, [NON #2]. 
Lack of Transparency, Law 
Enforcement, Frustration 
surrounding firms 
Generally, you have to deal with all levels and 
treat them as an important part of your network. 
Top officials must be very important since they 
are the one who make decisions.  For low level 
officials, we usually give them cigarette or small 
souvenirs to show our grateful, [PAR #3]. 
Government problems, 
Complicated matters with the 
government, Lobbying, Non-





Table 4.4  Final Coding Framework 
The third phase is the selective coding.  Strauss and Corbin (1998) argued 
that the goal of this phase is to establish a core category or central phenomenon.  A 
core category is expected to integrate all categories resulting from previous phases 
(open and axial coding).  Major categories were integrated into theoretical schemes 
as a basis for refining the theory.  Therefore, the core category was labelled 
sufficiently abstract and could be used in other research (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In 
this study, “institutional constraints” emerged as the integrating theme of the 
research. 
A workflow of how the coding processes in this study was conducted can be 
seen in Figure 4-2, which is built on the grounded theory practice (Richards, 2009). 
The workflow is not a simple linear process.  The researcher moved back and forth, 
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even facing challenges such as over coding and consistency in coding.  The problem 
with identifying and redefining codes also influenced the process.  Constant 
comparison (Heath & Cowley, 2004) was used to evaluate the concepts against each 
other and among themselves. This process led the researcher to a theoretical level of 
abstraction (Richards, 2009). 
 
Figure 4.2: Workflow of Coding Process 
The workflow indicated that the process started with open coding to see the 
emergence of the initial coding.  The researcher then developed tentative categories 
resulting from open coding activities.  The tentative categories were constantly 
compared with the new emergent categories that are developed.  Constant 
comparative analysis was employed during the coding process.  Theoretical 
sensitivity was formulated at this stage based on the patterns that emerged.  Once the 
theoretical and sampling saturation was reached, theory development subsequently 
started.  During the coding process, memos were written to help the researcher 
develop ideas and clarify the coding process.  It also helped the researcher identify 
the codes that were initially treated as analytical categories.  The memos were 
written in the form of a narrative text and also in the form of questions such as “What 
is going on here?” and “How can I make sense of it?”  
4.7. Data Analysis 
Corbin and Strauss (1990) put forward eleven basic procedures to follow in 




modified them to meet the objectives and context related to this study.  The grounded 
theory research process implemented for this study is summarised in Figure 4-3.  
Even though the figure shows that the process may appear chronological and linear, 
the actual process of grounded theory in this study was not linear.  The process was 
messy as the researcher had to simultaneously move backwards and forwards 
throughout the study.  In the coding process for example, while coding the interview 
transcript, the researcher also continued to search through the literature to ensure that 
the label of coding used was a correct fit with the body of knowledge.  In another 
step, once the open coding was done, the researcher then proceeded to the further 
data collection stage based on the result of the open coding.  It was then followed 
with the coding process that provided output such as concept and categories.  Thus, 






Figure 4.3: The Grounded Theory Research Process, Developed from Strauss 




Following Locke (2003) and Corbin and Strauss (1990), the procedures in the 
grounded theory method for this study are highlighted and followed the steps 
outlined below: 
• It began with general research questions which led the researcher to 
decide that the grounded theory method was the most appropriate 
method to be used for this study.  The rationale behind this decision 
has been clarified in the previous section. 
• A list of prospective participants was created based on the criteria as 
mentioned in the literature (theoretical sampling) and the decision for 
the sampling was discussed in the “case selection” section in this 
chapter.  Theoretical sampling refers to the process of further data 
collection directed by the results from the earlier sample (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967), as the theory emerges.  
• Relevant data was collected.  The researcher relied on interviews to 
best capture the experiences of the participants as the objective of this 
study proposed.  Other relevant data was also collected, such as 
government documents and regulations.  At the first stage, eight 
interviews were conducted.  During the data collection process, 
memos were written to help the researcher with documenting the ideas 
along with the impressions during the interview.  Data was then 
coded, where the researcher tried to generate concepts through 
identification and labelling.  Similar phenomena were then 
categorised into concepts according to their meaning and relevance to 
the study.  At this stage, the open coding process was conducted, with 
the constant movement back and forth during the coding process.  
This stage confirmed the need for the theoretical sampling and further 
data collection.  
• Through a constant comparison of indicators and concepts resulting 
from the previous steps, the researcher reviewed, put back data and 
connected them with categories.  Constant comparison indicated the 
simultaneous process of coding and analysing of data collected 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and forced the researcher to reflect on the 




transcript).  The contextualisation of the code led to the identification 
of a pattern.  The constant comparison process was applied throughout 
the analysis stage of this study, where the researcher sought out the 
similarity and differences of selections of data.  It also helped the 
researcher see whether the data selections confirmed the existing data 
or not.  Constant comparison continued until theoretical saturation 
was reached during the analysis stage.  
• Categories were saturated during the coding process.  It was done by 
constant redefining and restructuring of categories, including reducing 
the number of categories which led to the higher level concepts. 
• The next step was another coding process, where the researcher 
carefully selected the core category or central issue and systematically 
connected it to other categories.  Validation of this connection was 
also carefully analysed.  The outcome of the coding process was the 
proposal of a theoretical model.  
• Categories were found saturated and core categories were identified.  
The core categories as the higher level concepts were checked, refined 
and integrated with the theory.  The core categories were also 
systematically related to other categories and then further 
conceptualisation continued until the final report was completed. 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) argued that the general rule of grounded theory is 
to gather data until each category is found saturated. Saturation refers to the situation 
where no additional data are found to add new concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) or 
similar instances occur over and over again with no significant variation. Theoretical 
saturation is achieved through a constant comparison process where no new 
properties emerge from the coding process.  Glaser and Strauss (1967) concluded 
that saturation does not relate to the number of cases or participants, but on how 
many different concepts are identified by the researcher.  Therefore, the interviews 
conducted in this study will be stopped once saturation has been reached. 
In this study, after conducting 27 interviews, the researcher did not find any 
new category or concept, which indicated that saturation has been reached.  Reviews 




data emerging from the addition of new participants.  It also indicated that the 
categories were well-developed and the relationship between categories was 
validated and well-established. 
4.8. Research Site and Selection of Focal Industries 
4.8.1 Study Site 
In this thesis, the South Sulawesi province of Indonesia was selected as the 
research area as it represents an illustration of the dynamic change that defines an 
emerging market.  The province, thus, provides an ideal setting to study the non-
market environment faced by small firms with the economic development process in 
emerging markets.  
South Sulawesi is one of the major provinces in Indonesia.  The province is 
also a central place for trading, business as well as education, particularly for the 
eastern part of Indonesia.  As shown in Figure 4.3, the province is centrally located.  
Due to its geographical position as the centre point of Indonesia, the province is 
viewed as a gateway to the eastern part of Indonesia.  The opening of the new airport 
in 2008 has benefited the province’s economy, particularly Makassar city.  The 
airport serves as a hub for several international flights to other Asian countries.  In 
addition, the province has Soekarno-Hatta port, which is one of the main ports in 
Indonesia for exports and imports.  Supported by good infrastructure and its 
geographical advantage, the province is an attractive place for investors.  Moreover, 
Makassar is the capital and administrative centre of the province of South Sulawesi.  
Historically, it is a major place for trade with regular domestic and international 





Figure 4.3: Map of Indonesia Showing South Sulawesi (Sulawesi Selatan-red 
circled) located at the central point of Indonesia 
Source: Google Maps, 2015. Retrieved from https://www.google.com.au/maps/@-
0.1777172,117.4253331,6z, Copyright (2015) Google. 
South Sulawesi province administrates 21 regencies (kabupaten) and three 
municipalities (kota), with 304 districts and 2,993 definitive villages.  The total 
population of South Sulawesi, based on the latest population census, is 8.3 million 
(Statistics South Sulawesi, 2014), which makes the province the most populated 
province in the eastern part of Indonesia. South Sulawesi is one of the main 
producers of food crops in Indonesia, with rice as the main crop produced.  In 2013, 
the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) of South Sulawesi was recorded as 
IDR 184.7 billion.  The agricultural sector still dominates as the largest value-added 
sector followed by trade, hotel and restaurant sectors (Statistics South Sulawesi, 
2014). 
The excessive size of Losari coastal reclamation, a landmark of the city, in 
the last ten years, as well as Karebosi, a public square at the heart of the city, as a 
public space which turned to be a commercial arena, are two examples showing how 
business and government intimately tie-up in South Sulawesi.  For the coastal 
reclamation itself, only a handful of entrepreneurs were involved in the process; most 
of them are well-known for their personal or political ties with the city/ municipal 
and provincial government leaders.  Apart from violating the rules both on the local 




already damaged.  In Karebosi, a public square which consists of a dozen football 
fields and several other sports courtyards were converted into an underground mall 
and shopping centre surrounding the square.  Although the development project of 
Karebosi shopping centre aesthetically improved the appearance of the city and also 
became one of the city’s landmarks, such privatization of public spaces has faced 
criticism from groups of people.  Students and non-government organisations 
(NGOs) in Makassar rejected the reclamation idea due to the violation of the rules 
and corruption allegations in the process of privatisation (Cora, 2012; Mulyadi, 
2010). Furthermore, the development project was viewed as the product of 
clientelism that undermined political accountability.  
Therefore, the reasons for selecting South Sulawesi, particularly Makassar as 
the research site are threefold.  First, the dynamics of the business environment in 
Makassar are generally the same as in other big cities in Indonesia (Marketing, 
2015).  It is also one of several provinces that is characterised by patrimonialistic 
political culture, where personal connections predominantly influence local politics 
(Buehler & Tan, 2007).  Anecdotal information from NGOs, activists and news 
reports suggest also that business rules in South Sulawesi are often violated in 
practice.  Many public areas were turned into private or business premises, as seen in 
what happened in Losari and Karebosi.  
Second, the unstable regulatory environment that characterises the business 
environment in Indonesia is also easily found in South Sulawesi province.  Many 
local regulations (peraturan daerah) issued by the government of the South Sulawesi 
province and local regulation from local districts and municipalities in the province 
followed the implementation of decentralisation.  However, many of these local 
regulations have been cancelled by the central government.  One of the main issues 
related to these local regulations is the lack of substantial discussion prior to the 
issuance of the regulation and objection from the enterprises.  Many local 
governments issued new regulations only to boost their locally-driven revenue 
(pendapatan asli daerah), which is mostly perceived as not business-friendly by 




The third reason is due to accessibility and practicality.  Exploring the nature 
of non-market strategies implemented by firms in Indonesia required access to key 
policy-makers.  The time frame limited the researcher in his ability to conduct 
research without using existing contacts in different provinces.  In Makassar, the 
researcher utilised his contacts and managed to gain reliable access to key 
individuals and other supporting data sources. 
4.8.2 Focal Industries 
To provide a greater understanding of the non-market environment in South 
Sulawesi, three case study industries were chosen.  This section presents descriptions 
of the three industries chosen as the object of this study, namely that of advertising, 
government vendors and hotels.  This section is aimed at the clarification of the 
context of the case.  
Contextualisation is important in this study given the complexity of the non-
market environment issue.  The three industries were picked for the following 
reasons.  First, all firms in each industry met the case criterion stated above, 
specifically, the firms in these three industries interacted with political actors and 
institutions.  The interactions between the firms of these three industries with 
political actors were intense, given the nature of the industries.  Furthermore, all 
three industries are highly regulated by the government.  The second reason is that 
the hotel and advertising industries are two of the main sources of local revenue in 
the city of Makassar.  The contribution of both industries to the total local revenue 
for the city of Makassar has increased with time.  From only around IDR 7 billion in 
2009, the contribution of advertising tax to the total revenue of the city has increased 
to IDR 19.6 billion in 2013.  The same situation can be seen for the contribution of 
the hotel industry, where in 2013, the tax revenue from the sector was IDR 44.6 
billion, which was an improvement from IDR 26.3 billion in 2009.  In 2015, the local 
government expects a total revenue of IDR 98 billion (approximately USD 720 
thousand) from hotel tax (FAJAR, 21/05/2015). 
Meanwhile, government expenditures at the local level, particularly for 




government expenditure for procurement was IDR 1.37 trillion, approximately 18% 
of the total provincial budget.  However, in Makassar, IDR 810.4 billion was used 
for public procurement in 2014, approximately 30% of the total budget of Makassar.  
Given the strategic position of these industries, as well as the dependency of 
contractors on government sale, we expect the chosen firms to implement non-
market strategies. 
Thirdly, anecdotal information from our informal discussions with journalists, 
business leaders and research colleagues in Makassar suggested that these three 
industries are the most targeted by local politicians.  Apart from their contribution to 
the local economy through taxes and retributions, the business players from the three 
industries are well-known for their political ties in the local political environment.  
Stiff competition and the high number of players in the industries force them to 
maintain good ties with politicians and government officials in order to be sustained 
in the competition.  Below are the chosen industries for the case studies. 
4.8.2.1 Advertising Industry 
The outdoor advertising (hereafter: advertising) sector is one of the main 
potential revenue sources for many local governments in Indonesia, including 
Makassar.  According to the Local Regulation of Makassar City No. 3/2010, the 
format of advertising that will be taxed is billboards, street furniture and any other 
printed format of advertising, including the digital format which is used for 
commercial purposes.  It also includes the advertising material that is placed on 
anything that moves, such as taxis and buses. The regulation also determined the tax 
rate for advertising to be 25% of the current purchase price which is IDR 25,000 
(US$2.5).  There are two general categories of advertising namely, permanent and 
incidental advertising.  
Every year, the contribution from the advertising sector increases rapidly. In 
2009, for example, the advertising sector contributed more than IDR 7 billion (US$ 
705,290).  In 2013, the contribution was IDR 19.58 billion while in 2014, it reached 
IDR 23 billion.  Although the contribution of the advertising sector is less than 5% of 




the favourite channels for local government officials and politicians to boost local 
revenue.  For the 2015 financial year, the local government is expecting to reach IDR 
44 billion from advertising alone (Makassar-Corner, 02/10/2015). Given the strategic 
position of the advertising sector, the local government is thus trying to boost the 
revenue from this sector.  
4.8.2.2 Government Contractor 
One of the objectives of the decentralization in Indonesia was to distribute 
financial budgeting and authorities from the central to the local government.  Prior to 
the transition period, budget allocations were made by the central government.  The 
transformation of the budgeting system began after the introduction of Laws 
No.225/1999 and No.25/1999 on regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation, 
respectively.  These laws indicated that the cities and municipalities are the key 
administrative units that play an important role in providing goods and services to the 
people and therefore, are responsible for public procurement.  
As result of the budget development process and positive economic changes, 
the government expenditures at the local level, particularly for goods, works and 
services have increased every year starting from the year 2008 (Table 4.5).  As 
shown in the table, by 2014, the South Sulawesi government’s expenditure for goods 
and services reached more than IDR 1.1 trillion (approximately USD 83 million), 
approximately 19% of the total provincial expenditure.  However, in Makassar, IDR 
620 billion, or approximately 30% of the total budget of Makassar, was used for 
public procurement.  The massive spending was mostly allocated to education, 
healthcare and infrastructure development projects.  The considerable amount of 
government expenditure is a positive sign for many firms who see the opportunity in 





Table 4.5  Government Expenditure on Goods and Service in South Sulawesi 
and Makassar City, 2008-2013 (IDR, Billion) 
Year 
South Sulawesi Province City of Makassar 








2008 457 2 141 233 1 144 
2009 352 2 195 301 1 240 
2010 527 2 390 329 1 368 
2011 767 3 358 439 1 881 
2012 853 4 739 532 1 766 
2013 970 5 664 607 2 072 
2014 1 145 6 080  810 2 335 
Note: Adapted from “APBD Sulawesi Selatan dan APBD kota Makassar 2014”. 
The procurement system in Indonesia has been formally strengthened since 
2008.  This process was implemented through various initiatives of the institutional 
reform.  However, the public procurement system remains problematic due to legal 
inconsistencies, weak state capacity and insufficient enforcement of the regulatory 
framework. 
The current Presidential Decree (Peraturan presiden/Perpres) No. 4/2015 on 
public goods and service procurement was updated and adopted in early 2015 as the 
fourth amendment and replaced Presidential Decree No. 70/2012, No. 54/2010 and 
No. 35/2011.  The amendment streamlined many of the stipulations outlined in the 
previous decree, which is then able to boost the development process at all levels. It 
also provides clear descriptions of the implementation of the electronic system (e-
procurement) at both the national and sub-national levels which is expected to 
increase transparency and create a healthy investment environment.  Under the new 
regulatory framework, all government units are required to announce their 
procurement plans, tender invitations and other related information in designated 
national and local newspapers and on procurement websites.  The new regulation 
also redefined direct awards/ sole sourcing (penunjukan langsung) and simple 
bidding (pelelangan sederhana), which eased the procurement process.  However, 





4.8.2.3 Hotel Industry 
The trade, hotel and restaurant sector plays an important role for economic 
growth in many countries, including Indonesia.  In the South Sulawesi province, the 
contribution of the hotel industry to local government revenue indicates positive 
growth. In 2009, for example, local taxes on the total revenue from the hotel industry 
amounted to IDR 26.32 billion.  The increasing number of hotels developing in the 
region also influenced the taxation income for the local government.  As a result, in 
2013, the taxation income, including the revenue from the hotel industry, reached 
IDR 44.57 billion, or 7.09% of the total local revenue of Makassar city (IDR 627. 24 
billion).  In 2015, the expected revenue from hotel tax is estimated to be IDR 97.8 
billion (FAJAR, 21/05/2015). 
Market forces such as the increasing number of hotels in Makassar create stiff 
competition, particularly for small and medium hotels.  More rooms have been 
offered by big players and Western hotel chains.  In 2013, there were 316 hotels 
(classified and non-classified) in Makassar, an increase from 127 hotels in 2009 
(Statistics South Sulawesi, 2014). In 2014, the local government approved the 
licenses and operations of more new hotels, which are mostly part of the national and 
international hotel chains.  The increasing number of visitors (domestic and 
international) to Makassar and the South Sulawesi province drives the increase in the 
number of hotels.  The position of Makassar as one of the main destinations for 
MICE (meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions) in Indonesia is also 
influencing the growth of the hotel industry. 
The expansion and the increasing number of hotels will benefit the local 
government through the increase in tax and retribution from the hotel industry. On 
the other hand, such expansion will affect the small and medium players, which 
represent 80% of the industry (Statistics South Sulawesi, 2014). Unlike large 
enterprises, small and medium hotels often lack service innovation and thus are not 
as appealing due to the unknown brand and value (Tribun-Timur, 03/02/2015). 
Competition becomes stiff and small and medium hotels often fail to win the price 
war with larger competitors.  Another issue faced by small and medium hotels, as 




regulatory environment (Rakyat-Sulsel, 02/05/2013). While large hotels, with 
support from chain operations have more resources to deal with such issues, small 
and medium hotels need to handle the problem directly and this often takes time and 
more resources. 
4.9. Quality Criteria for Rigour  
A common evaluation in grounded theory is how well the advised research 
process has been implemented and the consistency of the process (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The rest of this section will describe the techniques 
adopted throughout this study, to ensure that the quality of the study has met the 
expected standard for the grounded theory method and general principles of the 
qualitative study.   
• In the data collection stage, the researcher outlined the process of data 
collection and noted every step and action in this phase.  The researcher also 
outlined the assurance of confidentiality regarding the identity of participants 
in this study.  Every effort to ensure confidentiality was outlined in the 
previous section.  The questions that were examined during the interview 
process, as well as the interview guides and the purpose behind each question 
have also been discussed to provide a broader context to the reader.  As 
suggested by Whittemore, Chase, and Mandle (2001), the researcher has also 
discussed the process when the interviews were transcribed, so as to show the 
authenticity of the data. 
• All interviews were transcribed as soon as the interviews were conducted, to 
ensure that the researcher did not lose the context of the interview.  All 
interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed.  Furthermore, the 
transcripts were rechecked against the recordings by another research 
colleague. 
• A case-based memo was written for each interview.  The memo was written 
right after each interview to ensure the researcher captured the initial ideas 
from each participant. 
• Throughout the coding process, the researcher also explained the process of 




Each stage was described and along with the rationale, the researcher also 
showed the example of the coding process and categorisation in this stage.  The 
early coding result was shown to supervisors and several research colleagues to 
check for the plausibility of the coding attributed to the interview transcripts.  
• The use of constant-comparison method during data analysis allowed the 
researcher to produce not just a description, but also abstract concepts which 
were then developed as substantive theory. 
• Member checks were carried out: several participants were contacted after the 
interview to clarify the findings from the interview.  Some of them gave 
feedback but no major amendments of the interview transcripts were made. 
• In presenting the data analysis process, the researcher employed the use of the 
Decision Explorer program and NVIVO 10, which provided a clear visual 
depiction of categories and emergent themes and their respective connections.  
The structure was then used to help in building emergent theories from the 
case.  Apart from interviews, the researcher also employed accessible reports 
related to the case ensuring triangulation. 
• Peer debriefing was also carried out: where the researcher sought feedback and 
comments from other colleagues during the study.  Feedback from other 
colleague researchers were received on several occasions, such as at CBS 
doctoral colloquiums and CBS research cluster meetings at the Department of 
Management Curtin University, where the researcher presented the initial 
findings.  Feedback was also received from the participants of the Strategic 
Management Society Annual Conference in Madrid, Spain, where the 
researcher presented a paper related to this study. 
4.10. Ethical Considerations 
Prior to commencing the study, the researcher had to get approval from the 
Human Research Ethics Committee at Curtin University.  Since the study involved 
the participation of humans and given the sensitivity of the issue in the study, the 
research was categorised as “Non Low Risk” and therefore required an application 




After two months, the approval for the application was given.  During the 
study, the researcher maintained the confidentiality as requested by the ethics 
committee.  Access to the original transcripts and recording was restricted and only 
available to the researcher and Supervisors.  All data were kept secure during the 
study period and will be kept securely for five years on the premises of the Curtin 
Business School.  Some participants of the study clearly stated off-the-record 
information to the researcher and such information have not been reported and 
included in the thesis. 
Each participant was also informed about this study prior to the interview and 
signed a declaration that they understood and agreed to participate in this study.  As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, confidentiality has been maintained by the 
researcher.  Exceptions have been made to the non-business actors who made it clear 
that they can be named for the purpose of this study.  Considerable care has been 
taken to ensure that such initials, as well as quotes used for this study, cannot be 
attributed and identified to a particular person.  
4.11. Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, the case for investigating and understanding the nature of the 
non-market environment in Indonesia employing the interpretive paradigm as the 
ontological perspective was put forth.  This chapter also discussed the reasons for 
using qualitative study which can summarised into three mains reasons: the nature of 
the research questions, the opportunities to explore qualitative data and the 
institutional context of the study.  It also offers holistic interpretations of realities 
beyond merely measuring variables and an understanding of the social process in 
context.  
Clearly, from the assumptions of the interpretivist paradigm, the reality of the 
non-market environment faced by small firms in Indonesia must be interpreted and 
understood.  Therefore, the interpretivist approach was chosen as the appropriate 
epistemology.  A central part of the chapter concentrates on the research approach, 
briefly discussing grounded theory and the case study approaches, including the 




theory was chosen because the researcher believed that it was the most appropriate in 
the context of ontological and epistemological reasons, where the study is expected 
to explore the nature of the non-market environment in emerging economies.  
Grounded theory enabled the researcher to achieve the research objectives of this 
study with its systematic procedure and effective data management. 
A description of how grounded theory and the case study method were used 
in this study was also outlined.  Data from the selected case study participants were 
gathered via in-depth interviews with owners and managers of SMEs from three 
sectors namely hotels, advertising and government contractors. 
This chapter also provided an explanation of the selection criteria for the case 
studies and the reasons for focussing on the three industries; the types of information 
elicited, the data collection; coding process, data management and the application of 
constant comparative analysis in the analytical process.  Checking for quality criteria 
ensured the rigorousness of the study, along with the ethical considerations that the 
researcher applied during the study.  
In the next chapter, the research findings based on the data analysis applying 





RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
5.1. Introduction 
It can be recalled that the purpose of this research is to investigate 
institutional changes in emerging economies and their impact on the firms’ choices 
of non-market strategies.  The aim is to identify non-market strategies of small firms 
in Indonesia and evaluate their impacts on the firms’ performance.  This chapter 
presents the findings of this research.   
In accordance with the objectives of this study, the findings will be presented 
in several sections.  Following this introduction, Section 5.2 discusses the 
identification of the political and social antecedents of non-market strategies and also 
illustrates the nature of the non-market environment in Indonesia.  Section 5.3 
explores the non-market strategies implemented by small firms in Indonesia.  The 
tactics used by firms are presented.  The patterns of strategic behaviour of these firms 
in dealing with the non-market environment in South Sulawesi are also presented. 
Political resources which may come in the form of financial and managerial skills are 
discussed in Section 5.4, while the different levels of participation by firms in 
implementing their non-market strategies is discussed in Section 5.5.  This is 
followed by Section 5.6 where the strategic tendencies of firms are described.  
Finally, the impact of implementing non-market strategies on the firms’ performance 
is discussed in Section 5.7.  
5.2. Social and Political Antecedents of Non-Market Strategy 
As established in the previous chapter, this study followed the constant 
comparative analytical feature that is consistent with grounded theory.  The findings 




with the non-market environment in Indonesia.  To clarify the findings, overall 
quotes from the interviews with participants were extracted.   
The first major data set in this study was obtained from the case text based on 
the interviews with 23 participants from small and medium enterprises, two 
government officials, one non-governmental organisation (NGO) activist and one 
journalist (total of 27 participants).  The case text is based on more than 40 hours of 
interviews and several volumes/ items of secondary data (government regulations 
and documents, as well as news clipping from several reputable news agencies in the 
region).  For anonymity and confidentiality reasons, real names of the participants 
were not used except for the participants from government and non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) who agreed to be named. 
The following sections present the factors for the implementation of non-
market strategies by firms in South Sulawesi (see Table 5.1).  The results show that 
the factors are mostly exogenous to the firm and initially triggered the use of non-
market strategies by firms.   
Table 5.1: Highlights of Political and Social Antecedents 
Firm/Industry Political and social antecedents  
Hotel - Labour constraint.  The demand of the employee, with 
support from the trade union, to be recruited permanently 
and not on a temporary contract basis. 
- The rising influence of Interest groups such as trade unions 
and NGOs.  They become so powerful and cause 
substantial changes to the way of doing business in the 
country. 
- Unclear jurisdiction among different technical government 
agencies.  Having obtained a construction permit to 
expand the hotel, the owner needs also to deal with several 
other technical agencies such as tax and retribution 
agencies at the same time.  A ‘crowd license’ also needs to 
be obtained from the district and village-government level.   
- Political risks.  The involvement of the local parliament 
means that the business issue will be solved politically. 
- Low level of law enforcement related to the problems 
(such as labour and local tax) in the industry.  No support 
from the local government when the industrial relations 




the employees tend to directly influence hotel operations.   
- Legitimacy, be perceived as a good citizen and useful to 
others. 
Advertising  - Unclear interjurisdictional regulation between government 
tiers.   
- Myriad of administrative desks and article works. 
- ‘Free judgement’ administrative behaviour.  The absence 
of specific regulations and unstandardized interpretation of 
laws and regulations.   
- Rent-seeking, particularly in the licence and administrative 
processes. 
- Constant pressure from politicians and political parties. 
- Discriminatory policy.  The firms owned by relatives of 
government officials or have close connections with 
politicians usually receive preferential treatment from 
government bureaucracy.   
- Insufficient formal institutions.  The firm has to deal with 




- Inconsistency of procurement regulations and lack of 
transparency during the procurement process. 
- Myriad of administrative desks and article works. 
- Heterogeneity of political actors.  The firms need to deal 
with government officials and legislators, as well as 
interest groups with different agendas. 
- The lack of necessary skills from government technical 
agencies in dealing with the new system. 
- Underutilisation of the new system.  Many complaints 
which were submitted electronically through the new 
system were not responded to thoroughly. 
- Opportunistic behaviour in the process of bidding from the 
procurement officials. 
- No clear dispute resolution mechanism. 
- Different political priorities make the political 
configuration in the local procurement system complex.  
Sometimes, the executive and legislative change the 
priority in the development process, without considering 
the efforts and cost from the enterprise.   
- Legitimacy, be perceived as a good citizen and useful to 
others. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, the three industries included in the study are 
facing identical problems such as rent-seeking, a myriad of administrative work and 
discriminatory policies that highlighted their political actions on issues that are 
specific to their particular industry.  Even though other industries may also face the 




might be different.  The hotel industry, for example, is dealing with labour problems 
more than the other two industries after the government’s new initiative on minimum 
wage and revisions in the legislation concerning pay for laid-off workers.  On the 
other hand, unclear interjurisdictional regulation between government tiers was the 
problem for the advertising industry.  Government contractors, meanwhile, had to 
deal with new institutional environment which is strongly reliant on technology 
compared to the previous situation.   
Table 5.1 also indicates that social and political antecedents that drive the 
implementation of non-market strategies by the firms were influenced by substantial 
political reforms as a result of decentralisation.  Political antecedents, extensive laws 
and the significant policy differences between districts and cities were also 
considered the main factors that brought about uncertainty within the business 
environment in Indonesia.  Red-tape and rent-seeking activities also affected the 
decision of firms to choose non-market strategies over market strategies.  A myriad 
of administrative burdens along with the firm dependency on government made the 
firms willing to engage in formal political participation. 
Social and private interests also stimulated the decision to apply non-market 
strategies.  The pressure for the firm from non-governmental organisation (NGOs) 
and other social civil society organisations regarding labour contract, for example, 
has affected the firm in its operations.  Personal giving, a desire to be perceived as a 
good person and useful to others along with ideological beliefs have motivated most 
of the social actions taken by the firm.  The key antecedents of non-market strategy 
include: regulatory uncertainty, unstandardized interpretation of regulations, 
government top level political game, political embeddedness, rent-seeking, and 
unclear interjurisdictional coordination between government tiers. Each of these 
findings is presented in more detail below. 
5.2.1. Regulatory Uncertainty 
The regulatory environment in South Sulawesi, in particular, is also affected 
by decentralisation.  Like most local governments in Indonesia, local governments in 




local income through tax and retribution.  However, the legal justification for these 
local regulations remains unclear since the communication and coordination between 
the local and national governments is often poor.  In addition, the process of creating 
new laws and regulations is not adequate and often without prior consultation with 
the business actors as the object of the law.  On many occasions, the firms receive 
unequal treatment from government officials and limited access to information 
related to the certain laws from the local government officials.  This situation caused 
the firms to suspend their strategic activities such as expansion and the acquisition of 
new customers.  As one respondent mentioned: 
“(…) I do not think it can be called a clear regulation.  Let me give 
you an example.  Ideally, the office should provide details on how 
much we should pay based on the size of the billboard, the location 
and also based on the time frame.  In reality, the regulation is not 
really clear.  Sometimes, the tax that I pay for a billboard is not the 
same as the amount I paid in the past, although the size and location 
of both the billboards are relatively the same.”  [PAR #3] 
All participants in this study asserted that generally, the regulatory 
environment in South Sulawesi is complex and confusing.  The local bills (Peraturan 
daerah) that are related to business activities have actually regulated many things.  
However, these are confusing when it is implemented by the government officials.  
Almost all participants expressed their frustrations about the government, which 
according to them, are not represented as expected.  The participants also asserted 
that the lack of support from the government and the inadequate local regulations 
leave firms in confusion.  The confusion becomes greater when the number of 
regulations introduced keep continuously increasing.  One participant (PAR #2) 
admitted that he had difficulties keeping up with the current local and national 
regulations.  As this participant indicated: 
“We have more regulations now compared to the past 15 years.  But 
again, the problem is usually in the implementation and law 
enforcement.  I recently found that this government is not sensitive to 




stability and being clear of the implementation of regulations.  
Unlike now, we, business actors, get confused every day.” [PAR#2] 
Another participant (PAR #7) from the construction and procurement 
industry also pointed out that the current situation does not show much progress as 
compared to the past.  Previously, with the centrally planned economy and 
authoritarian regime, the economic condition could easily be handled.  The current 
situation, however, creates confusion and uncertainties, which are worse than the 
previous regime.  Besides, the corrupt and manipulative system that is embedded 
remains and the market condition is also hard to predict. 
“I think the current situation is much worse.  But that’s my personal 
opinion.  At least in the past, we know exactly what happens.  We are 
even able to know exactly who will win the bid before the bidding 
process actually takes place.” [PAR #7] 
The factor of confusion and uncertainty also affects the labour issue.  All 
participants were concerned with the lack of and inadequate labour laws as this issue 
affects the firms’ operations.  Theoretically, current laws on labour are more 
employee-friendly than before.  However, in the implementation, the laws often 
create huge disagreements between employee and employers.  One participant (PAR 
#1) from the hotel industry expressed his frustration after facing a disagreement with 
his casual workers.  The involvement of the labour union and the ignorance of the 
local government made the situation worse.   
“After several strikes, the union finally brought the issue to the 
legislative office.  The local parliament invited me for a hearing.  
(…)  However, as you may know, the labour issue and even any issue 
could be brought to politics here, especially during this time when 
we have the governor election and next year, when we will have the 




The above case from the hotel owner shows how the firms are facing 
difficulties in dealing with the non-market environment, particularly from the interest 
groups representing employees as stakeholders and affected interests.  The demand 
from the interest groups such as the labour union and NGOs forces the regulatory 
uncertainty and constrain the firm’s ability to build legitimacy and solve its internal 
problem.   
Another participant from the hotel industry also noted that social pressure 
from NGOs and civil society norms forced changes to take place for government 
policies.  Such external pressures regularly arise when the issues related to the labour 
code such as minimum wage, worker compensation or unemployment benefits, 
attract unintended attention to the firm.  In their actions, local NGOs usually call for 
immediate attention which is sometimes very time-consuming.  As such, this affects 
the operational function of the firms.   
To make the situation worse, on the supply side, there was rivalry for power 
among political actors.  Instead of acting in the form of check and balance, 
government agencies and local legislative members compete to attract votes and 
influences.  On one hand, government agencies did not want to be blamed by 
enterprises nor labelled as not-business friendly.  On the other hand, the legislative 
members wanted to be known as a labour-friend and perceived as good legislators 
since it was nearly election time.  In the case of minimum wage, for example, the 
issue was used as one of the main references to get votes from the union members 
and not purely as a basis for a social safety net for poor workers.  As a participant 
(PAR #1) from the hotel industry pointed out: 
“For example, at the first demonstration, the employees insist that 
contract workers should be paid 32 times of the salary.  Can you 
imagine this?  Look, the salary of a casual worker is IDR 1.3 million, 
and they asked me to pay 32 times as compensation?  At that time, I 
just wanted to make the hotel go back to business as usual, that’s 
why I paid that.  The next demonstration, they thought that I was in a 
weak position, therefore, they insisted in implementing this policy to 




about non-financial loss such as my hotel image and my image as a 
businessman?  The worse thing is that it sends a bad and negative 
message to other workers.  Other workers believe that they can do 
anything and will not get punishment for what they have done.” 
[PAR #1] 
In a different situation, both government and legislative members are 
competing to acquire more power.  Furthermore, they would trade the influence with 
the enterprises and expect some form of financial support in return.  Each section 
competed for continuing support from firms and business people.  In general, the 
competition includes the implementation of the development program, especially in 
infrastructure.  A particularly big infrastructure project will be evaluated thoroughly 
by a group of parliament members.  This big project will then be broken down to 
several small projects with the help of local officials and using resources and 
information from firms who wish to be selected as contractors for that particular 
project.  One respondent (PAR #11) expressed his evaluation of the situation of 
collusive cooperation between local government officials and legislative members: 
“Let’s say that the local government and parliament agree to the 
road building project.  In particular, they agree to build 7 km long 
for this financial year.  In the middle of the project, the local member 
of parliament decide to divert 1 km of the project to a particular 
village, just to increase his chance of getting more electoral votes for 
the next election.  Let’s assume that 1 km of road costs IDR 1 billion.  
This 1 km is then divided again into ten different small projects.  So, 
each small project costs IDR 100 million, which according to the 
regulations, does not need to be tendered publicly.  By doing this, 
there are now ten different contractors.  Let’s just assume that each 
contractor paid me 10 percent of the total project’s budget.  Apart 
from money, I also get my name in the society.  So, you know the end 
of the story.  This only happened in one district with one project.  So 
you can imagine what will happen at the provincial and national 




The same collaboration initiative may occur in a different situation, where 
such an initiative is initiated by government officials.  Often planned projects are 
regularly followed by slow administrative processes, which result in limited 
resources for the local government to commence the project.  Furthermore, the 
transfer budget from the central government to finance the programs often comes 
late.  Therefore, the local government officials have to find necessary financial 
resources and make the project happen.  Government officials usually ask for help 
from business people for this matter.  The local enterprises are able to choose which 
project to contribute to and often have a hard time refusing.  Such a situation may 
benefit all parties involved, as the politicians can earn electoral votes, while small 
firms can obtain the contract and local officials can implement their programs and 
avoid being penalised. 
Another side of regulatory uncertainty is the informal patronage behaviour 
that still dominates the business-government interaction.  Government officials 
become more pervasive and get considerable discretionary allowance, where they 
can accept kickbacks or bribes and other illegal payments from enterprises.  A 
participant from the advertising industry asserts that such action is regarded as 
normal when dealing with license and administrative matters.   
“I do not think it is a bribe.  Let us put it this way.  You have to 
understand that most of the staff there are only casual staff and are 
not public servants.  Unlike public servants, they will not have a 
pension fund and other bonuses from the state.  Unlike public 
servants, they have to busy themselves every day, while public 
servants have the same salary even if they just sit there doing 
nothing.  We understand this and realise how hard the job of the 
casual staff are.  Therefore, we sometimes provide them with 




also provide them with ‘Ied Fitri2’ allowance, as well as send them 
food and some money”.  [PAR #9] 
The above comment from one participant (PAR #9) regarding casual staff in 
the local tax and revenue office indicated that regulatory uncertainty might also be 
caused by different political controls over government agencies.  The bureau or a 
government agency is given the authority to recruit casual staff based on the need of 
the organisation.  The recruitment of casual staff is expected to fill the gap so that the 
agency can perform well with limited resources.  However, since this authority is not 
fully supported by financial support from the government, the head of local agencies 
sought financial contribution from enterprises illegally to cover the cost for extra 
employees.  The extra employees were usually friends and relatives of officials in the 
bureau or other bureaus of the city.   
Among the respondents, the majority of them see the uncertainties caused by 
the constant regulatory changes, particularly after the fall of President Suharto.  
Given the size and limited resources of small firms, constant changes affect their 
operations in the short term.  Constant changes usually occur given the fact that 
many existing regulations need to be amended with new regulations, due to 
incomplete coverage, as well as the opaqueness in the process of conceptualisation of 
the regulations.  As one respondent from the advertising industry conveying her 
concern said: 
“You know, the regulation itself is very funny and unbelievable.  In 
submitting your proposal for installing a new billboard, for example, 
the licence office requires you to provide letters of approval, ranging 
from the village, district and municipal offices and even some 
national government agencies.  Imagine how time-consuming this 
process is for us.” [PAR #3] 
                                                 
2 Ied Fitr: A religious holiday celebrated by all muslim around the world that marked the end of 





The same situation has also challenged the firms in the procurement industry.  
The concern from the small firms’ owners is not in terms of the implementation of e-
procurement, but in the complexities surrounding its implementation.  During the 
2010 - 2015 period, the regulation of government procurement was changed five 
times.  The constant changing alone brought about confusion for the firms and also 
for the government officials.  Furthermore, the lack of support and technical 
assistance from the government made the firm rely on government staff to help them 
deal with technical issues.  This condition became an opportunity for government 
officials to gain financial advantage.  As one participant from the procurement 
industry noted: 
“The current system is very complex and time-consuming.  
Unfortunately, there is not enough support from the government for 
us, small business contractors.  Knowing the officials who handle the 
procurement is an important factor.” [PAR #4] 
This indicated that the impacts expected from the introduction of new laws 
and regulations were perceived as being more coercive, rather than supportive to 
small firms in general.  Consequently, common to all respondents, enterprises need 
to adapt to the regulatory uncertainty since there are not enough options available to 
them.  All interviewees’ responses also illustrated that a more proactive approach is 
the less attractive option, given the imbalance of power among small firms with 
authoritative stakeholders such as the government and local parliament.  The role of 
intermediaries, in this case, the business/ industry association, is important as 
indicated by the participant (PAR #1) from the hotel industry.  Incapable of solving 
its problems internally, participating in more than one business association helped 
him stabilise the situation in his firm.  It helped in the sense that the business 
organisation was perceived as more powerful to the government, despite the 
demographic size of the firm. 
5.2.2. Unstandardized Interpretation of Regulations 
Current regulations and laws on tendering and the government’s procurement 




example, do not allow government officials to grant contracts to parliament members 
and other government officials.  However, according to the participants in this 
industry, these rules are often violated in practice.  Firms may engage in political 
activities simply to enter into ‘economic barter’ with the government or legislators, 
in order to gain a contract from the government agencies.   
Another small firm owner also pointed out that in terms of government 
projects, the firms with close connections to government officials or politicians in the 
parliament will benefit the most.   
“I do not know.  I am just mad at the officials here.  They always 
refer to the regulations when we try to protest against them.  But 
when you insist for them to act based on the regulations, they always 
refuse to do so just because it is related to the relatives of top 
officials.  As a result, some of us, especially the firms that do not 
have direct connections with politicians and top officials, usually just 
ignore them.  Ignore in the sense that we usually install our billboard 
and then work on the license later.  If we did not do this, we would be 
wasting our time on the licensing process alone.” [PAR #3] 
The current Presidential Decree (Peraturan Presiden/Perpres) No.  70/2012 
on Public Goods and Services Procurement was adopted in 2012 as the second 
amendment and replaced Presidential Decree No. 54/2010 and No.  35/2011.  The 
latest version of the decree, No. 4/2015 was introduced in early 2015.  The 
amendment streamlined many of the stipulations outlined in the previous decree, 
which can boost the development process at all levels.  It also emphasised the 
importance of the electronic system (e-procurement) for both the national and sub-
national levels, which is expected to increase transparency and create a healthy 
investment environment.  Under the new regulatory framework, all government units 
are required to announce their procurement plans, tender invitations and other related 
information in designated national and local newspapers and on the procurement 
website.  The new regulations also redefined direct awards/ sole sourcing 




ease the procurement process.  However, the new regulations require the adaptation 
of firms, particularly in the matter of e-procurement. 
Although new regulations are expected to ease the process of the procurement 
system, in reality, many firms in the procurement industry found the new system to 
be quite confusing.  In addition, many firms found the new system to be complicated.  
To complicate the situation, there was also inter-agency confusion, as well as slow 
implementation of necessary actions to ease the process.  For small-scale direct 
awards, for example, the interpretation of who can get the contract may differ from 
one government official to another.  Moreover, getting a contract on the basis of 
direct awards in one government agency does not mean the same situation with other 
government agencies.  The interpretation, along with the personal discretion of top 
officials, is the key to this matter.   
A lack of understanding regarding the new regulations make the vendors rely 
on local procurement bureaucrats to help them navigate the cumbersome nature of 
the administrative process.  The new regulations introduced the electronic 
procurement system that some vendors find difficult to be adapted.  The Indonesian 
Employers Association (APINDO) reported that more than 20% of firms do not 
understand the electronic procurement system3.  Also, the new regulations were not 
followed by a new attitude, neither from the local procurement bureaucrats nor the 
bidders.  According to one interviewee (PAR #7), many local procurement 
bureaucrats approached the vendors to offer their help in filling out complex 
procurement documents.  After which, they demanded payment in return.   
“I mean, the system could be very complicated and modern, but in 
the end, based on my experience, it could be directed to favour 
several firms.  Put it this way, to get 1000, you have to provide 100 
first at the beginning of the procurement process.  I did this, but at 
the end it wasn’t me who won the bid, but some other firms instead.  
                                                 
3 Tribun-timur.  (27/05/2013).  GAPEKSINDO benarkan banyak kontraktor masih 




It happens sometimes.  The officials then have so many reasons to 
tell you.  But I believe, it is not only about the rules.”  [PAR #7] 
Despite the fact that the new regulations require the signing of integrity pacts 
(both from the government and the respective firm), the participants in this study 
expressed that apart from the complexities, the new regulations have not yet 
eliminated corruption and collusion.  A study by The Independent Procurement 
Control Board (Lembaga Pemantau Independen Pengadaan Barang dan Jasa) noted 
that in 2012, in Makassar, only 40% of the total procurements used the e-
procurement information system.  The study also showed that many procurement 
items were won by the same firms.  As such, this caused an uncompetitive climate 
and affected the general business environment (Tribun-timur, 20/06/2013). 
“The last time we bid for a project, I did not win.  I decided to 
complain and file a report since I believe that the process was unfair.  
Someone called me and I believe the person was part of the Rector’s 
son’s team.  He then asked me not to file a report and suggested to 
me to understand his position.  This project was the one that they 
really needed.  I then decided not to file a report.” [PAR #10] 
Some participants in this study also expressed that the procurement 
information are usually limited to firms that have close ties with the elite in the 
industry association.  Even though the law clearly stated that the tender information 
should be publicly announced through media, some government officials chose not 
to announce it.  According to one participant who usually participates in public 
tenders (even when the tender information is publicly available), often, the winner of 
the tender has been predetermined. 
Another option to get a contract in the public tender is to personally approach 
the family of the top officials or use intermediaries.  The intermediaries are usually 
people who have close ties with top officials in the agency.  Such situations may 
result in significant barriers for small firms as compared to their larger counterparts 




administration should be neutral to all enterprises, regardless of the size, even though 
it is not the case in reality. 
Poorly defined and ineffectively-enforced systems foster opportunistic 
behaviour and increase the expropriation by governmental and regulatory authorities 
with their own interpretation of the regulations.  The cases above also show that a 
weak market-supporting institution is compensated by the firms with private 
arrangements such as giving illicit payments to the governmental authorities. 
Most of the participants argue that the rent-seeking environment and 
insufficient support for law enforcement force the firms to choose private 
arrangements and have resource-based relations with politicians and government 
officials.  This decision allows them to operate under the most suitable interpretation 
of the law and is based on the future benefits that the firms can expect from the 
government.   
As expressed by all respondents, the role of the leaders in the government and 
legislative office is critical and powerful.  However, in the case of the advertising 
business sector, the situation becomes more complex, since the mayor and his deputy 
race to control the advertising sector.  The race is not only to boost local revenue for 
the city, but also to provide “additional income” for relatives, political parties and 
organisations for each mayor and deputy mayor.  The leadership game played by the 
mayor and his deputy is driven by the different ideological and political parties, 
which create a dilemma and bring about excessive burden to firms.  Apart from 
meeting all formal regulations and paying all taxes, firms also need to deal with the 
broad discretion on how to interpret and apply the regulations among the government 
officials.   
5.2.3. Aligning with Top Level Politicians (Playing the Top Level Political 
Game)  
Another issue faced by small firms in the region is the party affiliations that 
control political institutions (which contribute to political constraints).  Participants 




main sources for both the mayor and his deputy to gain political donation.  The 
involvement of top leaders even turns into rivalry since the mayor and his deputy are 
coming from different political parties.  The mayor is the chairman of the Provincial 
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) office, while his deputy is the chairman of the 
Golkar Party (Partai Golkar) in Makassar.  The two parties were the first and second 
most voted in the recent direct elections in South Sulawesi recently.   
The involvement of both the mayor and deputy mayor affects the market 
competition of the advertising sector.  The chairman of the advertising firms’ 
association (ASPRI) indicated that many advertising firms who violated the rules 
were backed by top officials4.  The majority of the participants in this study also 
expressed the existing conflict of interest that occurs as a result of top officials’ 
favourable policies to their cronies.  One participant shared his experience where he 
planned to install a new roadside billboard on one section of the national highway 
route in the province.  After submitting his application and waiting for the decision 
for about three months, he was finally told that his application was denied.  The 
reason for this decision was that installing new roadside and gantry billboards were 
not allowed for this national route.  However, not long after the refusal, several new 
roadside billboards were installed on the same route.  The participant said that 
according to rumours, the instalment was done by an advertising firm owned by 
relatives of the deputy mayor.   
The worst situation occurs when individuals from different sides (either from 
the mayor or deputy mayor of the city) offer an available spot for the installation of a 
new billboard at the same time.  It is confusing for the advertising firm as it needs to 
deal with two different parties (both the mayor and deputy mayor’s associates).  In 
this situation, having connections with the official in the revenue office will help the 
firm navigate the cumbersome administrative process.  The uncertainty in regulations 
and officials who handle the administration process make some firms proceed to 
build a billboard without obtaining license.  Afterwards, the firm then arranges for 
the permit.  In another case, a firm had built a billboard in an area that prohibited 
outdoor commercial advertisements.  However, the local office finally approved the 
                                                 
4 Interview with Chairman of Indonesian Advertising Firms Association (ASPRI) branch 





installation on the condition that the firm pay some discretionary fees to the 
intermediaries. 
Some firms with no direct link to top officials prefer to build good 
relationships with staff in relevant agencies.  Providing food and a small amount of 
money facilitates administrative procedures.  The firm usually provides an annual 
“Holiday Allowance” (Tunjangan hari raya) which is paid every “Ied Fitri” to all 
front and administrative staff.  This is important since they manage and administrate 
many papers, not just paperwork from the advertising firms.  For higher level staff, 
firms usually do not provide any special occasions allowance.  Instead, they must be 
prepared for “special demands” from higher level staff for transportation and 
accommodation expenses when they have official visits outside the city.  Despite the 
government having allocated a special budget for such expenses, firms remain an 
object of the officials for gaining additional income.  One participant (PAR #3) from 
an advertising firm was asked if the same formula is also employed by other firms in 
the same industry, and as he explains: 
“I believe other firms do the same.  I know this because we usually 
meet and share experiences.  We usually meet to discuss the 
regulations and how to deal with the local bills.  We also share our 
experiences in handling particular officials.” [PAR #3] 
In implementing such strategies, firms prefer to perform individual 
approaches based on their interests.  The role of the association in the industry is 
only for matters that involve the industry, such as representing members in 
discussion with the local government and the local parliament.  This is 
understandable since several players in the industry are related to politicians or even 
owned by some politicians or their relatives.   
Having a connection with politicians can help firms.  However, for one 
participant who does not have any connection with politicians or their relatives, he 
felt that having a connection with certain politicians is not a sustainable way for the 
firm.  After all, he shared the experience that politicians will come and go.  Instead, 




industry are the main points.  To build this relationship, his firm usually allows a 
politician, especially from the ruling and big parties in local politics to use his firms 
asset such as a billboard.  For instance, in last year’s governor election, many of the 
firm’s assets were used by governor candidates.  The candidates used the roadside 
billboard for political campaign and the firm let them use it if there were no 
commercial materials from clients for the billboard.  However, the firms and the 
candidates have an informal agreement that once the firm wants to use the billboard, 
the candidates will have to remove its material campaign. 
Apart from the myriad of administrative desks and article works, firms also 
need to deal with several external parties.  These parties are not part of the 
government agencies, nor from other market supporting actors.  They are people who 
always ask the firm to pay an informal “security expense”.  They either live near the 
firm office or around the area where the billboard is installed.  Refusing to pay may 
cause the billboard to become a target for vandalism.  Such ad-hoc substitutes exist 
because of the absence of laws and missing formal institutions.   
Meanwhile, an official (PAR #26) at the revenue office unsurprisingly refuses 
to comment on the bribery issue.  However, he is aware of the situation, including 
the uncertainty caused by the regulations that affect firms in the sector.  According to 
him: 
“Sometimes it is the firm itself who makes the situation complex.  
The firm naturally wants to pay as little levies and taxes as possible 
and sometimes manipulate the report.  Such situations therefore 
initiate rent-seeking and collusion.” [PAR #26]  
He also mentioned that some of its officials, particularly in the front and 
administrative offices are seasonal staff and not public servants (Pegawai Negeri 
Sipili/PNS).  Therefore, “it may be an opportunity for them to get additional income 
since they are not paid by the government like any other public servants”, explained 
the participant from the local revenue office.  As seasonal staff, they do not get 




The government official emphasised that the city government has made some 
progress with the use of technology to minimise the interaction between staff and 
firms in the process of obtaining business license.  Furthermore, as a higher level 
official, he is frequently approached both by firms directly or through politicians 
related to the firms for a particular matter.  However, he stresses that since the office 
is always targeted by social organizations, government watch organizations, and the 
media, the opportunities for ”illegal interaction” have decreased rapidly. 
To tackle problems in the licensing process and to minimize rent-seeking 
activities, the Makassar city government has established the Unified Licensing and 
Investment Agency (Badan Perizinan Terpadu dan Penanaman Modal/BPTPM).  
The main objective of this establishment is to ease licensing processes and 
procedures.  In this way, all licensing procedures will be managed solely by this 
agency.  The office consists of several technical teams which include cross-agency 
officials.   
5.2.4. Political Embeddedness 
While there are several respondents who are aware of the importance of 
giving more attention to the marketization process, majority of the respondents 
realised that apart from market issues, political ties remain important.  One possible 
explanation for such a condition is that small firms rely heavily on the government 
for critical information and resources.  Decentralisation also offers more substantial 
authority and advantage to local government authorities and makes the firms more 
dependent on the local authorities.  However, resource dependency creates 
uncertainties for the firm. 
In South Sulawesi and in Indonesia generally, local government authorities 
took advantage of this regulatory uncertainty (Brodjonegoro, 2004).  Therefore, 
political embeddedness became increasingly beneficial due to the uncertainty.  
Political embeddedness is the political strategy implemented considering political 
commitments, political knowledge and legitimacy in the context of networks (Welch 
& Wilkinson, 2004).  This is different from the strategy of aligning with top level 




more resources compared to small firms.  This is also due to the fact that small firms 
are not well-positioned to handle stiff competition as owners of small firms compete 
in a saturated market such as government vendors.  One of the participants stated that 
political connections or knowing someone with a good knowledge and relationship 
with politicians is very important.  His statement came from his experience in 
dealing with problems related to his business:  
“As you may know, Mr L has good connections with many people, 
particularly politicians.  His family is also well-known in politics and 
business.  I went ahead with his solutions and everything was soon 
back to normal.  I didn’t even need to meet with parliament members 
or sit with the labour organisation before an agreement could be 
reached.  I couldn’t believe this actually, but it just happened.  All 
negotiations with the employees are led by Mr L.  I also applaud him 
on his comprehensive knowledge of law and administrative 
solutions.” [PAR #1] 
The decision built networks with other political actors apart from top level 
politicians is also based on the situation where formal institutions are not proper and 
intra or inter-agency problems affect business processes.  As a result, this situation 
confused the business actors and firms since the firms have to deal with various 
regualtion on different level of governments. Therefore, many firms choose to pursue 
political process to moderate the uncertainties they faced.  The current system 
provides opportunities for both local authorities and business enterprises.  The 
decentralisation system allows business actors to recognise the opportunities and 
negotiate with local bureaucrats and legislators so as to profit from the negotiation.  
The political actors, government officials and legislators, on the other hand, depend 
more on the extra budgetary funds derived from fees and other unofficial payments.  
Thus, this shows that the relation between business enterprises and local authorities 
is a kind of power-dependence relationship that works both ways; one that 
complements rather than contradicts.   
Also, as indicated by one participant (PAR #19), political embeddedness is 




create and maintain their competitive advantage.  Political networking is also used by 
firms to capture non-market resources and gain preferential treatment.   
“Every year, when preparing the budget and programs, each 
government agency discusses and seeks approvals from the 
legislative office.  Each legislative member usually proposes its own 
program, along with the budget put across on behalf of the 
department or other governmental agencies.  On paper, the budget is 
written as the government agency’s expenses, while in reality, the 
budget is allocated and used by the legislative member.  What I mean 
here is that the legislative member can promote its contractor or 
vendor to provide goods and service and as such, use that specific 
budget allocation.  The official in the government offices usually 
allow this as a way to thank the legislative member who approved 
the proposed budget or even increased the budget allocated to the 
office.” [PAR #19] 
Another participant (PAR #5) similarly emphasized the importance of 
political connections to ease access to valuable resources such as tender information 
as well as relaxed treatment in licencing and administrative procedures.  It was 
indicated by the participant that political embeddedness is a complement rather than 
a substitute for formal legal institutions during institutional development.  Such 
efforts to build political connections were even referred as a normal strategy by 
participants in the current business environment. 
“If you question whether I got some advantages from knowing some 
people, I do not think so.  I think it is common sense that you will 
help people whom you know from before (…) if some people have 
political connections and gain some advantages from the connection, 
I think that’s fine.  It is a part of the strategy, which for me, there is 
no problem at all.” [PAR #5] 
Political embeddedness is also derived from the intense competition and 




larger firms.  In the hotel industry, for example, according to the Indonesian Hotel 
and Restaurants Association (PHRI), in Makassar alone in 2014, there were 125 
hotels or 8,800 hotel rooms, which increased from only 7,700 hotel rooms in 2013 
(Table 5.2).  In 2016, the total rooms are expected to increase, since the local 
government has approved the development of new hotels, mostly from the big hotel 
chains.  The total number of hotel rooms is mostly contributed by hotels with three 
and more stars.   
Table 5.2: Number of Hotels in South Sulawesi Based on Classification 
Hotel classification 
Year 
2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Classified (3, 4, 5 stars) 58 57 45 125 
Unclassified  455 491 n/a n/a 
Source: Indonesian Hotel and Restaurants Association (PHRI, 2014) and BPS (Statistics Indonesia, 
2014) 
 
*Note: Estimated figures. 
 
 
The increasing number of new hotel developments in South Sulawesi 
concerned the current players in the industry, since it may cause more uncertainties 
and stiff competition, particularly since the entry barrier to the industry is so low.  
Intense competition forces firms to gain political support through political 
connections or to lose more without it.  This is because regulatory institutions 
provide incentives that most small firms need in dealing with their competitors. 
All participants from the hotel industry in this study also mentioned the 
significance of facilities offered by financial institutions for hotel developments.  
Unlike several years back, financial institutions, both state-owned banks and private 
banks, are competing to fulfil a niche market.  One participant (PAR #2), who owned 
several hotels in the past, decided to sell all his hotels, leaving only one.   
“I mean it is simple.  In the past, we operated a hotel in a very 
normal way.  We were lucky because at that time, there were only a 
few hotels in this city.  However, as you can see, there are more than 




currently like a war in this industry.  So, we decided to operate only 
one hotel.  I tell you, the price war for this industry is very cruel.  I 
think hotels in Makassar only rely on MICE (meetings, incentives, 
conferencing and exhibitions) as the main target and not tourists or 
businesses.  As a result, a price war is the only option available for 
the players.  Our hotel is only three-stars, and you can get almost the 
same price from four or even five-star hotel, with more features and 
facilities.” [PAR #2] 
“(…) the price war among players in this industry is currently not 
healthy.  I think if the association wants to be useful, this kind of 
problem should be solved first.  We should stick to the rules and the 
association can act as a stabilizer.  The current condition shows that 
even four and five-star hotels want to compete with three-star hotels, 
where they offer the price almost the same as we did, but with even 
better facilities.  If this situation remains the same, at the end of the 
day, nobody wins, everybody loses.  [PAR #1]” 
The same concern was also raised by the chairman of the South Sulawesi 
Hotel and Restaurant Association (PHRI).  As such, a moratorium or government 
intervention may be needed to regulate the industry structure. 
“Apart from its geographical advantage, Makassar is not yet the 
main destination for tourism.  With an average 60 percent growth 
annually, a moratorium for developing new hotels is needed, unless 
we want to see trouble for this industry in the future.” [PAR #23] 
Similarly, another participant from the advertising industry also perceived the 
current competition as chaotic and full of uncertainties.  She described that the 
collusion and political connections of her competitors made the challenge even more 




“The worst thing is that the firms owned by the relatives of top 
officials usually do not have any experience in this industry.  Also, 
the firm has not been in operation for long, or is relatively new in the 
industry.  They do not have any workshop and production workers.  I 
do not even think they have an office at all.  Since they have a good 
relationship, they can ask for many spaces and then sell those to us, 
the main and proper advert firms.” [PAR #3] 
Apart from the advantages, the participants also raised the issue of 
unsustainability of political embeddedness.  The value of political connections for a 
firm may decrease quickly and may change from an asset to a liability.  As a result, 
the value of such political connections becomes negative, especially when an 
unexpected event, such as the decentralisation movement that took place in early 
2000, occurs.  It could also happen when the ruling parties fail to win elections and 
therefore, the political regime is changed.   
To overcome these negative consequences, some firms, especially medium 
and large firms, split their contributions; some firms choose to support each 
candidate, while others spread their influence with many politicians.  In other words, 
there are no political preferences that lead firms in terms of their political 
contribution.  The support in the form of donation could be the same amount or 
different, depending on the observation of the manager - whether the chance of a 
candidate to win is high or low.  By doing this, firms are trying to mitigate the 
problem with the win-lose politicians and therefore, they can expect preferable 
policies.   
5.2.5. Rent-Seeking Bureaucracy  
The majority of the participants underlined red tape bureaucracy as one of the 
main obstacles to doing business in the region.  Many illegitimate payments have to 





“The officials now are very careful and reluctant to show their 
interests.  You have to understand this situation.  But usually we 
understand and keep it confidential.  We proceed to make unofficial 
payment to officials only after the bidding process.  As I said, it is 
only like a ‘relational fee’ because they chose you as a winner.” 
[PAR #4] 
Similarly, another participant (PAR #7) asserted that voluntary payments 
need to be paid to get a contract from the government. 
“I was once asked by the government officials from the mayor of the 
city office to conduct some training.  In the end, I have to deal with 
many government officials only to get the money and too many 
officials want a portion of the budget.” [PAR #7] 
The voluntary payments or ‘relational fees’ paid by the firms are in different 
forms and are usually unrelated to the business and administrative processes.  One 
participant (PAR #11) who has enough experience in tendering notes stated that the 
demands from the government officials were sometimes crazy.   
“Let’s say you apply for procurement in Palopo, for example, you 
have to be there, which means you have to cater for transportation 
costs.  Second, you have to meet several people, the government 
officials, bidding managers, where you have to prepare the 
‘entertainment cost’.  (…)  Entertainment costs could be in the form 
of food allowance when you treat them in a restaurant, buy 
cigarettes and small souvenirs, take officials to karaoke or simply 
give cash.” [PAR #11] 
The majority of the participants agreed that such informal and illegal payment 
is a form of gratitude from the business actors to the government officials for good 




dealings, even though all participants agreed that it is common place in the region for 
rent-seeking activities to be implemented by government officials.   
“Look, I always believe that if someone helps you, you have to think 
to pay it back and do good things for him too.  It’s nothing, just to 
give them money for buying cigarettes or food; it’s not a big deal.  
After all, you have to deal with them not just once, so you have to be 
good to them.  At least you have to be grateful that they helped you 
and eased your problems.” [PAR #12] 
The risk of not paying such ‘voluntary payment’ is unavoidable if the firms 
decide to get involved in business.  One participant (PAR #19) expressed his 
frustration when he avoided paying bribes: 
“Well, the result will be very clear that you will not get any project.  
I can say that I am 100 percent sure about this based on my 
experience.  You also need to provide what we always call ‘after 
sales service’, where you invite government staff for dinner or 
provide small souvenirs after the contract is granted to you.  You 
have to show your gratefulness and share it with them.  I think it 
makes them comfortable doing business with you.” [PAR #19] 
Even though paying a bribe is unlawful and most business actors tend to 
avoid doing unlawful things, another participant (PAR #23) indicated that he is keen 
to do it.  However, he states that he only chooses to pay kickbacks to the low-level 
staff. 
“I personally do not like the term ‘thank you’ in the form of 
payments that need to be paid by us, business people, to the 
government officials.  However, as you may know, we cannot just 
ignore it as it does exist.  For me, I choose to pay bribes to low-level 




Referred to as “uang terima kasih”, Indonesian, for “thank you”, this practice 
is a framework for distribution of bribes and mark-ups in the public procurement 
sector.  The complexity of the new procurement regulatory framework does not 
prevent local procurement bureaucrats from finding a chance to exploit it.  One of the 
several methods to do this is to help bidders fill out complex procurement documents 
in exchange for money. 
Other various forms of red tape enforced on business enterprises include 
unnecessary official routines and lengthy procedures that cause delays.  One 
respondent noted that he wasted a considerable amount of time in dealing with 
administrative procedures, just to find that it has nothing to do with the actual 
procurement process.  Such unfavourable treatment typically occurs when the firm 
and government officials engage in disputes or disagreements.     
Local parliaments which are expected to supervise the budgetary and 
procurement processes are also the subject of this power-abuse action.  As a result, 
horizontal accountability on the level of local politics remains weak and meaningful 
change in the sector remains difficult to achieve.  In addition, the dynamics of 
businesses, particularly in the public procurement sector, are motivated politically 
rather than economically. 
The poorly crafted laws, inconsistency in regulations and weak capacity of 
local government officials may explain some of this situation.  Likewise, the stiff 
competition and lack of resources, as well as the inability to compete with larger 
counterparts is arguably one of the reasons why business enterprises choose this 
strategy.    
5.2.6. Unclear Interjurisdictional Coordination between Government Tiers 
The interjurisdictional coordination is unclear since the liaison between the 
government tiers (local, province and national levels) is poor and time-consuming.  
According to the Ministerial Regulation of Public Works No 20/PRT/M/2010, 
advertising firms are not allowed to put their gantry billboard (iklan bando) 




“Construction of building advertising and media information cannot 
be a portal and/ or other construction types that cross over the road, 
which is specifically intended solely for advertising and media 
information.” [Ministerial Regulation No.20/PRT/M2010, Article 
18] 
Unlike the roadside billboard, the gantry billboard (see for example Figure 
5.1) is built solely for advertising purposes without any other functions.  The 
structure of the gantry billboard is also visually intrusive, as it is positioned right in 
front of approaching motorists.  Thus, this becomes an issue with road safety.  
Therefore, in May 2013, the National Road Agency insisted that all gantry billboards 
that have already been built are to be removed by the end of 2014, since most of 
them did not comply with the safety regulations and were situated on the national 
highway routes.   
 
Figure 5.1: A Gantry Billboard (Reklame Bando) at One of the National 
Highway Routes in Makassar, South Sulawesi 
 
In Makassar, there are four national highway routes.  According to the 




of gantry billboards that are situated over the road (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).  
While the gantry billboard is prohibited on this national route, roadside billboards are 
still allowed.  However, the local government of Makassar city refused to remove the 
billboards or even limit the license for new billboards due to the income derived 
from this sector.  The decision from the local government was supported by the 
Advertising Firms Association (ASPRI).  The decision was made after several 
meetings, including lobbying to the local House of Representatives (DPRD).  The 
association also argued that the law enforcement process should honour the contract 
between the advertising firms and city office.  The local tax and revenue office of 
Makassar city argued that the central government did not comprehensively consider 
the laws before implementing it.  In addition, the central government should consider 
the potential loss of revenue that will affect the development process in Makassar.   
 
 
Figure 5.2:  A Gantry Billboard (Reklame Bando) Located Over a National 
Route in Makassar, South Sulawesi 
After several meetings and discussions, the national road agency through the 
provincial agency office insisted that the removal should be started.  To make things 
even more complicated, there was a rumour that such action taken by the provincial 




Makassar city.  In January 2013, there was a gubernatorial election to elect the 
governor of South Sulawesi province for the enxt five year term.in this elections, the 
candidates were the mayor and the incumbent governor.  The electoral competition 
between the two candidates was so intense and divided businesses into two different 
poles based on political choice and support.   
 
Figure 5.3: Gantry Billboard Removal Campaign Created by the National Road 
Agency and Provincial Office (Provincial Highways Directorate-Dirjen 
Binamarga) 
 
An owner (PAR#3) of an advertising firm conveyed her frustration from such 
situations: 
“We face so many uncertainties regarding the regulations here.  The 
local regulations allowed us to build a billboard for a particular 
roadside, while at the provincial and national levels, this is 
considered violation of the law.  The government, at all levels, 
should speak in one language.  I just thought that the current 




Being in an uncertain situation for such a long time, the association finally 
decide to file a lawsuit to challenge the decision from the national agency and 
provincial office to remove their billboards.  The lawsuit was submitted to the State 
Administrative Court.  In December 2013, the decision from the court emphasised 
the responsibility of the national road agency to remove all gantry billboards from 
the national highway routes.  The national road agency decided to continue the 
removal process.  The agency targeted 620 billboards and posters that should be 
removed by the end of 2014.   
After their first court effort failed, the association appealed to the high court.  
The association believed that the decision to allow the national agency to remove 
their billboards did not consider the arguments from the advertising firms.  It also 
indicated the lack of coordination between the government agencies, which affected 
the advertising firms.  By the time of the writing this thesis, the advertising firms 
association had filed an appeal to the Supreme Court (Berita-Kota, 25/07/2015).   
5.3. Non-Market Strategies  
Business-government interactions in Indonesia have dramatically changed 
following the implementation of decentralisation.  One of the main differences is the 
fact that the firm is now have to deal with many levels of government and no longer 
centralized in the central government. Firms needed to balance the strategic 
implications for dealing with the dynamics of the business environment and the 
importance to comply with governmental rules.  Compliance strategies could be 
categorised as attempts by firms to show how much they are in agreement with the 
government.   
Many attempts have been made by business actors to influence the non-
market factors that affect businesses in the volatile environment in the region (see 
Table 5.3).  In those attempts, the firms tried to insulate themselves from the external 
environment with generally one major objective: influencing the non-market 
environment in the firms’ favour.  One of the key questions asked of participants in 
the study is the type of non-market strategies they employ.  The participants were 




deal with a (particular) situation?” and other questions related to their strategies in 
dealing with non-market environment.  The following sections present the findings 
of the study and reveal the patterns of strategic behaviour among small firms in 
South Sulawesi based on the interviews with the study participants. 





Table 5.3: Firms' Non-market Strategies and Patterns of Action 
Industry/ firms Firms’ Specific Actions Non-market Analysis 
Hotel • Provide financial information of the firm to the government voluntarily 
to help the government calculate the tax and retribution. 
• Support local government tourism campaign in the form of providing 
flyers and other tourism information to the customers in the hotel. 
• Build connection with high-ranking local political actors to help the firm 
negotiate with the trade union. 
• Lobbying local government agencies, especially tax and revenue office, 
as well as the manpower office to support the firm in dealing with the 
labour issue. 
• Attend invitations from local House of Representatives (DPRD) for 
hearing sessions in tripartite meeting with the local government, 
employees/ trade union and hotel management. 
• Build connections with another business association (APINDO), apart 
from industry (hotel) associations. 
• Relocate families who lived around the hotel for hotel parking expansion. 
• Provide financial support for NGOs and youth organisations around the 
hotel, in particular on occasions such as Ied Fitr and Independence Day 
celebrations (sport and competition every 17th August). 
• Get involved in charity work with orphans and mosques  
• Build communication with the media to inform on the firm’s position on 
a specific issue. 
• Providing counter information, by inviting journalists for a media 
conference to explain the position of the firm regarding the labour issue. 
• Engage in grassroots’ activities. 
• Firms in this industry mostly 
exercise typical strategies that 
involve intermediaries with the 
combination of direct 
involvement in its 
implementation. 
• The role of intermediaries, 
particularly business associations 
and the media, is important to 
create pressure for the authorities. 
• The risk of using financial 
donations is high, since the issue 
(labour and sub-contract 
employee) is very complex and 
involves multi-agencies and 
multi-tiers of the government. 
• Philanthropy and charity remain 
the main option in getting 
legitimacy from the authorities 
and civil society. 
• Decision to take individual or 
collective action was highly 





Industry/ firms Firms’ Specific Actions Non-market Analysis 
Advertising • Meet local tax and revenue officers regularly to seek options for 
billboard permits.   
• Negotiate when and how much local retribution such as property tax, 
building permit and advertising tax would be paid by the firm.   
• Bribe local staff in several government agencies to drive permits and 
licenses administration. 
• Provide transportation allowance for high-ranking officers in the tax and 
revenue office. 
• Support collective movement by the industry association to take legal 
action on national regulation on the billboard development moratorium 
on the national road. 
• Contribute actively in counter lobbying by the industry association to 
pressure the local government not to follow regional and national 
regulations on the billboard moratorium. 
• Build public opinion by being an expert source for a news reports or 
articles in the local papers.   
• Allow politicians and political parties to use the firm’s resources, such as 
billboards, for political campaigning purposes.   
• Provide non-cash support for a few politicians and political parties 
(ruling parties) by designing and making copies of their respective 
political campaign posters.   
• Donate to mosques and orphans (as part of the obligatory charity actions 
or zakah and optional charity or sadaqah).   
• Support local community around the firm’s workshop by supporting 
them with printing and campaign materials for several occasions such as 
Youth Games and Independence Day celebrations. 
• Firms in this industry are facing 
issues mostly in the short-term 
basis.  Political connection is 
relatively weak, given the rather 
simple issue (fees, processing 
time and supporting documents). 
• Legal action was used to show 
clear reaction in counter action 
by industrial association.  Since 
the issue related to the regulation 
affected all firms, collective 
action was taken instead of 
individual action.  Financial 
strategies were mainly used to 
overcome administrative barriers.   
• Collective action is critical but 
does not dominate the movement 
of the firm in the industry.  
Collective action was chosen 





Industry/ firms Firms’ Specific Actions Non-market Analysis 
Government 
Supplier 
• Bribe procurement staff to obtain procurement information. 
• Be actively involved in several business associations. 
• Pay administrative staff in the procurement office for help in dealing 
with myriad and complex forms and administrative procedures. 
• Shared the project awarded to other firms particularly to the firms that 
have relationship with the local elites through sub-contracting method. 
By doing this, the firm may save time and cost in dealing with any 
dispute from the award decision and in administrative process. 
• Negotiate with procurement staff for budget allocation and to split a 
program to several projects, so that it can be appointed directly without 
public tender. 
• Provide ‘entertainment cost’ which may be in the form of hospitality 
(karaoke) or transportation allowances to the supervisory board for each 
project, so as to avoid thorough examination.   
• Provide financial support and bribe to legislators in order to get contract. 
• Recruit technical expert (hackers) to disrupt the local procurement 
system, so that competitors cannot submit their application, in particular 
for public tender. 
• Provide campaign materials to legislators. 
• Provide political donations to legislators.   
• Use relatives or family from top officials as the help in order to get the 
contract in public tender. 
• Co-operate with NGOs and other interest groups as a counter lobbying 
move to prevent competitors from being awarded the contract. 
• Simultaneously work with the industry association, to pressure 
authorities to provide technical and administrative support, in order to 
cope with the new system. 
• Networking and personal 
relationships with procurement 
staff and legislators dominated 
the non-market action by firms in 
this industry. 
• Aggressive lobbying and 
financial donations and bribes are 
implemented for the short term 
basis and in return, the contract is 
secured.   
• Build coalitions with other 
relevant stakeholders so as to 
influence public opinion and 
avoid a negative perception of the 
firm.   
• Collective action, as well as inter-
firm relationship and co-
operation dominated the non-
market environment in this 
industry.   
• Political embeddedness is 
perceived as very important, 
since it brings about positive 






As shown in Table 5.3, the firms’ actions and tactics are not necessarily 
singularly driven.  The majority of the participants in this study agreed that given the 
complexity of the institutional environment in South Sulawesi, non-market actions 
cannot be associated with only one driving force.  Compliance strategy for example, 
cannot be driven only by political factors.  In fact, empirical findings indicated that 
the compliance strategy could be attributed to both political and social factors.  
As can be seen from Table 5.3, the role of intermediaries, through industry 
association or general business interest organisation, is important in supporting the 
non-market actions taken by the firm.  The role of intermediaries is particularly 
important in legal action which is usually used to represent the interest of small 
firms.  Individual actions taken by the firm are mostly driven by the issue that are 
mostly of a short-term basis. 
5.3.1. Compliance Strategies 
The majority of participants agreed that when dealing with the non-market 
environment, firms should also consider formal tactics such as complying with 
regulations.  Complying regulation strategies implemented by firms are varied 
between three industries, but in general have the same in common. Meeting the local 
regulation, acquiring the necessary license and how each firm interact with the 
government agencies are part of the firm’s actions. Table 5.4 summarises the 




Table 5.4:  Compliance Strategy of Firms 
One participant (PAR #4) from the procurement sector emphasised the 
changing regulations as an important factor that needed to be considered by any firm 
in the industry.  The introduction of e-procurement in many government agencies at 
all levels has forced the firms to develop their knowledge and catch up with the latest 
development.  The participant further underlined the importance of meeting market 
obligation, which is that of completing other non-market related actions. 
“You have to know and have good knowledge in the procurement 
sector.  You also have to have knowledge about the system, since the 
current system is very complex and time-consuming.  We have a new 
version of the presidential decree on this matter and you have to 
understand the differences.  Knowing the officials who handle the 
procurement is also an important factor.  At least, by knowing the 
officials, you can play the game and know who you fight with.”  
[PAR #4] 
Hotel Advertising Government contractor 
- Report revenue for 
tax purposes 




regarding the labour 
issue 
- Get involved in 
several meetings 
and discussions held 
either by 
government offices 
or trade associations 
- Visit the relevant 
government office 
regularly 
- Agree to be 
involved in the 
tourism program 
organised by the 
tourism office 
- Administrate licenses 
and permits prior to 
building billboards or 
other types of 
advertising 
- Pay local tax 
retribution 
- Pay land and property 
tax 
- Obtain licenses to 




- Ensure that the 
property complies 
with road safety 
regulations. 
- License and permit 
processing time 
usually takes 6 days 




- Meet regularly with 
officials to get 
information on public 
procurement 
opportunities 
- Invite government 
officials to supervise 
the work under 
contract 
- Collaborate and form 
alliance with 
government technical 
agencies in developing 
technical standards and 
procedures for specific 
procurement 
- Comply with technical 




An understanding of the regulations and other essential information related to 
the business is also important regardless of the industry.  Compliance policies can 
also be found in the advertising sector.  One participant (PAR #17) who has been 
involved in the business for more than 20 years noted that the compliance policies in 
the advertising industry have become more important, particularly since the industry 
is viewed as one of the main revenue generating means for the local government.  
The participant explained that the implementation of a new law for obtaining a 
license (in order to install a new billboard) or renewing a license needs to be 
considered carefully.  There are now more agencies involved in the process 
compared to the past.  The increasing number of stakeholders in the business means 
the firms will need to provide more knowledge and resources.   
“To get a new license for installing a billboard, you have to prepare 
seven items; while, there are only two items for renewing the license.  
It looks easy and you may think to intentionally violate the rules.  But 
remember, by doing that, you just fool yourself.  After all, you just 
need to comply with the regulations, albeit the consequence of time 
and money that goes beyond what was stated.” [PAR #17] 
One participant (PAR #4), who has been involved in government tendering 
for years, noted that the changing environment is unavoidable.  In the past, it was 
easy to violate the rules and the subsequent risk could be avoided with bribery.  
However, under the current business environment, such an action is not enough to 
control the situation.  The participant acknowledges that the frequency of violation of 
rules is not entirely declining.  However, the pressure for firms to comply with 
regulations has become greater with increased public scrutiny.  Some areas even 
enforced stricter conditions for business actors to be involved in government 
procurement.  As mentioned by another participant (PAR #11),  the current 
regulation requires firms to be registered at the national level if the firms want to get 
a contract to supply medical devices to the government hospital:   
“In our industry, there is a new regulation that all medical devices 
distributors (Penyalur Alat Kesehatan-PAK) should have the 




the Ministry of Health in Jakarta.  In the past, such registration 
numbers could be obtained from the provincial level, but now we 
have to also register at the national level.  The cost of obtaining such 
a registration number could reach IDR 50 million ($5,000).”  [PAR 
#11] 
An understanding of the fundamental conditions in doing business will shape 
the behaviour of a firm in implementing its non-market actions.  One participant 
(PAR #17) expressed the general approach by all firms, where short term objectives 
mostly affected the decision of the tactics chosen:  
“(…) Doing business with the government means that you have to 
deal with many regulations and procedures.  It is a long and time-
consuming procedure, but you have to deal with it anyway.  If not, 
how are you going to get a contract?” [PAR #17] 
Similarly, another participant, who also served as the chairman of a business 
association in the region, emphasised the importance of a firm to comply with the 
regulations.  However, he realised that the greater effect usually comes from non-
market tactics.  Once the formal prerequisite is met, the firm needs to implement its 
non-market actions carefully at the start.  One participant (PAR #9) asserts that such 
carefulness requires experience and resources in order to attain favourable outcomes.  
Lump sum payment, another form of bribe, should be treated confidentially (with 
one-way interaction only).  The owners of small firms hardly ever meet directly with 
high-ranking officials who asked for the lump sum payment.  This approach is taken 
to avoid any attention from external parties, such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), competitors and legislative members.   
“With government officials, you have to deal with both the high and 
low-level ranking officials who handle your documents on a daily 
basis.  For the high-ranking staff, we don’t know the suitable amount 
and as such, if we give them money, it will be useless since they may 
find that it’s not enough.  Instead, what we provide is a ticket for 




to understand their unspoken hint.  For instance, sometimes, the 
secretary will call me and say, “the boss wants to go to Bali”.  From 
that point, you will need to read between the lines and understand 
that it means, ‘please provide the travel ticket and accommodation 
for the boss.” [PAR #9] 
Violating regulations with bribery is usually driven by the fact that the 
regulations are hard to follow and weak in compliance policies.  Bribery is thus used 
as the means to smoothen regulatory burden, even though all participants agreed that 
such actions should be taken carefully.  Pressure from the society and massive 
corruption eradication campaigns have resulted in many business actors being 
prosecuted.   
Apart from meeting regulatory requirements, all participants agreed that they 
also implemented other forms of compliance strategies.  Consultations and meetings 
with the government officials to discuss important issues in the industry are also 
carried out by the firms.  For instance, such actions have been conducted by the firms 
in the advertising business sector.  When the central government intended to abolish 
all billboards that violated the rules on the national highway, the firms tried to 
postpone the action by seeking opinions from the provincial and city governments.  
The firms in the advertising industry also had consultations with the local parliament 
to seek support for this matter.  Another compliance strategy adopted by government 
contractors is to invite the government officials to supervise their work.  Firms also 
regularly report on the progress of the respective work, as stated in the contracts.   
5.3.2. Participation Strategies 
The interviews also revealed that firms often pursued more than one strategy 
at the same time.  This is especially where the two strategies were easy to initiate.  
For example, participation in the trade association took place alongside bribery of 
officials.  As a result, some participants were not always sure which strategy or 




Based on the information from the respondents, the knowledge on the issue, 
as well as the regulatory environment at the local government level, is important for 
small firms, in their attempt to gain political influence at the local level.  The impact 
of local government regulation is perceived as coercive rather than supportive.  This 
is understandable, given the status of the local government within the governmental 
structure at the national level.  Many local governments experienced decentralisation 
euphoria, where they can propose new laws and regulations that disrupt the licensing 
process.   
Albeit the perception of coercive pressure from local government regulations, 
the majority of small firm owners believe that there are always options for them to 
utilise their influence on the local government.  The options will be taken when the 
firms recognize the available political resources (knowledge and political 
connections) that they have.  Several participants clearly indicated their involvement 
in a political party, either as a registered member or a supporter, is a part of their 
participation strategy.  By doing this, firms may take advantage of first-hand 
information from policy-makers or even participate in the formulation of government 
policies and laws. 
Given the nature of the three industries, organising collective action is more 
complicated, since such initiative may encourage free-riding from other firms in the 
same industry.  Collective action will be selected when such action matches with the 
general interest in the industry.  However, the intra-industry competition remains 
high for the three sectors, even though they belong to the same industry.   
In the case of one participant from the hotel industry a reason for belonging to 
the business association or collective organisation was to benefit from group 
insurance policies. After two years of dealing with the labour issue, which affected 
the operations of his hotel, the owner decided to seek an alternative solution from the 
trade association. In addition, firms in the government contractor sector may pursue 
broad networks or find options with other firms within the group.  In sum, the 
general view of the participants indicated that the variety and diversity of political 




5.3.3. Political Strategies 
Regulatory uncertainty, stiff competition and red-tape bureaucracy have 
forced firms to become more dependent on political strategy.  Political strategies of 
firms consist of political knowledge and competency, as well as political legitimacy 
and commitment.  Political strategies can help firms exploit political resources 
managed by the government (through regulations or personal intentions of the 
government officials), which can help firms smoothen their operation and ease the 
uncertainty.  As one respondent (PAR #9) from the advertising industry describes her 
experience: 
“A good relationship with staff at the revenue office will help, but 
what about other government bodies? Dealing with all of them is 
difficult, since they have different opinions regarding one matter.  I 
have several contacts in various government agencies, but it is just 
one thing.  The main thing to do is to approach the top officials.  
Therefore, we contacted them to have a chat and sometimes we 
invited the officials to a restaurant.  Some of them refused to 
‘cooperate’, but others were keen to do so and offered some help.” 
[PAR #9] 
The majority of the participants viewed political strategies as dominant as 
compared to market strategies, because the latter does not provide incentives for 
firms.  Given the current institutional environment in Indonesia and particularly in 
South Sulawesi, all firms agreed that the key success factor for firms is not just 
market capability.  The domination of political strategies could also be caused by the 
raising of social pressure from other interest groups and stakeholders.  All 
participants expressed that the best way to deal with social pressure is through 
informal institutions, where personal relationships and providing lump sum payments 
or bribing is more powerful to facilitate economic activities.  All participants 
interviewed admitted that such unlawful actions are beneficial to the firm in its 




When asked why such unlawful actions are preferable than legitimate ones, 
one respondent (PAR #19) from the government contractor sector indicated that the 
chance for the firm to get a contract is nearly impossible, without any connections 
with officials:  
“Well, the result will be very clear (if you do not bribe or have 
connections) that you will not get any project.  I can say that I am 
100% sure about this, based on my own experiences.  You also need 
to provide what I call ‘after sales service’ where you invite 
government staff for dinner or give them small souvenirs.  I think it 
makes them comfortable to do business with you.” [PAR #19] 
The nature of a firm also affects its legitimacy in dealing with its non-market 
environment.  The larger the firm, the easier it can acquire legitimacy.  Therefore, the 
only way a small firm can enhance its legitimacy, is through interaction with political 
actors.  The difference in treatment and support that small firms get is clearly 
expressed by one participant.  He noted that large firms usually have the support 
from high-ranking national officials or top security officials.  Therefore, they do not 
need to deal with day-to-day activities, which for small firms, can be very time-
consuming.   
The implementation of the political strategy is also affected by the 
attractiveness of the political market.  One participant (PAR #21) expressed his 
interest in entering public procurement as a government contractor, as he saw that the 
market was attractive and the likelihood of success was high; even though he was 
aware of the high level of competition in the sector, which to some extent made it 
more competitive to get benefits from the political strategy.  Given the good 
connection he has with government officials, politicians and other political actors in 
the region, it made him believe that he could exchange his resources with some 
financial advantages in return.  As he expressed: 
“I have many friends there (mentioning a government agency).  After 
several years, my friends then got promotions and became important 




job.  Since the job was not exceeding IDR 100 million (AU$ 10,000), 
there was no need for an open tender and it was just based on my 
friends’ assessment.” [PAR #21] 
Implementing political strategies, by building connections with political elites 
and government officials, eases the way for business actors to acquire first-hand 
information.  In such stiff competition, superior access and accurate information can 
help the firm reduce expropriation hazards, in situations where general 
communication in the public domain is inadequate.  In return, the firm will provide 
financial incentives to the government officials by paying their business-related 
travels.   
Two main instruments used by firms in implementing their political strategies 
are financial support and information.  The participants in this study found that 
legislators and other regulatory authorities in government agencies are responsive to 
these instruments.  Bribes and kickbacks offer financial incentives for the 
government officials and members of parliament, while receiving information from 
the firms could help agencies in their decision-making process.  Most information 
transmission from business enterprises is delivered through the business association, 
which may come in the form of data, statistics and other market-related information. 
While non-market strategies is perceived as highly important, in the case of 
political strategy, the majority of the firms in the government procurement sector 
agree that political strategy is more than just a complement to market-based 
competitive strategy.  For the firms in the sector, competition in public procurement 
is determined by non-market strategies, as well as political strategies (how to 
maintain the mutual exchange of favour with government officials and legislators).   
5.3.4. Social Strategies Mainly Driven by Shared-responsibility Culture 
In terms of social performance, findings from the study show that the values 
and cultures, as well as religious value, of the firms presumably affect how they 
implement their social strategies.  Philanthropy or charity is driven mostly by the 




activities when most activities are carried out by the owner.  All participants were 
aware of the notion, “Corporate Social Responsibility” or CSR; nevertheless, they 
did not want their social activities to be classified as CSR.  Unlike large firms, all the 
small firms’ owners in the study do not recognise the specific issues regarding social 
responsibility, which is to be handled separately by the firm. 
The shared responsibility culture which is driven by religious value also 
motivates the firm in its social strategies such as charity and philanthropy.  It is also 
driven by the encouragement from the value of the society to act in accordance to 
Islamic and good values in general.  Many participants believe, regardless of their 
religion, that doing good for others can stimulate rezeki (blessing from God) and 
doing the reverse will cause punishment on the day of judgement.  As indicated by 
one participant (PAR #7), the values that arise from donations or charitable actions 
are very important: 
“We always deduct our profit for that purpose.  First we pay tax and 
we also pay zakat (obligatory charity in Islam).  As a Muslim, I 
always insist that the firm has to pay zakat, which will be directly 
distributed to the poor people.  It is what we believe and were 
encouraged to do since we were young.  It is a good thing and I also 
believe that it will be beneficial for us.” [PAR #7] 
The influence of religious values shapes the approaches taken by the firms’ 
owner in engaging in charity activities, which are mainly in the form of zakat 
(compulsory giving), Sadaqah (non-obligatory charity and is not subject to any 
conditions) or Infaq (general giving).  In doing charitable actions, the locus of 
responsibility is dominated by the people in need (orphans, Muslim organisations 
and targeted beneficiaries) around the firm’s location.  No financial return is 
expected by the firms, instead it is merely a sign of altruistic value, as well as a 
desire to maintain the image of the firm.  The latter involves the enjoyment of giving, 
which will lead to longer relationships with people around the firm. 
“We usually support sports activities held by communities around 




usually request for us to participate; at least they can get their flyers/ 
posters for their events printed here for free.” [PAR #9] 
A small firm’s owner’s individual discretion dominates the decision on how 
and what social strategies are implemented.  A respondent (PAR #10) from the hotel 
industry shared the experience in philanthropy actions: 
“We also donate to the orphans and social organizations such as the 
Red Cross organization on a regular basis.  We have a lot of food 
containers, oil containers and used newspapers from our customers 
that we regularly donate to the people around us, so that they can 
sell or use it for their own purposes.” [PAR #10] 
From the participants of the study, it was found that there was no formal 
request from the government authorities to do social activities.  Instead, it would be 
up to the discretion of the owners of the small firms, who based their social activities 
on personal values and the importance of the beneficiary; although most of the time, 
the beneficiaries are the relatives or people around the firm.  Although there is no 
formal demand from the government and no financial incentives are expected, the 
firms are keen to implement social strategies, as it exhibits good attitude from the 
owners.   
5.4. Political Resources 
When it comes to political resources, small firms are assumed to have lesser 
financial and managerial resources compared to their larger counterparts.  However, 
from a different point of view, small firms essentially have a political resource in 
common with larger firms.  The results of this study showed that regardless of the 
firm’s size, in the turbulent economy, a firm needs to invest in political connections 
in order to exert legitimacy and influence.  Legitimacy is important for a firm, as 
shown by the majority of the firms in this study. 
The findings show that legitimacy is important since it serves as the currency 




access, particularly with the government.  As noted by one participant (PAR #4) 
based on his experience in building relationships with regulatory authorities: 
“I think you know what I mean.  You have to lobby and build good 
relations with officials, especially in the districts, so they can share 
information with you.  It is all about optimizing opportunities.  It is 
not a difficult thing.  I mean, it is common sense.  If you do good 
things to other people, you can expect that they will do the same for 
you.  So, you have to do good things, right?” [PAR #4] 
Governments are the source for firms to benefit through market exchanges.  
They are also the source of market information specific for firms.  The government 
offers not just support, but also market opportunities for firms, in the form of various 
public contracts, licenses and approvals, policies and regulations, taxes, as well as 
other forms of financial support.   
Heterogeneity of political actors in the institutions also forces firms not to 
have a homogenous view and treatment of political actors.  Furthermore, all 
participants in this study emphasised that they need to deal with heterogeneous 
political actors within a certain institution, inter-institution political actors and also a 
heterogeneous set of interest groups.  Given the locality of the context, firms in this 
study did not need to be aware of the heterogeneity between different political 
systems.  All participants in this study exerted different strategies for each level of 
government officials. 
“(…) generally you have to deal with all levels and treat them as an 
important part of your network.  Top officials must be very important 
since they are the one who make decisions.  For low level officials, 
we usually give them cigarettes or small souvenirs to show our 
gratitude.” [PAR #13] 
One difficulty however, is that small firms are more heterogeneous.  
Therefore, each firm has to deal with a specific problem, even within the same 




political commitments by meeting all administrative requisites and allocating more 
time in building political connections.  One participant (PAR #4) from the 
government procurement sector explained the process in implementing its political 
actions, which required time and commitment: 
“It is simple.  Don’t just contact them if you need something.  
Contact them regularly, make a conversation, help them with small 
things and the rest will be yours.”  [PAR #4] 
Political connections give firms an advantage to have superior access to the 
first-hand information from political actors in government institutions.  In addition, 
firms may build personal connections and special relationships with officials to 
rectify expropriation behaviours or political influences.  Good connections also 
provide firms with valuable resources that are insufficient in imperfect markets.  For 
example, small firms’ participants who work in the government contract sector 
mostly have difficulties in dealing with complex and myriad administrative 
procedures in government tenders.  A personal relationship with officials will 
provide an advantage as the firms can have access on how to complete forms by 
providing lump sum payments for officials in return.  It also helps them when dealing 
with supervisory matters, during and after the contract has been awarded, as one 
contractor (PAR #23) indicated: 
“You know how I can survive in this hard and cruel business?  I 
invest most of my time building connections, not just at the top level 
but also with the low-level staff.  They are also important.  Do not 
forget supervisory officials too, they can make a difference when you 
have a good personal relationship with them.  Every contract that I 
was awarded, I always check with the supervisor regarding the 
project, to make sure that everything was good.  In return, I provided 
him with transport allowance and a lump sum payment.  I don’t think 




5.5. Level of Participation 
The participants of this study also acknowledged the existence of different 
levels of participation in implementing their non-market strategies - the collective 
and the individual levels.  The decision of the participation level is context-based and 
depends on the nature of the industry.  In addition, the decision to involve and act 
collectively does not eliminate the choice to act individually.  Free-rider problem is 
the main concern for firms in choosing between collective and individual levels.  
However, for certain issues, collective action through participating in a business 
association is the only choice for the firm.  As a result, business associations are 
viewed as one of the political resources available to firms.  Several collective 
business organisations are recognised by the government and therefore, the 
involvement with the business associations can provide access to a particular firm.   
According to the participants in this study, collective business organisations 
can be divided into two general categories, namely business associations with a 
broad membership base and single sector business organisations or trade 
organisations.  In general, these collective business organisations served as 
intermediaries for the firms in implementing their political initiatives.   
All participants agreed that by being involved in a collective business 
organisation, a firm can get two collective benefits, namely securing essential 
information for the members and the power to change legislation.  For small firms, 
being involved in a business association is a reasonable choice, since pursuing 
political objectives such as legislative changes with private and individual political 
action, is very costly. 
Participants from the three sectors in this study indicated that in most cases, 
being involved in a business association can help the firms in seeking favourable 
legislative changes as another political resource.  Small firms in the advertising 
sector which tried to legally oppose the decision to limit new billboard developments 
can only voice their concerns through the Indonesian Advertising Enterprise 
Association (APRSI - Asosiasi Pengusaha Reklame Seluruh Indonesia) as a 




their interests through several collective business organisations.  Moreover, being a 
member in one of the recognised collective organisations is one of the essential 
requirements for a firm in the procurement sector.  A firm who wants to participate 
in a tender has to obtain a recommendation from a business association that is 
recognised by the government.   
Meanwhile, one participant (PAR#1) from the hotel industry sought other 
options from another business association that does not represent a single industry 
(APINDO - Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia), as its specific industry association 
Indonesia Hotel and Restaurants Association (PHRI - Persatuan Hotel dan Restoran 
Republik Indonesia) was unable to facilitate its labour issue with the trade union.  
According to the interviewee, most of the members of the hotel association might be 
uninterested because the issue affects their firms differently:    
“I got frustrated and I didn’t know what to do.  I should have got the 
support from my industry association, in this case PHRI.  However, 
after several meetings and consultations, I felt that the members, or 
the organisation elites, were not interested in my case, until I met Mr 
L, the chief of The Indonesian Employers Association (APINDO).  I 
consulted with him and hoped that he could offer me some solutions.  
Since I was not a member of his association, he asked me to join and 
register.  Finally, the association led by Mr L started to observe the 
problem and identify alternative solutions and important 
stakeholders who were involved in this case.  As you may know, Mr L 
has good connections with many people, particularly politicians.  
His family is also well-known in politics and business.  I went ahead 
with his solutions and everything was soon back to normal.  I didn’t 
even need to meet with parliament members or sit with the labour 
organisation before an agreement could be reached.  I couldn’t 
believe this actually, but it just happened.  All negotiations with the 
employees are led by Mr L.  I also applaud him on his 





The above case demonstrates that the decision to be involved in the collective 
business organisation could help a firm to pursue its private political actions.  Here, 
the collective business organisation served as an access provider for the individual 
firm.  In addition, non-economic factors, such as the sense of belonging to a group, 
also influence firm owners’ decision to get involved in a collective business 
organisation. 
However, one firm from the advertising industry expressed their negative 
experience from being involved with a collective business organisation.  This 
organisation is very specific as it focuses on small-scale advertising business, such as 
office printing, personal printing and small-scale promotional materials (banners, 
brochures, stickers and labels).  The low political bargaining from the organisation in 
dealing with related government agencies is one of the factors that affected the 
perceptions of several members of the organisation, including the informant of this 
study.  Another factor is the unclear and less strategic thinking that dominated the 
decisions made by the organisation.  One participant (PAR #20) from the advertising 
industry expressed his frustration about the business association that his firm is 
involved with: 
“What amazed me was that the members of the association tried to 
fight with a big business player.  This big business not only provides 
printing services, but also sells printing materials.  The members of 
the association tried to fight against him by boycotting his company 
and not buying any printing materials from him.  I didn’t participate 
at all and I told them that we are not in the same league with this big 
business.  I said that because I knew he has a big warehouse, with 
plenty of supply and huge capital.  I remember also that I had a debt 
of more than IDR 48 million ($4800) with the big company and he 
did not even send a debt collector my way.  Thus, it was clear that he 
must be a very big player and I didn’t want to be involved in a war 
that I certainly could not win.  Some of the members even tried to 
call and blackmail him.  (…)  In this industry, paying cash for 
printing materials is almost impossible since you also haven’t been 




to accept cash and all the small players were soon running out of 
printing materials.  It was terrible.”  [PAR #20] 
5.6. Strategic Tendency 
All the participants in this study agreed that the rules, regulations and other 
political factors influenced the operational aspect of their firms.  The impact is even 
greater during the decentralisation era, where local governments introduced various 
rules and regulations.  The new regulations required firms to spend on some 
adaptation costs.   
The findings indicated that in general, there are two kinds of strategies that 
represent how firms deal with the regulatory pressure. 
The first strategy is that firms tend to adapt to the rules and regulations, 
regardless of the position the firms have of the rules.  One participant (PAR #10) 
from the hotel industry expressed that several rules and regulations are imposed 
without the consideration of the conditions of firms.  For example, the new labour 
regulation regarding casual workers is one of the critical issues for firms.  Yet, firms 
have no choice but to obey the rules, even with the risk that the demand from the 
workers to get financial compensation is often more than what the rules state. 
“For example, at the first demonstration, the employees insisted that 
casual workers should be paid 32 times of the salary when their 
contracts are terminated.  Can you imagine that?  Look, the salary of 
a casual worker is IDR 1.3 million (US$ 115) and according to the 
latest regulation, the compensation for workers with less than two 
years’ of work is only 2 or 3 months wages.  And they asked me to 
pay 32 times as compensation?  At that time, I just wanted to make 
sure that business at the hotel can go back to normal, therefore I 
paid the amount as requested.  At the next demonstration, as they 
knew that I was in a weak position, they insisted on the 
implementation of this policy to other casual workers as well.  




losses, such as my hotel image and my professional image as a 
businessman? The worse thing is that it sends a bad and negative 
message to other workers.  Other workers will believe that they can 
do anything and will not get any punishment for what they have 
done.”  [PAR #10] 
Another participant, (PAR #13),  a government contractor, also pointed out 
the effects of the political units’ coercive actions.  The coercive actions, where 
political actors exercise their legitimate power for businesses to follow, have affected 
the performance of many firms.  The implementation of e-procurement has forced 
the firms to adopt new technology.  It also required the firms to deal with 
administrative and financial costs (related to fees and taxes).   
“We used to be able to get a contract from government agencies by 
simply sending them brochures or just calling the staff to ask for the 
bidding options.  But now, you have to log in, open an account and 
provide documents electronically.  You also have to spend some 
money on the installation of the Internet, purchasing of the 
equipment, paying someone to help you and many more.  I know it’s 
hard and time-consuming.  But you have to face it and deal with it.  
Otherwise, you will lose and will not get a single contract.”  [PAR 
#13] 
The second strategy is by modifying how firms adapt to the regulations.  By 
this, we mean firms are offering alternatives to the implementation of the rules.  This 
also refers to changing the established political rules.  Adaptation suggests that firms 
can also be active and not merely passive in dealing with the political actors.  The 
findings indicate that not all firms have the capacity to convert the adaptation and 
become more active in changing the established political rules.  However, when the 
firms act collectively, the outcome might be different.  As firms in the advertising 
industry pointed out, with collective action and intensive lobbying, some of the 
problems related to regulatory problems can be solved.  One of the successful 




the deadline for firms to remove the billboards that violated the rules, which 
provided firms more time to comply with the new regulations.   
5.7. Non-Market Strategies and Firm’s Performance 
One of the research questions in this study is on how non-market strategies 
affect firms’ performance.  Even though all participants were reluctant to share their 
financial information, the majority of the participants agreed that the implementation 
of non-market strategies, regardless of the types of actions, influences the 
performance of their firm.  When asked about how they measured the performance, 
the majority of participants indicated that sales turnover, employment growth, getting 
a contract from government agencies and profits are some of the indicators that 
reflect their performance.  As discussed in Section 4.5, the performance of the firm 
used in this study were mainly based on subjective perceptual measures from the 
managers during the interview since objective measures were not available as 
mentioned earlier in Section 4.5.1.  In addition, the performance indicator used by a 
firm may differ from one firm to another and from one industry to another.   
All participants from the government contractor sector agreed that non-
market strategies are important for them to be successful and to get more contracts 
from the government.  It can also be assumed that without non-market strategies, 
firms that have a high reliance on government sales will have difficulties getting a 
contract from the government.  In other words, non-market strategies directly affect 
the performance of a firm as indicated by the number of contracts the firm 
successfully got from the government. 
“You know, there are hundreds of companies out there.  We offer 
almost identical products and service.  We are in the situation where 
‘too many bidders with so little projects’.  Without friendship, 
lobbying and bribe, how can you get a contract?  The government 
has plenty of options to choose, you just need to do your homework 




The interviews with the firms that also served as government contractors 
revealed that unless the firm offers a very specific and unique product or service, the 
government will always have more options to choose from.  Along with the firms’ 
market strategies, firms also tried to offer further incentives to government officials 
using non-market strategies.  As one participant (PAR #11) indicated, the incentives 
to implement non-market strategies are therefore higher than doing business without 
the non-market strategies as it increases their chance of getting a contract:  
“Before the bidding process, I sent my brochures and catalogues 
from the factory, so that the officials will consider using my product 
specification in the bidding process.  At the same time, I also sent the 
brochures to the hospital director to make sure that he is also aware 
of the specifications.  Apart from that ‘normal’ strategy, you have to 
prepare a ‘commitment fee’ and propose an option for profit-sharing 
with the tendering officials.  So yes, having just a brochure and a 
good product is not enough in this business.”  [PAR #11] 
The participant above (PAR #11) illustrated the non-market strategies that he 
took in order to get a contract from government agencies.  Non-market actions in this 
case included providing a commitment fee and also ensuring that the firm will 
provide what the participant called, “facilitating fee”, such as entertainment and 
travel expense for tender officials.  In terms of the commitment fee, prior to the 
bidding process, informal negotiation along with illegal payment (bribe) were paid so 
that the officials will consider using the product specification from the firm in the 
bidding process.  The commitment fee also serves as a guarantee to officials that the 
firm agrees to share the profit if the firm was granted the contract.  The participant 
expressed that by doing all these actions the chance for the firm to get a contract 
from the local government is greater than simply following the normal procedures. 
Being granted more contracts from the government means that the business is 
running well.  It also means that the firm may require recruiting more workers.  
Contractors in the infrastructure development sector, for example, indicated that one 




“I always believe that doing business is not just about money and 
profit.  If you work hard and do good things, this means your 
business can continue and grow.  It means that you can recruit more 
workers.  Employing more people means your business is doing 
well.”  [PAR #8]  
For firms that have less dependency on government sales, the purpose of non-
market strategies is mainly as a bridge to ease procedural applications, such as 
getting licenses and renegotiation of local taxes.  It can also be said that the non-
market strategies have no or little relation to the core business of the firms.   
“We tried to comply with all regulations.  We have done this before, 
and I think all the procedures have been conducted, include those 
‘thanks’ allowance and everything.  We also believe we have done 
nothing wrong.  So we build our billboard and in the meantime we 
deal with licence procedure.  We negotiate the time frame for 
advertisement to be displayed.  Besides, everything will be fine if you 
handle it with care and meet their expectations.  Our intention is 
actually just to deal with time and try to meet our client’s 
expectation.”  [PAR #3] 
Building informal political ties with local tax officials through providing 
travel expenses and “thanks allowance” clearly ease the administration process.  
According to the participant (PAR #3), such tactics can make the processing time in 
getting a license faster than without doing them.  He even emphasised that the impact 
of those tactics allowed him to build the billboard and arrange the license after that, 
even though the regulation required the firm to get the license before building a 
billboard. The participant also mentioned that this helps the firm accept more order 
from clients since they can assure the client that the billboard can be built and that 
they can meet the client’s time frame.   
One participant from the hotel industry revealed that he adopted non-market 
strategies as a form of protection for the hotel.  Actions, such as paying an 




various thug organisations, have no direct relation to the market environment.  The 
non-market strategies, in this case, were used not to get profit or financial incentives, 
but to “protect” the firm.  In Indonesia, firms also need to tackle the problem of 
organised thuggery which may come from formal or informal organisations.  These 
organisations are usually affiliated with ethnic groups or even serve as the backbone 
of some political parties and are usually used to intimidate political rivals, or to force 
resolution of business and land disputes.   
Many informal organisations or gang-related organisations regularly ask for 
lump-sum payments from business organisations.  They use various reasons such as 
support for youth activities, security incentives, support for local sports team, and 
some even claim the organisation is a community shareholder and therefore, the firm 
need to support them financially.  However, implementing such strategies required 
cash outflows that may affect the operational costs for the firms.  But paying the fees 
ensures that the firm gets a better environment for the business to run well.  As one 
participant from the hotel industry acknowledge, his firm faced fewer protests from 
gang-related organisations compared to the condition before he implemented such 
non-market tactics.  He also acknowledged that doing such tactics makes him less 
stressed with “security” problems and he feels protected, even though he also 
emphasised that security and safer business environment should be the responsibility 
of the police and the local authority.      
One participant from the advertising industry (PAR #13) supported this 
argument as his firm also implemented non-market strategies.  In this case, the firm 
allowed a politician or political party to use their billboard for political campaigning, 
which did not directly bring about profits for the firm.  The participant claimed that 
allowing politicians or political parties to use the billboard is cheaper than giving the 
politicians financial donations for election campaign.  As the participant said: 
“I think it is much better than we donate our money to the campaign 
team.  It is hard for us actually since the mayor of the city is going 
head to head with the incumbent governor.  Both of them are the 
important person in this province.  Besides, the vice major is the 




with two candidates.  It is hard to choose only one candidate at this 
time.  Besides, my billboards were usually used by other politicians 
too.  When they saw that the billboard isn’t used by our clients, they 
will call me.  I usually let them use the billboard, as long as they 
don’t ask for other things.  If they want to use my labours, they have 
to pay them directly.  Not to me, but directly to the workers.”  [PAR 
#13] 
Being involved in a business organisation is also one of the non-market 
strategies that make ones firm improve its performance.  For instance, a participant 
agreed that in terms of financial indicators, the involvement in more than one 
business organisation mostly impacts the firm performance indirectly.  The 
participant is aware that he needs to deal with various issues which are not all 
business-related.  He gave an example of when he was frustrated by industrial 
relations matters in his firm.  The business organisation that he is a member of 
helped the manager to negotiate suitable terms which worked for the firm and also 
was accepted by the employees.  The organisations also helped the firm lobby the 
parliament so that the hearing session in the parliament house requested by the 
employees was cancelled.  The participant admitted that his involvement in the 
business organisation helped him solve this problem and therefore, avoid him 
spending so much money unnecessarily.  However, he argued that not all issues are 
best solved by the organisation, as he expressed:  
“I think it depends on the problem.  Based on my case, I have tried to 
solve it by myself without external help.  But as you may know, it 
didn’t work.  So, association, in this case APINDO, is the right way 
to solve the problem particularly since the problem was very 
complex and involved so many parts”.  [PAR #22] 
The advantage of participation strategy described above (in addition to 
collective action through business associations) has also helped the firm in the 
advertising sector to gain political benefits, albeit the benefit did not directly provide 




consultation and negotiation opportunities.  With the support of the advertising 
firm’s association, the firm was able to consult and renegotiate the deadline for the 
billboards’ removal with the government. 
5.8. Summary 
Following the constant comparative analytical feature that is consistent with 
grounded theory, this chapter presented the research findings related to the 
antecedents of non-market strategies implemented by firms in Indonesia.  The 
general experience of the participants in this study indicated that decentralisation, as 
an outcome of political reform, came with significant changes that influenced the 
operation of firms.  The changing institutional environment after the resignation of 
President Suharto made the challenge even greater for small firms.  The institutional 
environment based on small firms’ owners’ perspective was more complex and full 
of uncertainties. 
Regulatory uncertainty was one of the main factors that affected the business 
environment in Indonesia.  The uncertainties were due to the situation where the 
local governments issued more laws and regulations in favour of generating more 
income for the local government.  However, instead of clarifying what business 
actors should do, the laws created confusion since many of the laws have been 
established without consultation and thorough discussion with stakeholders.  As a 
result, firms often faced different interpretations of a particular law from various 
government agencies.  Apart from such regulatory burden, the non-market 
environment in South Sulawesi remains characterised by rent-seeking and red-tape 
bureaucracy.   
It is necessary to recognise the antecedents of non-market strategies that small 
firms face as well as how they influence the firms’ decisions regarding how they 
implement their non-market strategies.  The complexities surrounding labour factors, 
unclear jurisdictional authority between government agencies, rent-seeking and 
cultural boundaries in doing business are some of the social and political antecedents 




The study found that non-market strategies are utilised to overcome social 
and political pressures.  Firstly, the compliance strategy was perceived as an 
important non-market strategy, given the complexity of the regulatory environment 
in Indonesia.  Participation strategy is another form of non-market strategy 
implemented by firms, where firms are involved in a political party or are supporting 
one informally.   
The findings in this study also confirmed the importance of political strategy 
in the non-market strategies implemented by firms in Indonesia.  Political strategies 
can help firms exploit political resources managed by the government (through 
regulations or personal intention of government officials), which can help firms 
smoothen their operations and ease uncertainties.  The incentives for implementing 
political strategies as part of non-market strategies of firms are perceived to be 
greater than market strategies.  Social strategies, on the other hand, are mostly 
implemented on the basis of religious values and are personal-satisfaction driven.  
Social strategies are also seen as indications of the owner/ firm’s desire to share 
responsibilities with others. 
The next chapter will be devoted to the discussion of the findings in relation 









“Market success depends not just on their products and services, the 
efficiency of their operations, their internal organisation, and the 
organisation of their supply chains, distribution channels and 
alliance networks.  Success also depends on how effectively they deal 
with government, interest groups, activists and the public” (Baron, 
1995b, p. 73) 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the results of the study were presented following the 
constant comparative analytical feature of grounded theory.  Four concepts based on 
the research objectives of this study were presented.  First, the political and social 
antecedents have been identified which give the broader picture of the nature of the 
non-market environment in Indonesia.  Second, the choices of non-market strategies 
implemented by the respondent firms were also identified.  Third, the forms of non-
market actions and firms’ non-market strategy behaviour in dealing with the non-
market environment in South Sulawesi were also identified.  Lastly, the effect of the 
implementation of non-market strategies on the performance of the firms was also 
presented.   
It was also established from the findings that small firms in Indonesia face 
challenges related to the non-market environment as a result of decentralisation 
wherein the local government was given more discretion in economic decision-
making.  Generally, small firms become a target for extra fees and charges, as a 
result of the low quality legal environment due to macro level instability and the 




This chapter contextualises the findings within the existing literature on non-
market strategies in emergent markets.  It also examines the findings and compares it 
with extant literature.  Corbin and Strauss (1990) argue that such action is not just 
intended to validate the findings, but also to position the study within the existing 
literature.   
This chapter is structured as follows; Section 6.2 seeks to answer research 
question 1 on the nature and characteristics of non-market environment in emerging 
markets such as Indonesia.  Section 6.3 deals with research question 2 in regards to 
how non-market environments lead to the choice of non-market strategies.  This is 
followed by Section 6.4 which explores research question 3, how non-market 
strategies impact the performance of firms.  In Section 6.5, relationship-based 
strategies that employ political resources are discussed followed by the caveats that 
need to be considered in implementing non-market strategies in Section 6.6.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the key points from the chapter.   
6.2. Nature of the Business Environment in Indonesia - an Emerging Market 
As mentioned in Section 2.4, market and non-market strategies have become 
the instruments for firms to compete in an increasingly competitive environment.  
Market strategies are aimed at shaping the interactions between firms and their 
competitors and customers, as well as creating value for economic performance 
(Baron, 1995a).  Non-market strategies, on the other hand, are aimed at influencing 
the institutional players in public policy arenas and tailoring non-market 
environments (Baron, 2010). 
Non-market strategies differ in various institutional conditions (Doh et al., 
2012; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000).  As mentioned in Section 2.7 of the literature 
review chapter, previous non-market strategy literature focused mostly on Western 
and developed nations (Wright et al., 2005; Peng, 2002), with large firms as the 
objects overlooking strategic choices and its relationship with institutional 
frameworks (Bengtson et al., 2009; Peng, 2003).  The condition in most developed 
nations may not be homogenous with most emerging markets, which consists of 




Currently, there is a lack of empirical research from emerging market settings, such 
as Indonesia. 
In Indonesia, political change and reform have affected the magnitude and 
complexity of the business environment.  The Asian financial crisis in 1997 has also 
uncovered the weakness of the economic structure of the country which was mostly 
driven by political connections rather than market fundamental instruments (Fisman, 
2001).  Lack of transparency and monopolistic environment also contributed to the 
vulnerability of the Indonesian economy.  The combination of these factors led to the 
resignation of Suharto as President after more than 32 years in office as well as a 
deep social and political crisis. 
The transition to power from the centralised government to decentralised 
democracy took place with the direct parliamentary election in 1999 followed by the 
presidential election in 2004.  Major constitutional revision along with new 
regulations in the level of local governments was introduced.  Fundamental 
transformation and reform in the financial sector were also introduced to avoid 
economic deterioration as what had happened during the Asian financial crisis.  As a 
result, the Indonesian economy gradually went back to track with economic growth 
recovery to almost the pre-crisis level (Hill & Shiraishi, 2007).   
Despite the economic growth and other improvements at the macro level as a 
result of decentralisation, many observers believed that fundamental improvements 
are still needed and therefore, the business environment in Indonesia remains 
challenging (Van der Eng, 2004).  Ongoing institutional changes as well as the 
necessity for informal relationships in dealing with institutional voids, the main 
characteristics of emerging markets (Peng, 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2000), typified the 
situation in Indonesia.   
The literature on non-market environments in emerging markets setting have 
also mostly focused on institutional and infrastructure deficiencies (Kim & Li, 2014; 
Hoskisson et al., 2000).  Institutional deficiency is mostly present in the case where 
the country lacks market-supporting institutions (political and legal institutions) 




resources (Choi et al., 1999; Peng & Heath, 1996).  The following sections elaborate 
the macro perspective from participants of small firms in relation to the 
characteristics of business environment in Indonesia, namely, weak institutional 
environment and institutional transition.   
6.2.1. Weak Institutional Environment  
One of the main characteristics of Indonesia is the weak institutional 
environment.  As discussed in Section 2.5.1, the institutional environment 
surrounding small firms in Indonesia is still characterised by the absence of market-
supporting institutions.  For example, insufficient protection of property rights (Van 
der Eng, 2004) and extensive laws and policy differences among government bodies 
in the process of investment decision-making (von Luebke, 2009) remain 
characteristics of the business environment in Indonesia.  This situation is not unique 
to Indonesia and is generally found in emerging markets (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; 
Peng, 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
The absence of market-supporting mechanisms where the firms have to deal 
with imperfect market mechanisms, as well as a strong but unstable government 
makes it “a paradox of tensions and contradictions” (Li, Peng, & Macaulay, 2013).  
On one hand, the firms face stiff competition with an increasing number of 
competitors, as in the case of the three industries in this study.  At the same time, the 
firms are also forced to pay more attention to the powerful but unstable governments 
which continuously assert their importance for the business to operate.   
The findings in this study showed that the government, on every level, have 
continued to preserve and even impose their importance as a result of 
decentralisation.  While decentralisation means a reduction in the central 
government’s intervention, local governments still possess and even foster power in 
approving and allocating resources.  This finding is consistent with previous studies 
showing that government interventions dominate the market environment in 
emerging markets (Peng et al., 2009).  The regulatory dimensions within the national 
and local governments in Indonesia are characterised by a relatively loose system 




limited supervision and coordination.  Lack of clear coordination among government 
agencies and the tendency to over-regulate also contributed to the poor 
implementation and enforcement (Butt, 2010).   
The poor implementation and enforcement by government agencies at all 
levels have significant impacts on small firms.  As a result, the situation creates more 
uncertainties for firms, particularly small firms, as can be seen from the case studies.  
Take the advertising firm industry, for example.  The firms have to deal with 
uncertainties due to unclear jurisdictional coordination between the municipal, 
provincial and central government.  After installing their billboards on the national 
highway route, the firms had to uninstall all the billboards as instructed by the central 
government.  The situation is the same for the players from the hotel industry.  Apart 
from facing stiff market competition, firms also have to deal with labour issues such 
as wages, overtime pay and dismissal payment.  In addition, firms also faced high 
pressure with extra demands from other stakeholders and became a target for 
financial support by political candidates in the local election.   
From all the firms interviewed in this study, all 27 participants, small firms’ 
owners and directors from the three different industries (hotel, advertising and 
government supplier), confirmed the importance of informal political relations with 
politicians as a substitute for weak formal market support institutions.  These 
findings show that social relationship with other actors are crucial for the firms 
which is consistent with other studies in emerging markets (Fisman, 2001).   One can 
argue that when the non-market environment is surrounded with uncertainties, the 
strategic market-based choice is ineffective or not sufficient and offers less incentive 
for the firms.   
Given the prominent position of the government and other non-market actors 
that often force frequent transformations in the regulatory and legal framework, 
relational strategies are the leading strategies that are implemented by the firms 
(Rajwani & Liedong, 2015; Peng & Luo, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996).  Apart from 
lowering transaction cost, relational strategies also enabled firms to pursue their 
objectives with advantages from public policies through licensing and acquiring 




regulatory changes (Bonardi & Keim, 2005).  Relational strategies are even referred 
to as a unique type of entrepreneurial capital that leads to better performance of firms 
(Fan et al., 2011; Peng & Zhou, 2005; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
6.2.2. Institutional Transition 
Apart from the weak institutional environment, the business environment in 
Indonesia, as with most emerging economies, is characterised by transitional phases 
which reflect the need for different strategic implementations by the firm.  
Decentralisation, as a product of political reform in Indonesia, comes with significant 
changes that influence the operation of the firms, particularly for small firms.  The 
economic and political transition from the Suharto regime to the decentralisation era 
has resulted in different impacts for different actors.  Local political actors enjoy the 
new jurisdictional power which creates a dilemma for the firms.  However, the 
empirical findings in this study showed that decentralisation means increasing 
uncertainty in doing business.   
The findings in this research indicated that all firms, regardless of the 
industry, are facing the same situation.  Problems such as unclear jurisdiction among 
different technical government agencies, labour issues, low level of law enforcement 
and constant pressure from politicians and government officials force the firms to 
increase their use of private arrangements.   
The importance of informal political relations with government officials and 
other private interests such as activists or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is 
a result of public and private expropriation, which considerably restrains firms from 
engaging in market activities.  All participants confirmed the importance of private 
arrangements or institutional substitution strategies to compensate for missing 
market-supporting institutions.  The range of institutional substitution strategies 
implemented by firms is broad and includes lobbying, creating personal networks, 
and personal donation to politicians and soft money to government officials, which 




The majority of the participants asserted that the government authorities did 
not give credible commitment not to expropriate from the business actors during the 
transition period.  Government officials and politicians were able to extract rents and 
collect bribes, just two of the methods that reflected weak market-supporting formal 
institutions..  Other forms of public expropriation hazards from government officials 
were excess red-tape bureaucracy, interventions to market activities and rent 
extractions.  Such activities were very time-consuming due to the number of 
procedures required and the cost incurred to secure smooth operations for small 
firms.    
The firms in the three industries involved in this study faced rampant 
opportunistic behaviour from the regulatory authorities.  Interestingly, the evidence 
also indicated that such a challenge is not uniquely related to government officials or 
politicians, but also to the civil society at large, including social organisations around 
the operations of the firm.  This implies that firms should also think about including 
an informal exchange with other external counterparts, as a result of these external 
demands.   
Relational strategies are the main activities preferred by most participants in 
response to the institutional constraints they face.  Relational strategies refer to the 
integrated set of organisational activities in managing relationships with the 
stakeholders of the firms (Marquis & Raynard, 2015).  Firms in the government 
contractor industry in this study believe that such actions will effectively insulate the 
firms from market competition.  This is consistent with previous studies that have the 
basic premise that firms tend to use rent-seeking activities and relational actions to 
substitute market capabilities (Galang, 2012; Ivy, 2012; Chen, Li, Su, & Sun, 2011; 
Keim & Hillman, 2008). 
Unsurprisingly, according to the cases in this study, the government is 
perceived as one of the most difficult environmental dependencies to control and 
therefore, is considered one of the main constraints of the firms.  This echoes 
previous studies that viewed the government in emerging economies as a key 
constraint in shaping economic and social and cultural concerns (Hoskisson et al., 




made non-economic actions the priority (North, 1990b), since such actions are 
perceived as more attractive and rewarding.  Another reason a firm pursues non-
economic actions is related to the survival of the firms.  It is understood that non-
market activities can increase the probability of survival of a firm or even help a firm 
generate rent by neutralising the advantage of competitors.   
The findings in this study also indicated that the absence of strong 
institutions, combined with rampant opportunistic behaviour from regulatory 
authorities, places pressure on firms to be involved in corruption and extensively use 
their connections.  Corruption and bribery, as indicated by firms in this study, is seen 
as political action and a part of non-market strategies in response to competitive 
pressure (Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009).  Managers and owners of small 
firms rationalised the action of corruption as necessary to counter similar actions 
taken by their competitors.  Corrupt practices, as a strategy for dealing with red-tape 
bureaucracy, are seen as important competitive activities aimed at stifling competing 
firms (Lawton, McGuire, et al., 2013).  Such a strategy is particularly important for 
firms with a high dependency on government contracts and those in a more regulated 
industry.  The research outcome also shows a predominant reliance on the network-
based strategy to avoid unfavourable outcomes, as a result of weak formal market-
supporting institutions (Peng et al., 2009; Peng, 2003). 
The empirical findings in this study illustrated that institutional-based 
strategies are the main choices for small firms in Indonesia. This is becausethese 
strategies can be perfectly implemented utilising the intangible resources (e.g., 
political knowledge, personal political ties) that the firms have.  The lack of 
incentives for a firm to invest in firm-specific assets is one of the reasons why firms 
pursue institutional-based strategies.  As a result, personal connections served as an 
institutional substitution.  This is consistent with other studies (Peng, 2002; Fisman, 
2001).  In the case of emerging economies such as Indonesia, despite their illegality, 














6.3. Non-Market Environment and the Choice of Non-Market Strategies in 
Indonesia 
Given the prominent position of the government and other political actors, 
along with the uncertain and complex nature of the non-market environment, the 
firms in this study chose to engage in non-market strategies.  The findings of this 
study confirmed that the main driver for firms to implement non-market strategies 
was to overcome the hazards of public (government) and private expropriations such 
as those given to activists and NGOs.  Generally firms have two options in dealing 
with the institutional environment – (1) through market entrepreneurial activities and 
(2) through Political entrepreneurial activities (see Figure 6.1).  The use of non-
market strategies to handle the non-market environment was perceived by the firms 
as their best strategy to generate the best returns for their firms, as compared to 






Firms in this study confirmed that non-market strategies helped them attain 
advantageous positions and profits.  The “institutional void” has frequently been 
cited as the reason for a firm to implement non-market strategies, such as political 
strategies, relational transactions and extensive use of personal relationships (Peng & 
Luo, 2000).   
6.3.1. Political Strategies 
Firms in this study demonstrated two different behaviours in terms of 
implementing political strategies.  In the case of government contractors, the trend 




was to use political strategies for rent-seeking purposes.  The firms in this industry 
tend to insulate themselves from competitive forces with rent-seeking behaviours 
such as bribery and providing facilities for government officials.  This behaviour is 
common in small firms not only to secure public procurement contracts but also to 
block competitors from entering the competition.   
On the other hand, firms from the hotel and advertising industries showed 
different behaviour in the implementation of their political strategy.  Firms in these 
two sectors implemented political strategies to decrease the level of illegal payments 
imposed by local government authorities.  Political actions were also implemented to 
force regulatory authorities to provide better protection for small firms in 
entrepreneurial activities and market production.   
The two different behaviours of firms in the implementation of political 
strategies in this study lead us to the proposition that firms which focus mostly on 
rent-seeking purposes are firms that have fewer capabilities to survive in the market 
competition.  These cases also demonstrated that firms will invest more in hazard-
reducing strategy when they believe that the rent generated is unrelated to the firm’s 
market activities.  Apart from the differences, this study confirmed that in an 
institutional environment characterised by weak market-supporting institution, 
political strategies can reduce the level of uncertainty faced by the firm.    
When faced with public and private expropriation hazards, small firms 
substitute institutional challenges with political strategies, which can help them 
influence political decisions and policies.  Political strategies are an important part of 
non-market strategies, which influence the competitive strategy of the firm (Baron, 
2010).  The variety of political strategies taken by small firms ranges from campaign 
contribution, informal personal network with regulatory authorities to direct political 
participation.   
Furthermore, the findings showed that political strategies of small firms serve 
as antithetical to the development of market capabilities of the firm, given the fact 
that the small firms implementing such strategies have low market capabilities.  The 




market capabilities.  Instead, they become reliant on non-market strategies for their 
business activities.  As can be seen from small firms that rely heavily on government 
sales, they tend to avoid and even prevent regulation changes.  For firms with this 
character, non-market strategies serve as a substitute for market strategies.  This is in 
line with the argument from previous studies that non-market strategies, in this case 
political strategies, can help the firm replicate the functions provided by market-
supporting institutions (Hellman et al., 2003).  Apart from fewer incentives which 
might be obtained with market activities, the firms also understand that network-
based strategy and personal trust can help them overcome uncertainties (Peng, 2003; 
Peng & Heath, 1996). 
The above behaviours of the firms in implementing their political strategies 
also emphasised the importance of the discussion to integrate market and non-market 
strategy of the firms, as previous studies have demonstrated (Kingsley, Vanden 
Bergh, & Bonardi, 2012; De Figueiredo, 2009; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Baron, 1997, 
1995a). 
Another perspective in discussing political strategies could be seen from 
whether the political strategies were implemented in the form of relational or 
transactional approaches.  The findings in this study also showed that the direct 
relational approach was used more by firms with high dependencies on the 
government, while firms with less dependency tend to adopt the transactional 
approach.  It confirmed the conclusion from Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) that political 
activities implemented by firms can help reduce uncertainties related to dependence 
on the government.  However, each firm has a different influential capability, which 
is mostly related to asymmetrical capabilities, as argued by Oliver (1991).  A few of 
the participants indicated that the absence of a stable institution, as in the case of 
South Sulawesi, created great enthusiasm for firms to be involved in political actions 
and actually served as an attractive political market (Bonardi et al., 2005; Schuler et 
al., 2002; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000).   
According to Peng (2003), after experiencing environmental turbulence and 
calculating the possible incentive of the network-based strategy with regulatory 




supportive regulative pressure, which helps create a competitive environment.  In this 
phase, firms which implement hazard-reducing strategies explore an alternative 
approach beyond network-based and informal relationships, since such relations are 
no longer sufficient (Peng & Luo, 2000).      
The findings from this study also confirmed that the size of the firm 
determined the choice of political strategy and actions taken by the firm.  All cases 
illustrated that as small firms, they generally had the tendency to wait for the signals 
and chose to be passive instead of active.  This situation is in line with previous 
studies which showed that the size of the firm could be one of the main prerequisites 
of the political behaviour of the firm (Lux et al., 2011; Hillman et al., 2004; 
Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 2001; Hadjikhani, 2000).  In the environment that 
characterised with high level of corruption, small firms often have limited choices 
when faced with rent-seeking attitudes from the government officials (Young et al., 
2011).  However, in some cases, the firms may take initiatives to conduct corrupt 
exchanges (e.g., bribery and providing “facilitation fees”) with government officials, 
especially for the government contractor firms in order to secure public procurement 
contracts.  This tactic was used where the firm’s manager cannot develop 
independent strategies and has no choice other than engage in the corrupt exchange 
to gain favours and protections.  
Such resource-based arguments could also be employed to identify the 
interaction of small firms in the network.  For small firms, the alliance with political 
actors may be seen as relatively ad-hoc, depending on the particular objective (e.g., 
license for government contract) and the political actors targeted for the particular 
objectives.  Government officials are often rotated and their positions highly depend 
on the new regime policy which may differ from the previous government.  The 
unstable position of political actors and competition among political actors through 
media and other social movements are also among the factors that influence the 
stability of the network.  As a result, the political ties of the firm are conditional on 
the institutional environment.  In other words, the relationships between businesses 




One can argue that the more political knowledge and commitment that a firm 
can assure in the network, the more influence it will have.  However, such conditions 
do not happen to small firms where the relationship is perceived as coercive.  The 
findings reflected the implication that political strategies implemented by firms in 
emerging markets may not be as effective as political strategies in most advanced 
markets.  While a firm’s financial contribution and political actions are relatively 
well institutionalised in most developed countries, the regulatory and political 
environment of emerging markets are generally non-transparent (Peng et al., 2008) 
and therefore, its effectiveness cannot easily be measured. 
One thing that is also worth considering from the findings in this study is that 
all the participants considered relationship strategies as political ties and not business 
ties.  While political ties reflect the informal social connection between the firms and 
government officials, business ties emphasise the informal social connection that the 
firms have with other market actors such as buyers, suppliers and competitors.  All 
participants agreed about the importance of business ties apart from political ties.  
However, as complexity and uncertainty characterised the business environment, 
political ties were chosen and preferred since they provided direct effects through 
regulatory resources and are also short term in nature.  This confirms the previous 
studies that in emerging economies where market supporting institutions are lacking 
and strategic choice are mostly created on a short term basis, political ties are the 
alternative for the firm (Sheng et al., 2011; Peng, 2003). 
Another way to categorise political strategies implemented by small firms in 
this study is by looking at how firms organise their political actions.  The findings 
from this study illustrated that the issue of collective versus individual action was 
driven by the benefits experienced by the firms in their institutional environment.  
The case also clarified the influence of both formal and informal institutional 
arrangements as a consistent predictor for firms to use either approach when 
implementing a firm’s political strategy.   
The evidence from the cases indicated that given their demographics, small 
firms preferred individual involvement but will act collectively when they are 




the advertising firm.  Each firm has a different approach in building personal 
relationship and implementing relationship-based strategy in relation to their 
operations.  However, when it comes to political issues such as unclear 
interjurisdictional and regulatory uncertainty in different levels of government, 
collective action is the preferred solution for the firm.  These findings are consistent 
with the collective action theory (Cook & Barry, 1995; Olson, 1965) and the 
importance for the firm to adapt to the political environment (Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 
2001). 
Unlike previous studies on firms’ political strategies in advanced economies, 
the findings in this study indicated that small firms in Indonesia tend to pursue 
informal political network connections rather than direct political participation.  It 
led to the argument that the decision to implement political strategies by firms was 
based on two reasons, rent-seeking purposes or hazard-reducing purposes, given the 
fact that the institutional environment was mainly characterised by the lack of 
market-supporting institutions. 
Related to the above, the introduction of the e-procurement system in 
Indonesia and the improvement in the government budget assessment for the 
procurement sector have shifted the institutional environment faced by most 
government contractors.  Firms in this industry often need to deal with various 
regulations that sometimes contradicted each other.  In such unstable and challenging 
environments, a firm’s demographics such as age, size and relevant experience plays 
an important role that influence the decision to adapt with the new institutional 
environment or not.   
The findings also indicated that in dealing with the regulatory environment, 
the firms may take two options – passive (where they follow and meet the 
institutional requirements) or active (where they formalise their non-market 
strategies).  The government contractors tend to follow and meet all the requirements 
that the firms must follow.  Small firms in this sector were characterised by the lack 
of initiative to actively shape their external environment.  Meanwhile, the firms in 
the hotel and advertising industries responded to the regulatory environment with 
active actions and did more than just simply meet the requirements.  They also 




firms who filed a lawsuit to cancel the central government policy.  The firms in the 
hotel industry also actively sought out a political channel to voice their concern on 
the industrial relations issue.  This confirms the argument from previous studies, that 
the more negotiation power a firm has, the more likely its non-market strategy will 
be implemented formally.  As Meznar and Johnson (2005) argue, formalising non-
market strategies is needed when merely adopting the regulation is not enough.    
The interaction of the firm within a regulatory environment might also be 
seen from coercive and supportive initiatives.  The three cases indicated that the 
small firms did not actively attempt to challenge the public policy process.  Despite 
their objections on several legislative rules, the firms tend to follow the rules 
imposed by political actors.  However, such coercive initiatives do not remove the 
option for the firm to create interdependency with political actors, as can be seen 
from the case of one firm from the hotel industry.  After suffering from industrial 
relations issues for more than two years and after meeting all legislative rules 
enforced by the local government, the firm choose to exert influence as its strategic 
response.  This particular situation demonstrates the firm’s choice of interaction and 
how it adapted to the particular situation.  This finding is in line with the previous 
studies that showed that firms may choose to take initiatives and create 
interdependencies (Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 2001; Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  It also 
concurs with the findings from Bengtson et al. (2009) that small firms are not always 
passive when it comes to political decisions, even though the decision to be active is 
influenced by various levels such as size of the firm, the political issue and the 
industry.   
6.3.2. Social Strategy 
Political strategies that dominated non-market strategies implemented by 
firms were driven by economic motivation. On the other hand, philanthropy and 
charity are the preferences in its implementation with less market reward as the 
motivation.  The majority of the firms in this study consider philanthropy and charity 
as indirect support (North, 1990b) to their business. This is in line with observations 
made in other studies (Porter & Kramer, 2006) .  Furthermore, this indirect support is 




owner’s discretion and religious values are the main elements in the implementation 
of social activities.  Such mechanisms, where ownership is institutionalised in a firm, 
are understandable given the size of the firm with a less hierarchical structure.  
Moreover, the owner of the firm plays a critical factor in almost all decision-making 
processes.   
In contrast to previous studies, e.g., (Pei, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012; Lyon & 
Maxwell, 2008)), social actions such as philanthropy or other strategic corporate 
social responsibility actions taken by the firm are not seen as merely economic 
complements (Pei et al., 2012).  However, it does not mean that there is no intention 
to use social actions proactively to strengthen the value of political actions.  Overall, 
the findings did not coordinate social actions’ initiative with political activities, in 
order to enhance the competitive advantage of the firm, as previous studies 
documented (Baron, 2007; Baron & Diermeier, 2007a; Baron, 2001).  In this study, 
such actions were mainly implemented to reflect the personal values of the 
managers/firms’ owners or are driven by religious motives.  As can be seen from 
almost all small firm owners in this study, the religious value as a Muslim drove their 
actions to share and do charitable actions.  This is in line with the study of 
Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) that showed that commercial imperative is not the 
main factor that drives a firm to implement CSR.  The desire of the manager or the 
owner to be perceived as an individual that makes a difference also influenced the 
decision to implement social strategies.  It also cannot be seen easily as a strategy-
driver approach (Del Baldo, 2012).  The discretion of owners and managers 
dominate many decision-making processes in small firms.  This further illustrates the 
simplification of values where an individual’s value is not necessarily replicated in 
the firm’s value. 
The findings also reflected the embeddedness of small firms in the local 
environment and therefore, their actions are to some extent defined by the other 
actors in the environment.  Despite the personal value of the managers/owners as the 
main driver of social action, the embedded circumstances of the firm also influence 
the decision to do philanthropic actions.  The case of one firm in the hotel industry 
illustrated this condition.  The owner of the hotel conduct philantrophy activities to 




and they know each other for a long time. This finding concurs with Spence (2014) 
argument that philanthropic contributions from small firms are not entirely 
principally of their own and in some cases, they might not be at the centre of the 
stakeholder map.    
6.3.3. Degree of Involvement: Individual Vs Collective Action 
The nature of the business environment also influences the decision of the 
firm on how to pursue its non-market strategy, whether to act individually or 
collectively.  Based on the empirical findings, a collective action is important for the 
firms as it directly emphasises the importance of the intermediaries.  Furthermore, 
these intermediaries can be divided into two general actors.  First is the non-public 
intermediary actor such as the trade association.  The three cases from the three 
different industries indicated that each industry has a collective mechanism in acting 
collectively.  The second intermediary actor is the public intermediary such as the 
municipal government.    
Intermediaries help small firms in alleviating the institutional environment’s 
constraints.  The case from the hotel industry, as well as from the government 
contractors, clearly illustrates the important role that intermediaries, such as business 
associations and other civil society organisations, play as part of a firm’s business 
network.  This is in line with the discussions in the literature that intermediaries are 
involved in setting political rules and regulations (Bengtson et al., 2009), which help 
the firms reduce the distance between themselves and their regulatory authorities.  
However, pursuing political actions through business association or other 
intermediaries is likely to be a complementary, rather than a substitute for individual 
action.   
The findings indicated that the role of intermediaries is more critical when the 
interaction between two parties is limited.  As illustrated by the case from the hotel 
industry, the intermediaries were task-oriented and were employed to deal with 
specific issues, whereas intermediaries in the other two industries function mostly to 




The findings suggested, however, that business associations which served as 
intermediaries were not entirely capable of providing help, particularly when dealing 
with a higher level of government.  As a result, as illustrated in the case of the hotel 
and advertising industries, firms tend to combine individual with collective action, so 
as to facilitate both firms’ individual and collective targets.  The reason for this 
decision is not just because collective action is a less costly alternative as compared 
to individual action (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), but also that collective action through 
salient experience and knowledge from its members can help firms become more 
effective in pursuing their individual actions (Hansen et al., 2004).   
Collective action also serves as a preferable choice when it relates to common 
interests in the industry (Jia, 2014).  Alleviating hazards and suspending new 
regulations are the main interests in the advertising industry, while avoiding a price 
war and having a fair competitive market are the main issues in the hotel industry.  
For such common interests, a firm will not pursue individual actions since it offers 
less incentive for the firms, given the limited knowledge and capabilities.  However, 
the problem with the free-rider issue (Olson & Olson, 2009) remains a challenge 
when the collective action is selected as the main channel for pursuing political 
actions.   
The natural process in alleviating this free-rider problem might be in the form 
of group size, selective incentives and certain political connections and affiliations.  
The institutional environment, therefore, profoundly influences the decision of the 
firm to work individually or collectively, based on the benefits available from each 
method.  Such a decision also tends to be context-dependent, where specific issues 
may affect the firms’ strategic choices.  In the government contractor sector for 
example, firms with relative common interests and similar dependency on certain 
political actors tend to work collectively.  Such electoral engagement occurs when 
firms are guaranteed to be granted a contract for the next budget year, while the 
political actors will be supported through political donations. 
When collective benefits such as challenging current regulations faced by the 
advertising industry evenly affects the firms, the collective action remains a major 




billboards on the national road, for example, as well as solving the price war between 
small and medium players with larger players in the hotel industry could only be 
solved by the respective industries.  In this case, the industry association is expected 
to be a vehicle to institutionalise the new organisational form and to bridge the gap 
between the members, since it takes on a much wider range of issues.   
In response to the political issue, advertising firms also used public 
intermediary actors, in this case, the local government of Makassar city.  By 
approaching public intermediary actors, the advertising firms committed to being 
more proactive in mitigating regulatory policy from the national government 
agencies.  Otherwise, it would be difficult to achieve changes in regulations with 
individual actions, especially with the limitations of resources and capabilities of 
small firms.   
However, the findings also indicated another interesting fact where not all 
issues related to the institutional environment could be positively dealt with by 
collective action.  Elites in the particular industry’s organisation are usually 
controlled by big players in the industry and have different political and economic 
interests from other members of the association, particularly for the small firms with 
limited resources and capabilities to offer.  Having such resource-based linkages 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) is a stark reminder that narrow political and economic 
interests from the members of the industry’s organisation may serve as a 
fundamental difficulty for businesses.  Political cohesion and common economic 
interests therefore play an important role in shaping the decision of collective action 
by small firms. 
6.4. Non-Market Strategies and the Performance of the Firm 
In many industries, the performance of a firm depends on the ability of the 
firm to shape the non-market environment, as well as its capacity to compete in the 
market environment.  While there are various measurement tools in evaluating the 
performance of the firm from the market environment perspective, measuring 
performance from the non-market perspective is rather difficult.  However, as 




when there are no objective measures data available (Singh, Darwish, & Potočnik, 
2016; Dess & Robinson, 1984).  In this study, small firms’ owners who participated 
were asked about the overall performance of their firms as a result of implementing 
non-market strategies.  The overall performance was reflected by the sales compared 
to the previous year or the contracts that the firm gained (in terms of value and 
number) compared to previous years.   
The benefits from implementing non-market strategies differ from one firm to 
another and from one industry to another.  In general, the findings suggested that all 
firms in this study agreed on the positive outcome from implementing non-market 
strategies.  Firms in the advertising industry, for example, exercised their resources 
and capabilities in dealing with non-market forces.  Relational strategies with 
government officials along with financial donations have helped the firms gain 
positive outcomes.  Positive outcomes were demonstrated through the firm’s success 
in extending the use of the billboards which meant longer time available for leasing 
to customers, and the negotiation of flexible tax payment time when the firm has 
enough resources to pay.   
A certain positive outcome for government contractors was that they were 
able to mitigate the impacts of their lack of knowledge and resources in dealing with 
the e-procurement. New regulations  can be mitigated through informal political ties 
with procurement officials.  Having a political connection implied the preferential 
access to the information of government procurement so the firm can manage to meet 
the requirements, or even provide information as the basis for defining the tender.  
Political ties have also helped the firms in this sector to influence the decision to use 
certain specifications that can be met by the firm.  By doing this, the firm may limit 
the access for the competitor to enter the market.   
The findings also showed that at the micro-level, government contractors 
were mostly awarded contracts after “internal processes” with politicians or 
government top officials, whereas small firms were awarded the non-bidding 
contracts.  Such “internal processes” occurred when firms collaborate with 
government officials or legislative members to reinforce arranged-bidding or direct 




and sub-contracting opportunities are several other benefits accrued through the 
leveraging of social capital.  Therefore, although new and stricter regulations have 
been issued for the procurement industry, for example, the same firms, given their 
salient experiences and personal networks, can still generate supra-profit in the 
sector.   
While government contractor firms perceived positive outcomes when they 
obtained more contracts in terms of number and value of contracts, the advertising 
firms have a different perception of what are positive outcomes.  The firms in the 
advertising sector felt that non-market strategies had no direct effect on their 
performance or have brought profits to their firms in the short term.  However, they 
felt that implementing non-market strategies created a beneficial environment for the 
firm to operate safely within and which in turn will allow them to gain profit from 
their businesses.  In which case, the effect on their performance is indirect. 
These findings suggest that non-market strategies are positively related to the 
performance of the firms which are consistent with previous studies, albeit some 
effects are direct and others, indirect.  Employing subjective perceptual measure, the 
findings in this study confirmed that the performance of firms is improved.  
However, given the complexity surrounding the regulatory environment in all three 
industries, and the uncertainty surrounding the institutional environment in South 
Sulawesi, maintaining their position in the competitive market place can be 
considered an indicator of success.  This is in line with the previous studies that show 
that implementing non-market strategies, especially political strategies, may 
contribute to the survival of the firm amidst the competition (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).   
Peng and Luo (2000) postulate that ties with politicians and personal 
relationships of the manager with government officials positively influence 
performance of the firm.  In the context of emerging markets, the findings in this 
study also confirmed findings by Li and Zhang (2007) that political ties of the 
manager can boost the performance of high-tech ventures in China. The combination 
of political and relationship-based resources also improves the family-owned firms in 




obtained before other firms, giving the firm a competitive advantage.  In the case of 
the advertising industry, the findings support the proposition from previous studies 
that buffering strategies through implementing non-market strategies may improve 
the performance of the firm through preferential government policies (Yuanqiong et 
al., 2007; Meznar & Nigh, 1995).  Personal ties and involvement in the political 
process also help firms mitigate uncertainties (Getz, 2002).   
When these non-market strategies are implemented integrally with market 
strategies, the influence on the firm’s performance is even greater as suggested by 
scholars in previous studies (Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014; De Figueiredo, 2009; 
Baron, 1995a). 
6.5. Non-Market Strategies and Political Resources  
While the non-market environment factor is important in influencing a firm’s 
non-market decision, the next question to ask is how non-market strategies are 
related to the firm’s resources.  Each firm, regardless of the industry, has different 
resources and therefore has a different effect on the usage of non-market strategies 
(political and social strategies).   
All firms in this case particularly those that rely on government sales have 
developed relationship-based resources with government officials.  The majority of 
the firms even emphasised that relationship-based resources are more important than 
market factors, as firms can strategize the non-market opportunities and have 
incentives for such actions.  As shown by the firms in the advertising industry, the 
ability to influence institutional environments, in this case postponing the demolition 
of their billboards, lawsuit and getting support from the city government, is a result 
of building upon the political resources.  In addition, the case of the government 
contractors clearly illustrates that building relationship-based resources provide 
certain benefits for the firms.  Getting first-hand information about upcoming tenders 
and assistance on navigating the cumbersome nature of the tender process are some 




The relationship-based resources often include skills that are activated to 
cement the relations with non-market actors.  Practically, the skills are the important 
bond for the firm to be successful in the non-market environment, particularly in 
emerging markets.  Supporting resources, for example, such as recreational services, 
dinner parties and karaoke, financial incentives and travel arrangements can help the 
firms gain personal and favourable contacts from their non-market actors.  
From the resource-dependence theory perspective, the findings from this 
study also showed that firms will likely prioritise cooperation with the government 
agencies and departments which they are most dependent on.  In the case of the 
advertising firm for example, the relationship with licensing agencies and also the 
local tax authority is more important for the firm than the provincial or national level 
governments.  This is because the local government has greater discretion and 
incentives to address the local firms’ needs after decentralisation was implemented in 
Indonesia.  In addition, the heterogeneous interests among governmental agencies 
and departments made it more complex for the firm.  Such power imbalance has led 
the firm to adopt a variety of actions, so as to deal with the external environment.  
This is in line with the previous studies related to resource dependence theory 
showing that firms engage with political actors to create a favourable environment 
for their firms (Hillman et al., 2009; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). 
The findings in this study also showed that the lack of market-supporting 
institutions was compensated with political embeddedness (Welch & Wilkinson, 
2004) and social capital, where personal relationships and other forms of informal 
ties (Li & Zhang, 2007) played a crucial part in gaining political favouritism 
(Fisman, 2001).  The findings indicated that the relation between the owners of the 
small firms within the political network is the main source of social capital.   
The absence of strong institutions contextualises the importance of social 
capital in emerging economies as indicated by Peng and Luo (2000), using cases 
from China.  The majority of the firms indicated the incorporation of norms, trust 
and networks to enhance their economic performance through getting government 
contracts or getting discretionary decisions regarding rules and regulations (Meznar 




(Hillman et al., 1999) and hindering competitors from entering the market.  
However, it is worth noting that such an advantage is also influenced by the 
configuration and stability of the network. In the case of Indonesia, decentralisation 
and direct elections made maintaining political networks even harder for firms. 
From the micro-level analysis, the use of a relationship-based political 
strategy also gave certain advantages to some firms in this study, particularly in 
getting access to additional labour when additional work needs to be done.  In the 
contractors and advertising industries for example, firms sustained strong networks 
through sharing information regarding potential work or sub-contracting options 
available and potential employees available for additional work.  This situation is 
understandable since many of their workers are part-time and casual workers.  A 
different situation appears in the hotel industry, where the labour issue is highly 
regulated and constantly scrutinised by government and non-governmental 
organisations.   
However, as illustrated by the small number of firms in the study, personal 
relationships or political ties may become significant liabilities to the firms.  
Unstable environments and strong political ties developed by firms require a strong 
effort to maintain, even though such connections offer less advantages to the firm 
(Uzzi, 1997).  Such unbalanced-exchange relationships may lock the firm among 
narrowly-connected actors that contribute to the low attention of competitive 
pressure from the market environment.  Small firms in the government contract case 
were insulated from the information and perspectives from the outer environment 
and were not aware of the development of market-based capabilities. 
The findings also indicated that given the limited resources of small firms, 
they have to subsequently employ external actors’ resources.  However, when it 
comes to the external actors’ resources, a firm has to have critical elements namely 
political knowledge and commitment, as well as legitimacy (Bengtson et al., 2009; 
Hadjikhani, Lee, et al., 2008; Hadjikhani & Thilenius, 2005; Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994).  Political knowledge refers to the situation where business actors understand 
the needs in maintaining the connection, as well as the knowledge about political 




actors own to make a successful relationship, which may take place in the form of 
time and is used in dealing with political organisations.  Legitimacy in the different 
spectrums is about how political actors perceive the business actors (Boddewyn & 
Brewer, 1994).   
Political knowledge was indicated by most firms in this study as acquiring 
specific knowledge on the specific issue, either by self-attempt or by employing 
external actors.  Political knowledge was also obtained by firms from their 
involvement with business organisations, where a firm can get information on the 
political system and decision-making process in the industry.  The firm can also 
identify key political actors and decide how to approach them and use various ways 
to build a relationship with them, as indicated by the firms in the advertising 
industry.   
The empirical findings from this study extended the discussion on 
organisational capabilities that matter to the firm, in the successful implementation of 
their political strategies.  The cases in this study revealed that apart from technical 
capital, which arguably not all small firms are able to successfully develop, social 
and institutional capital have contributed to the development of the cooperative 
relationship between firms and government officials.  The case also indicated that 
firms’ social and institutional capitals play a significant role in an inter-
organisational relationship through trust and information, which cannot be 
represented by technical capital. 
6.6. The Implementation of Non-Market Strategies — Some Caveats  
The general postulate in this study is that the implementation of non-market 
strategies will lead to a positive impact on the firm’s performance.  However, it can 
be contended that the idea of “hard to imitate” resources do not fit well with the 
empirical findings.  Various political resources owned by the firms cannot be 
classified as something that is “hard to imitate” by the competitors.   
For example, financial incentives and recreational activities can be easily 




collective business organisations can also be replicated by other firms.  As such, 
political connections and personal relationships with political actors often do not 
reflect a speciality.  Therefore, in the case of unstable governments and shifting 
institutions, implementing non-market strategy should consider many factors.  
The empirical findings in this study showed that in the case of emerging 
markets such as in Sulawesi, the implementation of non-market strategies should 
consider the subtle characteristics of the political context.  As can be found in many 
emerging markets, the position of the government in Indonesia is strong and remains 
the major source of power and legitimacy.  As a result, non-market strategies 
implemented by the firms, as confirmed by the empirical findings in this study, 
mostly emphasises cooperation rather than confrontation with the government.  In 
influencing government policies, the difference between one firm to another is 
related to asymmetrical resources.  In many cases, it is the firm that is influenced by 
the governmental and political actors.  The implementation of non-market strategies, 
therefore, becomes a response to the signal from the political actors.  This confirms 
the study by Oliver (1991), which suggests that the nature of institutional pressure is 
the most important determinant in strategizing.  Other studies also advanced the 
dominance of the government and required non-market strategies to be related to the 
nature of the firms’ resources  (Tian, Hafsi, & Wei Wu, 2009; Tian & Deng, 2007).   
6.7. Conclusion 
The central concern of this study is to explore the nature of the non-market 
environment in South Sulawesi and how firms react to non-market environments.  
The findings emphasised that many challenges faced by small firms emerge from the 
changing institutional environment in South Sulawesi and Indonesia in general.  The 
basic characteristics of the non-market environment in Indonesia are uncertainty 
surrounding the regulatory environment and the lack of social and political 
infrastructure.  Various issues also specifically affected the non-market environment 
such as labour restrictions, the myriad of administrative procedures, red-tape 




While firm-specific political resources and relationships remain important in 
most developed nations, they are even more important in emergent economies such 
as in Sulawesi in Indonesia.  At the micro-level, the never-ending transitional phase 
leads businesses to chaotic competition, where the non-market environment plays a 
major role.  The unstable institutional landscape and unbalanced competition leaves 
businesses vulnerable to uncertainties.  However, all participants agreed on the fact 
that the political process may moderate the uncertainties. 
Apart from the effective results achieved through non-market actions, all 
participants also indicated that there were existing barriers that limit their 
achievement and obstructed their response to non-market issues.  Such institutional 
conditions mostly occur in emergent economies for two reasons - a less stable 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000) and conducive environment for economic actors to have a 
mutually beneficial economic exchange between them (Peng, 2003; North, 1994). 
This study has shown that implementing non-market strategies in South 
Sulawesi has improved the performance of the firm, albeit in various ways – directly 
or indirectly.  The improvement of the overall performance of the firm varied and 
was mostly reflected in a better situation for the firms.  These may be in the form of 
sales, government contract awarded, or faster processing due to the assistance 
received in mitigating regulatory burdens, compared to the previous time.  
Relationship-based strategy is also one of the main preferable strategies for firms in 
dealing with the rent-seeking environment.  The findings in this study are consistent 
with previous studies that have the basic premise that firms tend to use rent-seeking 
activities and relational actions to substitute for market capabilities (Keim & 
Hillman, 2008).   However, not all participants agreed that personal ties and political 
involvement will benefit them in the long-term and will necessarily lead them to a 
better competitive environment.  While companies who practice non-market 
strategies gain short-term benefits, the insecure business environment in Indonesia 
poses great challenges to SMEs. 
Despite the fact that regulatory uncertainties remain challenging for small 
firms, the incentives to integrate non-market with market strategies are increasing.  




environment, which also reflects the level of firms’ adaptations.  A more regulated 
business environment and high pressure from stakeholders forces small firms in the 
public procurement industry to obey the rules and regulations. 
Following the implementation of decentralisation, small firms in South 
Sulawesi, Indonesia, faced a strong institutional environment, which remains 
characterised by poorly-enforced institutions with insufficient market-supporting 
institutions.  Stiff competition and market maturity also influence the existence of 
non-market opportunities.  Non-market strategies such as political strategies were 
preferred by firms due to the high policy uncertainty, weak legal systems and 
pressure from the civil society.   
Despite the fact that the findings described in the previous chapter are based 
on small firms in Sulawesi, Indonesia, the findings provided some general clues 
about the behaviour of firms in emerging economies which face unstable 
environments.  This study intends to provide a more systematic understanding of 
firms’ behaviour towards their non-market environment in emerging economies such 
as Indonesia.   
While most of the findings are consistent with the literature on non-market 
strategies in most developed countries, the findings also indicated that non-market 
strategies come in the different forms and characteristics under different context and 
cultures.  Approach to political strategy is also different in the context that firms in 
developed countries formulate their non-market strategies based on an issue-by-issue 
basis.  In most developed countries, the firms are also taking advantage of well-
established market supporting institutions to channel their concerns.  Firms in South 
Sulawesi and most emerging countries, meanwhile, tend to take the relational 
approach and employ social capital to get things done.  Financial incentive strategy is 
common in both developed nations and emerging nations.  However, the range/scope 
and degree of such tactics are different since many financial incentive strategies in 
many emerging countries are in the form of corrupt-exchange actions that are 




The next chapter will draw conclusions from the overall findings from this 
research.  Practical and theoretical implications of this study will also be presented at 







SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
The central concern of this study is to explore the nature of the non-market 
environment in emerging economies, using South Sulawesi province in Indonesia as 
a case, and understand how firms react to the non-market environment.  Social and 
political forces create an institutional environment which can be challenging for the 
firm.  The theoretical reflections on the empirical findings of the study were 
presented in the previous chapter.  
This chapter draws the summary and conclusions from the overall findings of 
the study.  In Section 7.2, a summary of this study is provided while key findings of 
the study are identified in Section 7.3.  Section 7.4 provides the theoretical gaps and 
contributions of this research, while managerial and policy implications of this study 
are identified in Section 7.5.  The limitations of this study are provided in Section 7.6 
which also indicates directions for future studies in this field. 
7.2. Summary  
The business environment consists of market and non-market components. 
Both different environments need to be handled carefully in order to achieve a firm’s 
objectives.  While almost all firms at all levels are familiar with the market 
environment, many firms are still searching for good strategies to deal with non-
market environments.  Current studies in the non-market strategy field were mostly 
conducted in more stable countries, mainly with large firms as the object of most 
studies.  This study is responding to the call to examine the phenomena of non-




In Indonesia, an example of an emerging economy, the challenge for firms 
became greater after the implementation of decentralisation.  Decentralisation shifted 
the power from the central government to the local governments.  Reforms in the 
economic and political system were implemented with the expectation that such 
actions will improve the investment climate, particularly for the development of 
SMEs in Indonesia.  The collapse of the authoritarian and centralised system and the 
rapid embrace of democratic and decentralised systems were expected to create a 
supportive environment for SMEs.  However, in reality, the changing political and 
economic systems did not create the expected supportive environment for local 
investors, particularly small firms.  Rather, it has created uncertainties and confusion 
and opened up new challenges for small firms resulting from the non-market 
environment. 
The key research questions that this study tried to answer are: (1) what are the 
characteristics of the non-market environment in emerging markets such as 
Indonesia?  (2) How does the non-market environment lead to a firm’s choice of 
non-market strategies?  And (3) how do non-market strategies impact the 
performance of the firm?  
The overriding objective of this study is to explore the nature of the non-
market environment in South Sulawesi in Indonesia, identify social and political 
antecedents of non-market environment faced by small firms.  Another objective of 
this study is to investigate how firms react to the non-market environment.  This 
study also aimed to examine how the non-market strategies implemented by the 
firms influence their performance.  Finally, this study is expected to provide a 
discussion of policy implications that impacted from non-market strategies. 
The literature pertaining to non-market strategies mostly focus on developed 
countries (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008) with large firms as the object of the study (Doh 
& Lucea, 2013), but neglects the unique situation of the non-market environment that 
are faced by the small firms.  As a result, there is still a gap in micro level studies on 
what the characteristics of non-market environment are in emerging markets and how 




The study was conducted in South Sulawesi, Indonesia as it represents an 
illustration of the dynamic change, a characteristic in most emerging markets.  As 
one of several major regions in Indonesia, South Sulawesi is a centre for trading with 
the complexities inherent in big cities in Indonesia.  The province is also 
characterised by a patrimonialistic culture where personal ties and political 
connection predominantly influence business and political environment.  Another 
reason for choosing the research site was practical reasons.  Exploring the nature of 
non-market strategies implemented by firms in South Sulawesi in Indonesia required 
access to key policy-makers.  The time frame limited the researcher in his ability to 
conduct research without using existing contacts in different provinces.  In Makassar, 
the researcher utilised his contacts and managed to gain reliable access to key 
individuals and other supporting data sources. 
To accomplish the objectives above, in-depth interviews with 27 participants 
were conducted.  The participants are small firm owners and managers from three 
industries, namely hotel, advertising, and government contractors.  The three 
industries reflected the industries where firms implement non-market strategies either 
because of the nature of the industry which is highly regulated or there is a 
dependency on government sales.  Four participants are not business actors; they 
consist of government officials, a journalist and an NGO activist.  Given the nature 
of the study, grounded theory and the case study method were used as the 
overarching methodology for the research.  Grounded theory was chosen because it 
enables the researcher to achieve research objectives with its systematic procedure 
and effective data management technique, while the case study method was chosen 
because it allows the researcher to develop deep insights about the target case 
respondents. 
7.3. Key findings 




7.3.1. Characteristics of the Non-Market Environment in South Sulawesi in 
Indonesia as an Emerging Markets 
One of the main characteristics of the non-market environment in South 
Sulawesi in Indonesia is the strong influence of the government and society on small 
firms.  Although the cases analysed in this study do not belong to one industry, the 
strong influence of the institutional environment was evident in all these cases.   
Regardless of the industry, all interviewees from small firms described their 
dissatisfaction with the business climate caused by dynamic and uncertain changes in 
the regulatory environment.  As in many other places in Indonesia (Patunru, 
McCulloch, & von Luebke, 2009; Brodjonegoro, 2004), the regulatory environment 
in Makassar is affected by decentralisation where all local governments have passed 
local bills (peraturan daerah) in order to boost their local income through tax and 
retribution.  However, the legal justification for these local bills remains unclear 
since the communications and coordination between the local and national 
government is often poor. 
The constant regulatory change, particularly after the fall of President 
Suharto, also caused the uncertainty in the institutional environment faced by small 
firms.  These changes matter to the firms, since given the size of the firms and the 
limited resources they have, constant change affects their operation in the short and 
long term.  Constant changes usually occur given the fact that many existing 
regulations need to be amended with new regulations due to incomplete coverage as 
well as opaqueness in the process of decision making.   
Unsurprisingly, rent-seeking bureaucracy remains salient which influence the 
opportunistic behaviour from government officials.  Many illegitimate payments 
have to be paid by firms even though from the government officials’ perspective, this 
was a “voluntary payment” or a “relational fee”.  The majority of participants 
perceived such informal payment as a form of gratefulness from business actors to 
government officials for good services.  As a result, such voluntary payment is 
perceived as a normal thing in doing business, with all participants agreeing that rent 




region.  Several participants even emphasised the importance of bribery for the 
success of their business and claimed that they cannot afford to avoid the action.  
Referred as “uang terima kasih”, translated in Indonesian for “to share”, a 
framework exists for the distribution of bribes and mark-ups in the procurement 
world in Indonesia.  The complexity of the new procurement regulatory framework 
does not prevent local procurement bureaucrats to find chances to exploit the system.  
For instance, one of the methods to extract payment is to help bidders fill out 
complex procurement documents in exchange for money.  
7.3.2. How Does the Non-Market Environment Lead to a Firm’s Choice of 
Non-Market Strategies? 
Firms’ demographics such as age, size and experience influence the choice 
and the effectiveness of non-market actions.  The choice of non-market actions of the 
firms may differ in form, such as: 1) passive reaction, where managemenet adjust the 
firm’s policy based on the changes that already happened; 2) positive anticipation, 
where firms try to anticipate changes before they occur, and 3) proactive public 
policy shaping, where the firm is actively involved in the process of changes.   
The complexity surrounding the institutional environment of small firms 
made them deal with different types of political issues, various administrative 
commitments and numerous connections with individuals or groups.  In general, 
respondents believed that the situation makes small firms react similarly and engage 
as a homogeneous group which affect the whole industry.  The political action by 
firms relies heavily on the resources and the environment they encounter.  The 
diversity of the firms’ resources influenced the decision of firms to implement their 
non-market action, especially for small businesses.  Such restraints forced small 
businesses to act collectively and made business associations an important factor in 
the business environment.   
The involvement of a firm in the association is based on the interest of the 
firm which converge with the industry interests.  However, in the case of the hotel 
industry, we found that the association sometimes inaccurately communicate the 




predominantly the larger (business) members’ interest.  The current price war among 
members supports this argument, where small firms have to face stiff competition 
with large firm.  However, given the nature of competition and market coverage, 
specific actions were taken individually by firms to meet their goals.  
7.3.3. How Do Non-Market Strategies Impact the Performance of Firms? 
Given the weak formal institutions faced by small firms in Indonesia, firms 
tend to rely on informal institutions, since they have more significant influence on 
their performance.  In this study, the performance of the firm was based on the 
subjective perception of the managers/owners of small firms.  In reflecting the 
performance, the participants used various indicators such as the number of contracts 
that the firm get from the government, the number of workers (casual or permanent) 
employed and the assistance that the firm gets from government officials in dealing 
with regulatory burdens.  The finding of this study is that the implementation of non-
market strategies leads to the above indicators.  Relational strategies and informal 
political ties with government officials, for example, may help the firms getting a 
contract in public tender.  The same goes to the advertising firms, where relational 
strategies may help them mitigate the regulatory burdens which influence their 
capability to acquire more clients. 
Having resource-based relations or personal ties with authorities in various 
levels is beneficial to the firm and is also one of the main preferable strategies in 
dealing with rent-seeking environment which help firms in any political process.  
Personal ties and involvement in the political process may help firms mitigate the 
uncertainties, especially for the firms that rely on government sales as their main 
business.  It can also be assumed that without non-market strategies, firms with a 
high reliance on government sales will have difficulties getting a contract from the 
government.   
This is consistent with previous studies with the basic premise that firms tend 
to use rent-seeking activities and relational actions to substitute for market 
capabilities.  However, not all participants agreed that personal ties and political 




a better competitive environment.  Such an environment poses great challenges to 
SMEs but at the same time provide immense opportunity for others.  
7.4. Contribution of This Study 
Baron (1995a) argue that market forces such as products and services, the 
strength of internal organisation as well as the efficiency of the operations within the 
firm  are not the only forces that influence the success of the firm.  How firm 
effectively manage and deal with non-market forces is also important.  This study 
contributes to knowledge on micro-level analysis of business-government 
interactions.  Previous studies mostly focused on the macro-level analysis such as 
country and industry analyses (Shaffer & Hillman, 2000; Hillman & Keim, 1995).   
Secondly, this study enriches our understanding on the importance of 
relational strategies, as part of non-market strategies, in economic transitional and 
weak institutional environments.  As mentioned in this study, relational strategies are 
influenced by resource-based factors and social relations-based factors.  
This study also addressed the gaps in the extant literature in this area in a 
developing country context.  Previous studies mainly focused on developed countries 
and relatively stable institutional environments.  Non-market environments, however, 
are even more challenging in emerging economies such as Indonesia.  As such, there 
is a need to study non-market strategies in the context of emerging economies 
(Aggarwal, 2001).  This study is the first of its kind in Indonesia that focused on how 
small firms manage their non-market environment, and therefore, contributed to 
enhance our understanding in this field. 
This study contributes to the literature on small firms’ adaptation to 
institutional changes, particularly in the context of emerging economies.  The study 
also offers a distinct contribution in looking at how the institutional environment 
influenced strategic decisions of small firms, particularly in dealing with regulatory 
uncertainty, a key feature of emerging economies. 
This study also contributed in deepening our understanding of SMEs’ 




current non-market literature based on the stable economies emphasise the 
importance of political connection (Goldman et al., 2009; Hadjikhani, Johanson, & 
Thilenius, 2008; Adhikari et al., 2006), this study found that this is not enough.  In 
emerging economies characterised with a rent-seeking economy, unofficial 
mechanisms such as bribery and cronyism and nepotism are very important or even 
almost expected to solve the formal and informal constraints.  This study, therefore, 
extends our knowledge by highlighting the importance of formal and informal 
institutions (Child & Tsai, 2005; Peng & Heath, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) 
particularly in emerging markets with their unique characteristics (Wright et al., 
2005; Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
The findings of this study also extend our understanding on the network 
perspective (Bengtson et al., 2013; Welch & Wilkinson, 2004; Hadjikhani & Ghauri, 
2001), particularly from the point of view of small firms.  While most studies in the 
current literature of network perspective emphasised industrial-based relationships, 
this study expanded network context to political and social actors. 
Albeit in the form of normative discussion, this study contributed to the 
management literature on the importance of non-market strategies to the performance 
of the firm, particularly for small firms.  As also found in other relationship-based 
capitalism, social and political capital is more prominent in enabling firms to extract 
rent from the government.  
Therefore, in sum, this study contributes to the discussion on non-market 
strategies with an emphasis on emerging markets.  The academic significance of this 
study is highlighted by the following: (1) it investigates the nature of the competitive 
environment under the condition of institutional changes; (2) it contributes to the 
literature on the role of institutional changes in firms’ choice of non-market 
strategies in emerging economies and (3) it explores the intertwined relationships 
between businesses and power.   
7.5. Managerial and Policy Implications  




7.5.1. Managerial Implications 
The findings of this study indicated that the implementation of non-market 
strategies by small firms in South Sulawesi in Indonesia was mainly driven by their 
desire to deal with the uncertain environment as well as gain benefits.  This is 
expected to provide a starting point for deep understanding of non-market 
environment in emerging economies which offers different institutional challenges 
for the firms.  The implications of the findings underline the complexity surrounding 
small firms’ business environment in emerging market.  The findings clearly 
indicated that there are structural and unstructured constraints that create challenges 
for small firms.  The findings also showed that a firm’s performance is determined 
mostly on how the firm deals with structural conditions within which the firm 
operates.  Therefore, as for practical implications, this study suggests that small firm 
owners consider the impact of political and social actors and find ways to 
strategically interact with them. 
The necessity for acquiring institutional knowledge and network skills is 
critical in such a non-market environment.  Institutional knowledge about the 
political and social issue and how to take advantage of opportunities in the political 
landscape is essential in the business environment characterised with instability and 
uncertainty.  An understanding of the heterogeneity of political actors including the 
heterogeneous sets of interest groups such as NGOs and media is also important to 
respond to the non-market environment.  This study suggests that the manager can no 
longer rely on passive political strategy, even for the firms in the industry that are 
seldom affected by government decisions.   
Another insight, this study has shown is that apart from its limited resources 
and skills, small firms have the capacity to influence non-market actors.  To achieve 
this objective, the firm should create and maintain long-term political commitments 
both internally (with other firms within the industry) and externally (with the 
government and other political actors).  In addition, albeit the absence of a clear-cut 
answer, this study demonstrates how small firms in South Sulawesi deal with their 




7.5.2. Policy Implications 
This research also has important policy implications from the understanding 
of the social and political antecedents of non-market environments faced by small 
firms in Indonesia.  The findings indicated that small firms are more affected by 
problematic regulations, particularly with the inconsistencies and unstandardized 
interpretation which cause confusion to small firms, and which has led to the 
proliferation of non-market strategies.  These non-market strategies include political 
strategies for rent-seeking purposes, such as bribe and paying facilitation fees, 
informal personal networks with government officials, and direct political 
participation.   
Government policies have not yet adjusted with the attitude and practices of 
government officials to increase transparency.  Many of these non-market strategies 
would not have been necessary if the correct policies and supportive regulatory 
environment are in place.  Although these non-market strategies are seen by small 
firms as necessary to their survival, these are coming at a cost to small firms and 
should therefore, be mitigated.   
Therefore, this study suggests that the relations between government and 
firms should be made more transparent.  Several actions that may be taken in the 
short-term are creating clearer policies and measures to reduce red tape bureaucracy. 
The government needs to develop clear regulations and improve the weaknesses of 
the current legal framework by including other stakeholders, especially small firms 
in discussions on setting up a business friendly environment.  
Given the strong influence of the government on the business environment in 
emerging markets, policy-makers should also prioritise efforts to improve small 
firms’ knowledge and expertise in dealing with market forces.  The support may also 
come in the form of a supportive business environment with less administrative 
burden and more friendly policies that encourage the development of small firms.  
Policymakers should also improve the predictability of its policy creation and 




efficient market-supporting institutions that can help reduce the use of unofficial 
mechanisms which most small firms used.  
Government officials should also be aware of the heterogeneity of small 
firms.  Hence, methods on how to handle small firms should also include and 
consider that factor.  In addition, supporting programs from various government 
agencies will be much better, if conducted simultaneously, with better coordination 
between government agencies, and are based on the needs of the small firms.   
In the procurement sector, there are obvious opportunities to improve the 
current SMEs’ contribution to the Indonesian economy beyond economic growth and 
as a provider of job opportunities.  Technological improvements through the 
implementation of e-procurement along with simplified procedures and improving 
consistency in public procurement policies and procedures can help achieve these 
objectives.  A comprehensive capacity building program is needed for the local 
government officials as well as for the small firms through their business association.  
By doing this, small firms managers can develop their knowledge and understanding 
of regulatory and technical issues in e-procurement.  Better knowledge and skills in 
the procurement sector along with more transparent process of tender can help small 
firms avoid being involved in corrupt exchanges with government officials.  
Government officials need to have training on good governance and on 
avoidance of graft and corruption in line with the push by international aid agencies 
(World-Bank, 2012; Meijer & Oey, 2002).  Coupled with this, systems must be put 
in place that encourage transparency and a mechanism for reporting attempts on both 
sides (government and business sector) for corruptive behaviour to discourage 
bribery and graft and corruption. 
Trade associations and other business organisations have served as the 
intermediaries for small firms in dealing with external forces in the industry.  
However, it seems that some members remain unaware about the support that they 
can get from being a member of the association.  It was also found in this study that 
small firms do not know where to turn to when they need assistance.  The local 




begin to working together in findings new ways of reaching out to small firms.  
Apart from reaching out, it is also important to provide better information for small 
firms to reduce confusion so that they do not have to resort to non-market strategies.   
The study also found that there is a growing trend in the region that many 
owners of small firms with strong dependency on government contracts are 
earmarking more resources to strengthen their non-market strategies, especially in 
the illicit side, than building their core company competencies. Furthermore, the 
findings showed that political strategies of small firms serve as antithetical to the 
development of market capabilities of the firm, given the fact that the small firms 
implementing such strategies have low market capabilities.  The consequence is that 
these small firms do not pay more attention in improving their market capabilities.  
Instead, they become reliant on non-market strategies for their business activities.  In 
the short term, this would be a value-creating strategy, but in this free market of 
political party and the growing public demand for clean governance, this kind of 
non-market strategy is not a sustained competitive advantage. SMEs have to stick to 
the improvement of their market strategies and improving their core competencies.   
7.6. Limitations and Future Research 
The limitation of this study is mainly associated with the limited number of 
case study industries, which had to be limited to only three industries due to time and 
budgetary constraints.  The restricted time for fieldwork and also inadequate 
secondary data to support the findings are factors that contributed to the limitations 
of this study.  However, the researcher believes that the findings of this study 
accurately reflect the situation where the same phenomenon is investigated with 
multiple sources (Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989).  The findings in this study, albeit 
unsurprising, were not only provoking, but are also exploratory, thus require further 
research.  The theoretical view in this study, for example, is examined by only 
several empirical cases from only three industries in South Sulawesi.  As a result, it 
is providing limited possibilities for generalisation.  This limitation, in turn, calls for 
further studies that can enhance the understanding of non-market strategies in the 




firm.  A longitudinal perspective on the outcome and the effectiveness of non-market 
strategies would further advance the study on this topic. 
This study has also found that social capital and formal institutions, 
particularly in emerging countries such as Indonesia, are two aspects that are difficult 
to separate. The study also suggests that social capital is critical to ensure long-term 
business survival. Therefore, further research into social capital is required if we are 
to gain a deeper understanding of non-market strategy in Indonesia. 
The majority of studies in the non-market strategy field reported strong links 
between non-market strategies with the performance of firms.  However, as indicated 
in this study, measuring performance remains problematic, particularly in the context 
of emerging markets and small firms.  While employing objective measures is widely 
supported, the field still needs qualitative work with various subjective perceptual 
measures that could complement and provide meaning beyond solely financial 
indicators.  
Further research might also focus on the different outcomes from specific 
non-market strategies, including the conditions related to the outcomes.  In addition, 
it would be interesting to know the nature of non-market strategies from other 
industries outside the three industries discussed in this study.   
7.7. Conclusion 
The central focus of this study is to explore the nature of the non-market 
environment in South Sulawesi and how firms react to non-market environments.  
The findings emphasised that many challenges faced by small firms emerge from the 
changing institutional environment in South Sulawesi and Indonesia in general.  The 
basic characteristics of the non-market environment in Indonesia are uncertainty 
surrounding the regulatory environment and the lack of social and political 
infrastructure.  Various issues also specifically affected the non-market environment 
such as labour restrictions, the myriad of administrative procedures, red-tape 




While firm-specific political resources and relationships remain important in 
most developed nations, they are even more important in emergent economies such 
as Indonesia.  At the micro-level, the never-ending transitional phase leads 
businesses to chaotic competition, where the non-market environment plays a main 
role.  The unstable institutional landscape and unbalanced competition leaves 
businesses vulnerable to uncertainties.  However, the political process could 
potentially moderate the uncertainties. 
Apart from the effective results achieved through non-market actions, all 
participants in this study indicated that there were existing barriers that limit their 
achievement and obstructed their response to non-market issues.  Such institutional 
conditions mostly occur in emergent economies for two reasons - a less stable 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000) and conducive environment for economic actors to have a 
mutually beneficial economic exchange between them (Peng, 2003; North, 1994).  
Having resource-based relations or personal ties with the authorities on various levels 
was found to be beneficial to the firm.  Moreover, it is also one of the main strategies 
preferred by firms in dealing with the rent-seeking environment, which helps firms in 
the political process.  This study is consistent with other research (Getz, 2002) that 
showed that personal ties and involvement in the political process help firms mitigate 
uncertainties.  This is also consistent with previous studies that have the basic 
premise that firms tend to use rent-seeking activities and relational actions to 
substitute for market capabilities (Keim & Hillman, 2008).  However, not all 
participants agreed that personal ties and political involvement will benefit them in 
the long-term and will necessarily lead to a more competitive environment.  Such an 
environment poses great challenges to SMEs, but at the same time, provides 
immense opportunities for others. 
Despite the fact that regulatory uncertainties remain challenging for small 
firms, the incentives to integrate non-market with market strategies are increasing.  
The non-market strategy serves as a bridge for firms faced with such external 
environment, and also reflects the level of firms’ adaptations.  A more regulated 
business environment and high pressure from stakeholders can however force small 




Following the implementation of decentralisation, small firms in South 
Sulawesi Indonesia, faced a weak institutional environment, which remains 
characterised by poorly-enforced institutions with insufficient market-supporting 
institutions.  Stiff competition and market maturity also influenced the existence of 
non-market opportunities.  Non-market strategies such as political strategies were 
preferred by firms due to lack of market supporting institutions which leads to the 
high policy uncertainty and weak legal systems.   
The conclusions of this study open the way for future discussion on small 
firms and how they respond to the non-market environment.  Given the fact that 
small firms represent a large segment in many countries, this study has contributed to 
the knowledge in this important field and is expected to offer a broader and 
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Analysis of Non-Market Implemented By Firms in Emerging Economies – The Case 
of Indonesia 
1. What is the purpose of the research?  
The purpose of this research is to investigate institutional changes in emerging 
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choice of non-market strategies. 
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available in one or more of the following sources; scientific papers in peer 
reviewed academic journals; presentations at conference and seminars.  The 
publications will not contain any reference to individual participants unless 
participants have agreed to be referred to as appropriate in scientific referencing 
systems.  
10.  Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information you provide to us will be kept confidential.  Only members of the 
research team will have access to it.  All data collection, storage and processing 
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Human Research Ethics Committee of Curtin University (Approval HR 
No.148/2012).  The Committee is comprised of members of the public, 
academics, lawyers, doctors and pastoral carers.  
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4. I agree to the interview being recorded. 
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publications. 
 
I ________________________________________ (participant’s name) agree to 
participate.  I consent to my interview being audio recorded and understand that all 
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Appendix B : Questions for Interview  
Part 1: Introduction  
Questions 
1. Please tell me about your company including the history, the operation, the 
business and the coverage of the business 
a. Could you say something more about it?  How about the 
product/service? 
b. How long has been your firm in this industry? 
2. Please tell me about yourself, your position in the company 
a. How do you feel with your work, any personal experience in relation 
to your role in the company? 
3. Can you name a person who has had a tremendous impact on you as a leader? 
a. How about the founders, are they still involved in the company’s 
activities?  Could you give me an example of their involvement? 
b. Is it positive to the company or not? 
4. What are the company’s market strategies?  Could you please explain a little 
bit about what kind of market strategies the company employs? 
a. Compare this to what others have done, how do you rate your 




Part 2: Internal Conditions 
Questions 
1. Does the company have a values statement?  
a. Can you give more detail about the statement?  Is it formally 
documented and known by all the employees? 
2. Does the company have rules of conduct? 
a. Can you give more details about the rules?  Is it formally documented 
and known by all the employees? 
3. Does the company have a formal policy of CSR?  
a. Please explain more about that.  How did others see the policy?  Is 
there any different perspective on implementing the policy? 
b. How does the company formulate this policy?  What led the company 
to have this formal policy? 
4. Does the company have a formal policy in dealing with the government? 
a. Is the policy made as an initiative from the company?  Does it meet 
the regulation from the government? 
b. You may want to explain more regarding the situation of the company 
and its relation with the government? 
c. How does the external environment of the company affect the way the 
company deals with the government? 
5. Does the company have a political connection or some of its members are 
active politician(s) or former politician(s)? 
a. Please provide more details about that, (position, active or past 
politician).  Is it strategically discussed by the board of directors or an 
initiative from the founders?  How did others see it?  





c. What are the impacts to the company? 
6. Apart from your market strategies, does the company have non-market 
strategies?  What are they?  Please explain 
a. Can you think of examples of this? 
b. How about lobbying or political donation? 
7. How does the company set its non-market strategies?  Does the company 
have a specific procedure in setting the strategies?  Can you please explain 
about these procedures? 
8. Does the company have a department or manager that is specifically 
responsible for non-market strategies?  What was the situation behind the 
decision to make a special department?  How did others see it? 
9. In implementing its non-market strategy, does the company integrate it with 
the company’s market strategy?  Can you give me examples of this?  How 
does this impact the company? 
10. So, do you agree that the company has both social and political strategies? 
a. If the strategies have not yet been formalized, do you think in the 
future the company should formalize this?  
b. Why do you think so? 
11. In deciding both strategies (political and social strategies), how does the 
company see the influence of the industry organization? 
a. What about the company’s level, what are the procedures in deciding 
the strategies? 





Part 3: External Conditions 
Questions 
1. Does the fact that your company is a family business play a role in its 
relationship with stakeholders?  
a. What is the role of the owner? 
2. How does your company analyse its external environment? 
a. How did the company adapt with the institutional environment in 
Indonesia? 
b. What do you think about the political condition?  How does the 
company adjust with such changes?  Please provide examples. 
c. Does the changing political landscape affect the company?  What else 
can you remember about the situation? 
d. In terms of adapting to the political situation, does the company prefer 
active or passive approach?  
e. Does the company discuss the situation with other players in the same 
industry or just wait for the situation clear and then take an initiative 
to adapt with the situation? 
3. Do you think that personal intention to gain more political access from the 
owner plays an important role for the company in deciding its strategy? 
a. As a Director, how do you handle this situation?  How did others see 
it? 
4. Are the customers are considered in social and political strategies decision 
making process? 
a. Does the company get feedback from the customers?  
b. What kind of feedback did you get?  
c. How does the company get the feedback?  





5. Are there any specific issues that you want to discuss regarding the non-
market environment of the company?  Please expand. 
a. What eventually happened?  How did the company respond to the 
situation? 
6. Does the company have a business that is related to a government contract or 
sale?  Please explain. 
a. Can you think of another example of this? 
7. Kindly explain how the company won the government contract?  Do you 
know how many companies are involved in the bid?  
a. What else can you remember about that situation? 
8. Do you find it easy to get the government contract?  Why or why not?  Are 
you happy with the process in getting contracts? 
a. Compare this to what others have done, what do you think your 
company has done, similar or different from other companies? 
b. What else can you remember about that situation? 
c. What led you to do that? 
d. What was the outcome? 
9. Is the company ever involved in lobbying political parties or political actors 
for the sake of the company’s objectives? 
a. What eventually happened?  What did your supervisor/owner say / 
do? 
b. How did others see it? 
c. Is this typical for your company or is it typical for the industry, or 
even the country?  Kindly give me more details about what you did, 
please.  




e. What did other companies do in lobbying? 
f. What do you think about lobbying activities, and what was the 
financial impact to the company? 
10. Is the company ever donating to political parties or other organizations? 
a. What eventually happened?  What did your supervisor/owner say / 
do? 
b. How did others see it? 
c. Is this typical for your company or is it typical for the industry, or 
even the country?  Kindly give me more details about what you did, 
please. 
d. Is this typical in the industry? 
e. What was the financial impact to the company? 
11. What other contracts with the government or other third parties does the 
company have apart from what you have explained before?  Please expand. 
a. Can you think of another example of this? 
12. Can you think of other motives why the company needs to be involved in 
lobbying and political donations activities? 
a. Please provide examples. 
13. Has your company had any involvement by other stakeholder such as NGOs?  
Please explain the nature of this involvement.  How has this affected your 
non-market activities and strategies? 
a. How about social conditions and culture, does your company also 
consider this in deciding and implementing its programs?  Tell me 
more about that. 
b. How do you find NGOs and other social organizations in relation to 
the company? 




are there any barriers and challenges that the company still face in its effort 
towards further integration of social aspects of doing business? 
a. Does the company implement its CSR program by itself or involving 
others organization?  
b. What was the outcome?  What was the financial impact to the 
company? 
c. Does the company report its CSR programs? 
15. Can you explain about the company’s social activities? 
a. What are the main activities of the programs?  
b. Are there any specific targets from the activities? 





























Lack of human resource 
Lack of Support 




Experience in Non-Market 
Integrated strategies 
Market Advantage 
NO to Collective Action 
NO to Non-Market Strategy 
Non-Market Actions 
Bribe 
Businessman as Politician 
Hospitality 
Entertainment expense 
Higher Incentives  
Lobbying 
Meet the regulation 
Network 




Politician as Businessman 
Relationship With Officials 
Social Strategy 
Type of Strategy 
Passive Approach 
Proactive Approach 
Businessman as a politician 









Red Tape and Corruption 
Regulatory Efficiency 
Role of Business Association 
Social Condition 
Structural problem 





Importance of Non-Market Strategy 




Refuse to Work with Government 
Response to Environmental Demand 
Size of the firm 
Religious 
Social pressure 
Coping others 
 
 
